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Environmental transition through social change and lobbying by citizens. (2023). Vauday, Julien ; Gatti, Donatella.
In: CEPN Working Papers.
RePEc:hal:cepnwp:hal-04158754.

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Cited: 3

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Cites: 27

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Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Unpacking the green box: Determinants of Environmental Policy Stringency in European countries. (2023). Serranito, Francisco ; del Lo, Gaye ; Gatti, Donatella.
    In: CEPN Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:cepnwp:hal-04188866.

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  2. Unpacking the green box: Determinants of Environmental Policy Stringency in European countries. (2023). Serranito, Francisco ; Lo, Gaye-Del ; Gatti, Donatella.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fae:wpaper:2023.07.

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  3. Unpacking the green box: Determinants of Environmental Policy Stringency in European countries. (2023). Lo, Gaye-Del ; Gatti, Donatella ; Serranito, Francisco.
    In: EconomiX Working Papers.
    RePEc:drm:wpaper:2023-25.

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References

References cited by this document

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  12. Gatti, D., G.-D. Lo, and F. Serranito (2023). Unpacking the green box: Determinants of environmental policy stringency in european countries. FAERE Working Papers.

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  23. Redoano, M. (2010). Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies? Journal of Public Economic Theory 12(3), 407—435.
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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. When are Private Standards more Stringent than Public Standards?. (2013). Vandemoortele, Thijs ; Deconinck, Koen.
    In: LICOS Discussion Papers.
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  2. Competition for procurement shares. (2011). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  3. Allocations and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions under Complete Information with Symmetric Bidders. (2010). Larue, Bruno ; Jeddy, Mohamed .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
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  4. Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice. (2008). Albertin, Giorgia.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2008/065.

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  5. Putting the Lid on Lobbying: Tariff Structure and Long-Term Growth when Protection is for Sale. (2006). Trefler, Daniel ; Nunn, Nathan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  6. Bargaining with a Bureaucrat. (2006). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Tauman, Yair.
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  7. Bargaining with a Bureaucrat. (2006). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Tauman, Yair.
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  8. The Political Economy of Investor Protection. (2006). Tommasino, Pietro.
    In: Temi di discussione (Economic working papers).
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  9. Let Them Burn Money: Making Elections More Informative. (2005). Campbell, Colin.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
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  10. Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing. (2005). Willmann, Gerald ; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes ; Facchini, Giovanni.
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  11. The logic of two-level games with endogenous lobbying : the case of international environmental agreements.. (2005). Haffoudhi, Houda .
    In: Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques.
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  12. Cross-Border Political Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs. (2005). Endoh, Masahiro.
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  13. Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing. (2005). Willmann, Gerald ; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes ; Facchini, Giovanni.
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  14. When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy. (2005). Bellettini, Giorgio ; Berti Ceroni, Carlotta.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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  15. Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector. (2004). Falaschetti, Dino.
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  16. Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector. (2004). Falaschetti, Dino.
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  18. A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics. (2004). Lehmann, Etienne ; Dharmapala, Dhammika.
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  19. Political Pressure Deflection. (2004). Zanardi, Maurizio ; Anderson, James.
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  20. Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing. (2003). Willmann, Gerald ; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes ; Facchini, Giovanni.
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  21. Why Legislators are Protectionists: The Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs. (2003). Willmann, Gerald.
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  23. Voter Turnout, Regulatory Commitment, and Capital Accumulation: Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector. (2003). .
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  24. Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U. S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry. (2003). Duso, Tomaso ; Jung, Astrid .
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  47. Exclusive Dealing. (1996). Whinston, Michael ; Bernheim, B. Douglas.
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  49. An Economic Model of Representative Democracy. (1995). Coate, Stephen ; Besley, Timothy.
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  50. Foreign Investment with Endogenous Protection. (1994). Helpman, Elhanan ; Grossman, Gene.
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