Debiasing preferences over redistribution: An experiment

Romain Espinosa, Bruno Deffains and Christian Thöni

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: We study the manipulation of preferences over redistribution. Previous work showed that preferences over redistribution are malleable by the experience of success or failure in a preceding real-effort task. We manipulate the information subjects receive about the importance of chance relative to effort in determining success. We investigate the effect of this manipulation on (i) subjects’ redistribution choices affecting third parties, and (ii) preferences for redistributive taxation. Our results show that informing the subjects about the relative importance of chance after the real-effort task does not mitigate the self-serving bias in redistribution choices. Only providing full information

Keywords: Redistribution; Self-serving bias; Debiasing; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pp.
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Debiasing preferences over redistribution: an experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Debiasing preferences over redistribution: An experiment (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:20.03

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