Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

Martin Cripps, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson ()
Additional contact information
Larry Samuelson: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.

Keywords: Reputation; Imperfect Monitoring; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2002-07-30, Revised 2003-05-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/file ... ng-papers/03-016.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2010)
Journal Article: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2004)
Working Paper: Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:03-016

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 133 South 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Administrator ().