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Credibility costs in the monetary integration game. (2003). Vranceanu, Radu ; Besancenot, Damien.
In: The Economics of Transition.
RePEc:bla:etrans:v:11:y:2003:i:4:p:727-741.

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Cites: 18

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Cocites: 23

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Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Exchange rate dynamics in a Taylor rule framework. (2017). Yao, Shujie ; Chen, Chuanglian ; Ou, Jinghua .
    In: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money.
    RePEc:eee:intfin:v:46:y:2017:i:c:p:158-173.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Adrian, T. and Gros, D. (1999). ‘A stochastic model of self‐fulfilling crises in fixed exchange rate systems’, International Journal of Finance and Economics, 4, pp. 129–46. .
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  2. Agénor, P.‐R. and Masson, P. R. (1999). ‘Credibility, reputation and the Mexican Peso crisis’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 31(1), pp. 70–84. .

  3. Andersen, T. M. and Risager, O. (1988). ‘Stabilization policies, credibility, and interest rate determination in a small open economy’, European Economic Review, 32, pp. 669–79. .

  4. Backus, D. and Driffill, J. (1985). ‘Inflation and reputation’, American Economic Review, 75(3), pp. 530–38. .

  5. Barro, R. J. (1986). ‘Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 17(1), pp. 3–20. .

  6. Barro, R. J. and Gordon, D. B. (1983). ‘Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(1), pp. 101–21. .

  7. Besancenot, D. and Vranceanu, R. (2000). ‘Macroeconomic implications of voucher privatisation in a model with incomplete information’, Policy Reform, 4(4), pp. 147–64. .

  8. Cukierman, A. and Meltzer, A. H. (1986). ‘A theory of ambiguity, credibility and inflation under discretion and assymetric information’, Econometrica, 54(5), pp. 1099–1128. .

  9. Drazen, A. and Masson, P. R. (1994). ‘Credibility of policies versus credibility of policymakers’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, pp. 735–54. .

  10. Fleming, M. J. (1962). ‘Domestic financial policies under fixed and under floating exchange rates’, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 9(4), pp. 369–80. .
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  11. Froot, K. A. and Rogoff, K. (1991). ‘The EMS, the EMU, and the transition to a common currency’, NBER 1991 Macroeconomic Annuals, pp. 269–317. .
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  12. Kreps, D. M. and Wilson, R. (1982). ‘Reputation and imperfect information’, Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), pp. 253–79. .

  13. Lucas, R. E. (1973). ‘Some international evidence on the output‐inflation trade‐offs’, American Economic Review, 63, pp. 326–34. .

  14. Masson, P. R. (1995). ‘Gaining and losing ERM credibility: The case of the United Kingdom’, The Economic Journal, 105, pp. 571–82. .

  15. Mundell, R. A. (1963). ‘Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates’, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 29(4), pp. 475–85. .
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  16. Obstfeld, M. and Rogoff, K. (1996). Foundations of International Macroeconomics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. .

  17. Velasco, A. (1996). ‘Fixed exchange rates: Credibility, flexibility and multiplicity’, European Economic Review, 40, pp. 1023–1035. .

  18. Vickers, J. (1986). ‘Signaling in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information’, Oxford Economic Papers, 38(3), pp. 443–55. .

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Analyzing Poverty Impact of Trade Liberalization Policies in CGE Models: Theory and Some Policy Experiments in Agricultural and Non-agricultural Sectors in South Asia. (2008). Khan, Haider.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:7609.

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  2. Social Accounting Matrices(SAMs) and CGE Modeling:Using Macroeconomic Computable General Equilibrium Models for Assessing Poverty Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies. (2007). Khan, Haider.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
    RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf463.

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  3. Trade Liberalization and Poverty Reduction in General Equilibrium: The Role of Labor Market Structure. (2007). Khan, Haider.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
    RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf462.

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  4. Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime. (2004). Hefeker, Carsten.
    In: HWWA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:298.

