[1] Austen-Smith, David, and William Riker 1987. Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation. American Political Science Review, 81:897-918.
[10] Farrell Joseph and Gibbons Robert, 1986. Cheap Talk with two Audiences, American Economic Review. Vol.79. No. 5. p. 1214-1223.
- [11] Gibbons, Robert. 1986. Learning Equilibrium Models of Arbitration, American Economic Review. Vol.78. No. 5. p. 896-912.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [12] Gilligan, Thomas W., Krehbiel, Keith. 1987. Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An informational Rational for Restrictive Amendments Procedures , Journal of Law, Economics ~ Organization, 3: ~?87-335. 29
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [13] Gilligan, Thomas W., Krehbiel, Keith. 1989. Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee, American Journal of Political Science, Vol 33. No. 2
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [14] Kolmogorov A.N., 1950. Foundations of the theory of probability, New York. Chelsea Publishing Company.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [15] Krehbiel, Keith, 1991. Information and legislative Organization. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[16] Krishna Vijay, Morgan John, 1999a. A model of Expertise. Mimeo.
- [17] Krishna Vijay, Morgan John, 1999b. Asymmetric Information and legislative Rules: Some Amendments. Mimeo
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [18] Londregan John, Snyder James,1994. Comparing Committee and Floor preferences , Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19(2): 233-267.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[19] Milgrom Paul and Roberts John, 1986. Relying on information of interested parties, Rand Journal of Economics. Vol 17. No. 1, p.18-32.
- [2] Austen Smith, David, 1991. Information acquisition and orthogonal argument, in Political economy: institutions competition and representation, proceedings of the seventh international symposium in economic theory and econometrics, eds. Barnet, William A., Melvin Hinich J. and Schofield Norman J.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [20] Plott, CR.,1966. A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. American Economic review, 57:787-806.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [21] Layer, Michael, Shepsle Kenneth A.(eds.), Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government, Cambridge University Press 1994.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- [22] Tirole Jean, 1992. Collusion and the theory of organization, in Advances in Economic Theory: Six World Congress. Volume 2. Econometric Society Monographs, No 21, Ed. Jean-Jacques Laffont. p. 151-20 30
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[3] Austen Smith, David, Interested experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, pp. :3-44.
- [4] Austen-Smith David, Banks Jeffrey, 1999. Positive Political Theory: Collective Preferences. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[5] Baliga Sandeep, 1999. Monitoring and Collusion with Soft Information. Journal of Law Economics and Organization; 15(2). p.434-440.
- [6] Bernheim B. Douglas, Peleg Bezalel, Whinston Michael D., 1987. Journal of Economic Theory. Vol.42. No.1. p.1-12
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
[7] Crawford P. Vincent, Sobel Joel, 1982. Strategic Information Transmission, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 6: 1431-1451.
[8] Diermeier Daniel, Feddersen Timothy J., 1998. Information and Congressional Hearings, mimeo.
[9] Epstein David, 1998. Partisan and Bipartisan Signalling in Congress, Journal of Law, Economics ~ Organization, v.14, n2: 183-204.