Fair Wages Survive Multiple Sources of Income Inequality

No 130009, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: When an employee in a gift exchange game earns significantly less than the employer, the source of employer income does not affect effort choices. However, to induce one unit of effort, the employer has to pay higher wages than in a game without payoff inequality.

Keywords: Gift exchange; fair wage-effort hypothesis; reciprocity; inequity aversion; tit for tat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D31 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2013/2013_09.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fair wages survive multiple sources of income inequality (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:130009

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