Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agentsâ€™ signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small.

Keywords: Auctions; Incentive Compatibility; Mechanism Design; Interdependent Values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D44 D60 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2002-07-30, Revised 2003-04-13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Informational Size and Efficient Auctions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:03-011

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