It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace

Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin

No 3947, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this Paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increase the probability of a peaceful resolution compared to a conflict between two non-democratic regimes.

Keywords: Democratic peace; Cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace (2004)
Working Paper: It takes two: an explanation of the democratic peace (2004)
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