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On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinsteins game. (2016). Duman, Papatya ; Trockel, Walter.
In: jMID articles.
RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v1i1a3.

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Cited: 9

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Cocites: 22

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations received by this document

  1. Sixty-seven years of the Nash program: time for retirement?. (2021). Serrano, Roberto.
    In: SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association.
    RePEc:spr:series:v:12:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s13209-020-00221-5.

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  2. Socio-legal Systems and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Debreu-Hurwicz Equilibrium. (2021). Trockel, Walter ; Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Working Papers CIE.
    RePEc:pdn:ciepap:140.

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  3. Socio-legal Systems and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Debreu-Hurwicz Equilibrium. (2021). Trockel, Walter ; Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:647.

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  4. A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements. (2020). Vidal-Puga, Juan ; Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo.
    In: Review of Economic Design.
    RePEc:spr:reecde:v:24:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10058-020-00230-7.

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  5. Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Ha-Essential Equilibria. (2020). Trockel, Walter ; Duman, Papatya.
    In: Working Papers CIE.
    RePEc:pdn:ciepap:130.

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  6. Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash Program: Time for Retirement?. (2020). Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2020-20.

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  7. Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: $H_{\alpha}$ -Essential Equilibria. (2020). Duman, Papatya ; Trockel, Walter.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:632.

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  8. A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements. (2019). Vidal-Puga, Juan ; Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:97934.

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  9. A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements. (2017). Vidal-Puga, Juan ; Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:80424.

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References

References cited by this document

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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium. (2022). Trockel, Walter ; Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Review of Economic Design.
    RePEc:spr:reecde:v:26:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00278-z.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Sixty-seven years of the Nash program: time for retirement?. (2021). Serrano, Roberto.
    In: SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association.
    RePEc:spr:series:v:12:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s13209-020-00221-5.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions. (2020). Wakayama, Takuma ; Mizukami, Hideki.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:104:y:2020:i:c:p:60-67.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash Program: Time for Retirement?. (2020). Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2020-20.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory. (2017). .
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:322.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory. (2017). .
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:305.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinsteins game. (2016). Duman, Papatya ; Trockel, Walter.
    In: jMID articles.
    RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v1i1a3.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash Solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein’s game. (2016). Trockel, Walter ; Duman, Papatya.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:550.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs. (2016). Gamp, Jan-Philip ; Brangewitz, Sonja .
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:453.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution. (2011). Trockel, Walter.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:77-83.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution. (2011). Trockel, Walter.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:426.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules. (2011). Trockel, Walter ; Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:393.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. (2011). Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:366.

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  14. On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules. (2010). Trockel, Walter ; Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Review of Economic Design.
    RePEc:spr:reecde:v:14:y:2010:i:1:p:17-25.

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  15. Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games. (2010). Harrenstein, Paul ; Brandt, Felix.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:233-256.

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  16. Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core. (2009). Platt, Brennan.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:3:p:361-381.

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  17. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. (2009). Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:57:y:2009:i:2:p:177-187.

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  18. Nash implementation and the bargaining problem. (2007). Vartiainen, Hannu.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:2:p:333-351.

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  19. Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem. (2007). Duggan, John ; Kalandrakis, Tasos .
    In: Wallis Working Papers.
    RePEc:roc:wallis:wp49.

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  20. COPING WITH THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS: GAME STRUCTURE AND DESIGN OF RULES. (2005). Faysse, Nicolas .
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:cirad-01002167.

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  21. Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003. (2004). Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-20.

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  22. A crash course in implementation theory. (2001). Jackson, Matthew.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:655-708.

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