- `6An extensive empirical literature, summarized by Waite and Gallagher (2000), has documented a strong correlation between being married and better health, longer life, higher wages, greater wealth and better child outcomes.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Allen, D. W., 1992. Marriage and Divorce: Comment. American Economic Review 82 (3), 679685.
Alm, J., Dickert-Conlin, S., Whittington, L. A., 1999. Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty. Journal of Economic Perspectives 113 (3), 193-204.
Anderberg, D., 2007. Marriage, Divorce and Reciprocity-based Cooperation. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109 (1), 25-47.
Asdrubali, P., Sørensen, B. E., Yosha, 0., 1996. Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: The United States 1963-1990. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (4), 1081-1110.
Azariadis, C., 1975. Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria. Journal of Political Economy 83 (6), 1183-1202.
Becker, G. 5., 1973. A Theory of Marriage: Part I. Journal of Political Economy 81(4), 813-846.
Becker, G. 5., 1974. A Theory of Marriage: Part II. Journal of Political Economy 82 (2), SllS26.
Becker, G. S., Landes, E. M., Michael, R. T., 1977. An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability.
- Bennett, N. G., Bloom, D. E., Craig, P. H., 1989. The Divergence of Black and White Marriage Patterns. American Journal of Sociology 95 (3), 692-722.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Boot, A. W. A., 2000. Relationship Banking: What Do We Know? Journal of Financial Intermediation 9 (1), 7-25.
Brien, M. J., 1997. Racial Differences in Marriage and the Role of Marriage Markets. Journal of Human Resources 32 (4), 741-778.
Chami, R., Hess, G., 2005. For Better or For Worse? State-Level Marital Formation and Risk Sharing. Review of Economics of the Household 3 (4), 367-385.
Cochrane, J. H., 1991. A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance. Journal of Political Economy 99 (5), 957-976.
Demyanyk, Y., Ostergaard, C., Sørensen, B. E., 2007. U.S. john Banking Deregulation, Small Businesses, and Interstate Insurance of Personal Income. Journal of Finance 62 (6), 2763-2801.
Elliehausen, G. E., Lawrence, E. C., 1990. Discrimination in Consumer Lending. Review of Economics and Statistics 72 (1), 156-160.
Friedberg, L., 1998. Did Uniliteral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence From Panel Data. American Economic Review 88 (3), 608-627.
Halla, M., 2007. Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers. IZA Discussion Papers 2962, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
Hess, G. D., 2004. Marriage and Consumption Insurance: Whats Love Got to Do with It? Journal of Political Economy 112 (2), 290-318.
Hoffmann, M., Shcherbakova, I., 2007. Consumption Risk Sharing over the Business Cycle: The Role of Small Firms Access to Credit Markets. Unpublished manuscript, University of Zurich.
Hunter, W. C., Walker, M., 1996. The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage Lending Decisions. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 13 (1), 57-70.
- Kmenta, J., 1997. Elements of Econometrics, 2nd Edition. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Korniotis, G. M., Kumar, A., 2007. Investor Sophistication and Interstate Risk Sharing Using Financial Assets. Unpublished manuscript, University of Texas at Austin.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Kotlikoff, L. J., Spivak, A., 1981. The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market. Journal of Political Economy 89 (2), 372-391.
Ladd, H. F., 1982. Equal Credit Opportunity: Women and Mortgage Credit. American Economic Review 72 (2), 166-170.
Lewis, K. K., 1996. What Can Explain the Apparent Lack of International Consumption Risk Sharing. Journal of Political Economy 104 (2), 267-297.
Ligon, E., Thomas, J. P., Worrall, T., 2002. Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies. Review of Economic Studies 69 (1), 209-44.
Mace, B. J., 1991. Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty. Journal of Political Economy 99 (5), 928-956.
Matouschek, N., Rasul, I., 2008. The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence. Journal of Law and Economics 51(1), 59-lb.
Mechoulan, 5., 2006. Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family. Journal of Legal Studies 35 (1), 143-174.
Peters, E. H., 1986. Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting. American Economic Review 76 (3), 437-454.
Peters, E. H., 1992. Marriage and Divorce: A Reply. American Economic Review 82 (3), 686-693.
- Rasul, I., 2004. The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage. Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Rasul, I., 2006. Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 22 (1), 30-69.
Rosenzweig, M. R., 1988. Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-Income Countries. Economic Journal 98 (393), 1148-1170.
Rosenzweig, M. R., Stark, 0., 1989. Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage: Evidence from Rural India. Journal of Political Economy 97 (4), 905-926.
Rosenzweig, M. R., Wolpin, K. I., 1985. Specific Experience, Household Structure and Intergenerational Transfers: Farm Family Land and Labor Arrangements in Developing Countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (Supplement), 961-987.
Rosenzweig, M. R., Wolpin, K. I., 1994. Parental and Public Transfers to Young Women and their Children. American Economic Review 84 (5), 1195-4212.
Smith, J. F., 1977. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: A Cost/Benefit Analysis. Journal of Finance 32 (2), 609-622.
- Soloveichik, R. H., 2007. In Sickness or in Health? Divorce Law and Health Care Usage. Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Stevenson, B., 2007. The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital. Journal of Labor Economics 25 (1), 75-94.
Stevenson, B., Wolfers, J., 2007a. Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2), 27-52.
- Stevenson, B., Wolfers, J., 2007b. Trends in Marital Stability. Unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Waite, L. J., Gallagher, M., 2000. The Case for Marriage: Why Married People Are Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially. Broadway, New York, NY.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Weiss, Y., 1993. The Formation and Dissolution of Families: Why Marry? Who Marries Whom? and What Happens Upon Marriage and Divorce. In: anb Oded Stark, M. R. R. (Ed.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics. Vol. 1A. Elsevier, Ch. 3, pp. 81-123.
- Weitzman, L. J., 1985. The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America. Free Press, New York.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Wolfers, J., 2006. Did Uniliteral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results. American Economic Review 96 (5), 1802-1820.