Debiasing preferences over redistribution: An experiment

Romain Espinosa, Bruno Deffains () and Christian Thöni
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Bruno Deffains: CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas

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Abstract: We study the manipulation of preferences over redistribution. Previous work showed that preferences over redistribution are malleable by the experience of success or failure in a preceding real-effort task. We manipulate the information subjects receive about the importance of chance relative to effort in determining success. We investigate the effect of this manipulation on (i) subjects' redistribution choices affecting third parties, and (ii) preferences for redistributive taxation. Our results show that informing the subjects about the relative importance of chance after the real-effort task does not mitigate the self-serving bias in redistribution choices. Only providing full information before the real-effort task prevents the emergence of the self-serving bias.

Keywords: Redistribution; Self-serving bias; Debiasing; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02614203
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, inPress, ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01265-z⟩

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Journal Article: Debiasing preferences over redistribution: an experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Debiasing preferences over redistribution: An experiment (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02614203

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01265-z

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