How Do Low-Income Enrollees in the Affordable Care Act Marketplaces Respond to Cost-Sharing?

Kurt Lavetti, Thomas DeLeire () and Nicolas Ziebarth ()

No 26430, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The ACA requires insurers to provide cost-sharing reductions (CSRs) to low-income consumers on the marketplaces. We link 2013-2015 All-Payer Claims Data to 2004-2013 administrative hospital discharge data from Utah and exploit policy-driven differences in the value of CSRs that are solely determined by income. We find that enrollees with lower cost sharing have higher levels of health care spending, controlling for past health care use. We estimate the demand elasticity of total health care spending to be -0.10, but find larger elasticities for emergency room care, lifestyle drugs, and low-value care. We also find positive cross-price elasticities between outpatient and inpatient care.

JEL-codes: H24 H41 H43 H51 I11 I18 J32 J33 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-pbe
Note: EH
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Kurt Lavetti & Thomas DeLeire & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2023. "How do low‐income enrollees in the Affordable Care Act marketplaces respond to cost‐sharing?," Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol 90(1), pages 155-183.

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Related works:
Journal Article: How do low‐income enrollees in the Affordable Care Act marketplaces respond to cost‐sharing? (2023)
Working Paper: How do low-income enrollees in the affordable care act marketplaces respond to cost sharing? (2023)
Working Paper: How Do Low-Income Enrollees in the Affordable Care Act Marketplaces Respond to Cost-Sharing? (2019)
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