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Goals and Rules in Central Bank Design. (2015). Walsh, Carl.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5293.

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  1. Evaluating Monetary Policy with Inflation Bands and Horizons. (2023). Foerster, Andrew ; Davig, Troy.
    In: FRBSF Economic Letter.
    RePEc:fip:fedfel:95687.

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  2. Communicating Monetary Policy Rules. (2023). Foerster, Andrew ; Davig, Troy.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:151:y:2023:i:c:s0014292122001763.

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  3. Inflation targeting and exchange rate pass-through in India: Lessons from international experience. (2023). Baig, Mirza Allim ; Peer, Arshid Hussain.
    In: Theoretical and Applied Economics.
    RePEc:agr:journl:v:1(634):y:2023:i:1(634):p:239-254.

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  4. Inflation-Forecast Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?. (2022). Pinshi, Christian P.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:111709.

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  5. Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, and Daniel J. Smith: Money and the rule of law: generality and predictability in monetary institutions. (2022). Walsh, Carl E.
    In: Business Economics.
    RePEc:pal:buseco:v:57:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1057_s11369-021-00244-1.

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  6. Instrument-Based versus Target-Based Rules. (2022). Yared, Pierre ; Halac, Marina.
    In: Review of Economic Studies.
    RePEc:oup:restud:v:89:y:2022:i:1:p:312-345..

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  7. Ciblage des prévisions dinflation : Un nouveau cadre pour la politique monétaire ?. (2022). Pinshi, Christian.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03548273.

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  8. Communicating Monetary Policy Rules. (2021). Foerster, Andrew ; Davig, Troy.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedfwp:90935.

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  9. Central bank losses and monetary policy rules: A DSGE investigation. (2019). Benchimol, Jonathan ; Fourans, Andre.
    In: International Review of Economics & Finance.
    RePEc:eee:reveco:v:61:y:2019:i:c:p:289-303.

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  10. What Rule for the Federal Reserve? Forecast Targeting. (2019). , Lars.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13949.

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  11. Estimating the Taylor Rule in the Time-Frequency Domain. (2018). Martins, Manuel ; Aguiar-Conraria, Luís ; Soares, Maria Joana ; Manuel, .
    In: NIPE Working Papers.
    RePEc:nip:nipewp:04/2018.

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  12. Estimating the Taylor rule in the time-frequency domain. (2018). Martins, Manuel ; Aguiar-Conraria, Luís ; Soares, Maria Joana.
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:57:y:2018:i:c:p:122-137.

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  13. Communicating Monetary Policy Rules. (2017). Foerster, Andrew ; Davig, Troy.
    In: 2017 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed017:1133.

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  14. Forward Guidance, Pros, Cons and Credibility. (2017). Ryczkowski, Maciej.
    In: Prague Economic Papers.
    RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2017:y:2017:i:5:id:631:p:523-541.

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  15. Communicating Monetary Policy Rules. (2017). Foerster, Andrew ; Davig, Troy.
    In: Research Working Paper.
    RePEc:fip:fedkrw:rwp17-04.

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  16. Monetary Rule, Central Bank Loss and Household’s Welfare: an Empirical Investigation. (2017). Fourcans, Andre ; Benchimol, Jonathan ; Fourans, Andre.
    In: Globalization Institute Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:feddgw:329.

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  17. Rules versus Human Beings, and the Mandate of the ECB. (2016). Fratzscher, Marcel.
    In: EconStor Open Access Articles.
    RePEc:zbw:espost:157540.

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  18. Forward Guidance, Pros, Cons and Credibility. (). Ryczkowski, Maciej.
    In: Prague Economic Papers.
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