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  5. Monetary secrecy and selective disclosure: The emerging market case of Mexicos monetary reporting. (2004). Saunders, Anthony ; Wilson, Berry .
    In: Review of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:wly:revfec:v:13:y:2004:i:1-2:p:199-210.

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  6. The role of policy rules in inflation targeting. (2004). Kuttner, Kenneth.
    In: Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2004:i:jul:p:89-112:n:v.86no.4.

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  7. Monetary secrecy and selective disclosure: The emerging market case of Mexicos monetary reporting. (2004). Saunders, Anthony ; Wilson, Berry .
    In: Review of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:revfin:v:13:y:2004:i:1-2:p:199-210.

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  8. Economic fundamentals and self-fulfilling crises: further evidence from Mexico. (2004). Robinson, Wayne ; Bratsiotis, George.
    In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:23:y:2004:i:4:p:595-613.

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  9. Credibility and Duration in Target Zones: Evidence from the EMS. (2003). Sosvilla-Rivero, Simon ; Perez-Bermejo, Francisco .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2003-19.

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  10. Multiple equilibria and currency crisis: evidence for Korea. (2003). Ratti, Ronald ; Seo, Jeonghee.
    In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:22:y:2003:i:5:p:681-696.

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  11. The Regime‐Dependent Determination of Credibility: A New Look at European Interest Rate Differentials. (2003). Tillmann, Peter.
    In: German Economic Review.
    RePEc:bla:germec:v:4:y:2003:i:4:p:409-431.

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  12. Credibility costs in the monetary integration game. (2003). Vranceanu, Radu ; Besancenot, Damien.
    In: The Economics of Transition.
    RePEc:bla:etrans:v:11:y:2003:i:4:p:727-741.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. The demand for money by private firms in a regulated economy: Theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence for Germany 1960 - 1998. (2002). Sell, Friedrich L. ; Bohl, Martin T..
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20023.

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  14. Economic Fundamentals and Self-Fulfilling Crises: Some Evidence from Mexico. (2002). Robinson, Wayne ; Bratsiotis, George.
    In: Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:man:cgbcrp:23.

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  15. Credibility and Reputation: An Application of the External Circumstances Model for the Real Plan. (2002). Portugal, Marcelo S. ; Tejada, Cesar A. O., ; Tejada, Cesar A. O., .
    In: Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE.
    RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:56:y:2002:i:4:a:827.

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  16. Monetary Policy under Flexible Exchange Rates: An Introduction to Inflation Targeting. (2002). Agenor, Pierre-Richard.
    In: Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series.
    RePEc:chb:bcchsb:v05c03pp079-170.

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  17. A Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choice in the Transitional Economies of Central and Eastern Europe. (2001). Klyuev, Vladimir.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2001/140.

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  18. Monetary Policy Under Flexible Exchange Rates: an Introduction to Inflation Targeting. (2001). Agénor, Pierre-Richard.
    In: Working Papers Central Bank of Chile.
    RePEc:chb:bcchwp:124.

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  19. Monetary policy under flexible exchange rates - an introduction to inflation targeting. (2000). Agénor, Pierre-Richard.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2511.

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  20. Reflections on the South African rand crisis of 1996 and policy consequences. (1999). El Badawi, Ibrahim ; Aron, Janine ; Elbadawi, Ibrahim.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:wps/1999-13.

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  21. Multiple equilibria, contagion, and the emerging market crises. (1999). Masson, Paul.
    In: Proceedings.
    RePEc:fip:fedfpr:y:1999:i:sep:x:6.

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  22. Reflections on the South African rand crisis of 1996 and its consequences. (1999). Aron, Janine ; El Badawi, Ibrahim ; Elbadawi, Ibrahim.
    In: CSAE Working Paper Series.
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  23. The Mexican peso crisis. (1996). Joseph A. Whitt, Jr., .
    In: Economic Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedaer:y:1996:i:jan:p:1-20:n:v.80no.1.

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Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

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CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.