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Institutions and the Environment: Existing Evidence and Future Directions. (2016). Dasgupta, Shouro ; DeCian, Enrica ; de Cian, Enrica.
In: MITP: Mitigation, Innovation and Transformation Pathways.
RePEc:ags:feemmi:240747.

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  108. Masini and Menichetti (2013). Investment Decisions in the Renewable Energy Sector: an Analysis of Non-Financial Drivers. Renewable energy share in the investment portfolio Institutional pressure from industry peers, consultants, and published technical information Cross-section OLS and logistic regression. Survey data from 93 investors in Europe Institutional pressure of both peers and outside consultants has a strong negative impact on portfolio - forces them to concentrate investments on a few specific technologies.

  109. Meon, P.-G. and Sekkat, K. (2005) “Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth.” Public Choice. Vol. 122: 69-97.

  110. Methane and CFC Democracy (Gastil, 1987) 2SLS and Cross-section Logit 118 countries Democratic regimes produce more methane in total but significantly less per unit of national output.
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  111. Meyer et al. (2003). Institutional, social and economic roots of deforestation: a cross-country comparison. Rate of deforestation Control of corruption Cross-section OLS 99-115 countries Improved control of corruption reduces rate of deforestation.
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  114. Meyer, A.L., G.C. van Kooten and S. Wang, 2003. Institutional, Social and Economic Roots of Deforestation: Further Evidence of an Environmental Kuznets Relation? International Forestry Review 5(1 March): 29-37.
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  115. Midlarsky, M. (1998). ‘Democracy and the environment: an empirical assessment”. Journal of Peace Research 35 (special issue on environmental conflict): 341-361.

  116. Murdoch, J. and T. Sandler (1997). “The voluntary provision of a public good. The case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal protocol”. Journal of Public Economics 63: 331-349.

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  120. National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy? Policy Index: commitment to mitigation process Policy outcomes: in terms of emission levels and trends Democracy Panel regression 185 countries 1990–2004 Effect of democracy on commitment to global public goods provision is positive while effect of democracy on policy outcomes are ambiguous.
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  121. Neumayer (2002). Do democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment? A cross-country analysis.

  122. Neumayer (2002). Do democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment? A cross-country analysis. Percentage of their land area under protections status Combined index of political rights and civil (Freedom House,), combined index of democracy and autocracy (Polity IV), Vanhanen’s index of democracy, and Voice and accountability (WB) Cross-section OLS 206 countries Democracies and countries with higher Freedom Index put greater percentage of their land area under protections status.
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  123. Neumayer (2003). Are left-wing party strength and corporatism good for the environment? Evidence from panel analysis of air pollution in OECD countries.

  124. Neumayer, E. (2002). “Do democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment? A cross country analysis”. Journal of Peace Research 39 (2): 139-164.
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  126. Number of fires Corruption (TI) Non-parametric sign test and OLS 37 countries 2002-2004 Reserves are least effective at reducing fire frequency in many poorer countries and in countries beset by corruption.
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  129. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2011). Corruption, Democracy, and Environmental Policy: An Empirical Contribution to the Debate Environmental Protection Stringency (Eliste and Fredriksson, 2002) and Environmental Regulatory Regime Index (Esty and Porter, 2002) Corruption (TI), Democracy (Polity IV), and Index of democracy (Vanhanen, 2000) Cross-section OLS 51-62 countries Effect on environmental policy stringency is negative for corruption but no evidence significant effect of democracy.
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  133. Probability of Kyoto protocol ratification Government units, environmental lobby, democracy (Freedom House), Logit and stratified hazard model 170 countries 1998-2002 Greater environmental lobby strength raises the probability of ratification but greater number of government unites reduce the impact of agreements.
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  134. Rate of deforestation Corruption (TI, BI, and ICRG) WLS 100 countries 1980-90, 1990-95, 19902000 Corruption increases rate of deforestation.
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  135. Regulation of lead content in gasoline Environmental lobby; Democratic participation; and Democratic competition Cross-section OLS, 2SLS, Tobit 104 countries, 1993, 1996, and 2000 Greater political competition and number of environmental groups raises the stringency of environmental policies. However, democratic participation affects environmental policy stringency only in countries with sufficiently high degree of political competition.
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  138. Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X. (2002), “15 Years of New Growth Economics: What Have We Learnt?” Central Bank of Chile Working Paper, 172, 2 Scott, W. R. (1995). Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests and Identities. Publisher: Sage Scruggs, L., and Rivera, C. (2008). Political regimes, democratic institutions and environmental sustainability: A cross-national analysis. In Proceedings of the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting in Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA (Vol.

  139. Scruggs and Rivera (2008). Political Regimes, Democratic Institutions and Environmental Sustainability: A Cross-national analysis. Carbon monoxide, biochemical oxygen demand, SO2, NO2, CO2, CH4, protected areas, and forest land Democracy (Freedom House and Polity IV) Cross-section OLS 169 countries, No evidence that long-established democratic countries perform better.
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  140. Sector specific energy policy stringency Corruption (TI), worker influence, and lobbying Panel OLS 12 OECD countries (11 sectors) 1982–1996 Corruption increases energy waste by reducing stringency of energy regulations. Worker lobby is relatively influential in those sectors in which the capital owners have relatively minor impact, and vice versa.
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  141. Shandra (2007). Economic dependency, repression, and deforestation: A quantitative, cross-national analysis.
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  142. Signature of Vienna and Montreal Protocol on CFC Democracy (Gastil, 1987) Cross-section Logit 118 countries Authoritarian regimes enact less stringent environmental standards than democratic regimes. Liberal democracies are more willing to regulate environmental effluents and international agreements on environmental matters attract more signatories as the number of democratic regimes increases.
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  143. Signing and ratification of multilateral environmental agreements; membership in environmental intergovernmental organizations; reporting requirements for the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora; percentage of a country’s land area under protection; existence of a National Council on Sustainable Development; and availability of environmental information Democracy (Freedom House, Polity IV, Vanhanen’s Index, and Voice and Accountability - WB) Cross-section Probit and OLS 100-175 countries, around the year 2000 Democracies sign and ratify more multilateral environmental agreements, participate in more environmental intergovernmental organizations, comply better with reporting requirements under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora.
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  146. Stavins, R. N. (2004). Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations. RFF Discussion Paper 04–12.

  147. Sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide Corruption (ICRG) Instrumental Variable RE 94 countries 1987–2000 Corruption is estimated to have a positive direct impact on per capita emissions. Indirect effects are found to be negative and larger in absolute value than direct effects for the majority of the sample income range.
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  148. Sulphur dioxide; nitrogen dioxide; carbon monoxide; carbon dioxide Left-wing party strength (the share of green/left-libertarian party seats as a percentage of all seats, the share of traditional left-wing party seats, and the share of cabinet portfolios of left-wing parties -Comparative Parties Data Set of Swank, 2002) FE/RE regression 21 OECD countries, 1980, 1990 and 1999 Green or left-libertarian parliamentary strength is associated with lower levels for all five air pollutants. Traditional left-wing party strength is possibly also associated with lower pollution levels, but the evidence is less consistent and robust.
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  149. Sulphur emissions Corruption and law and order (ICRG) ML with FE and SUR 39 European countries 1999-2003 Decline in corruption and improvements in law and order reduces sulphur emissions. Actual emission levels in countries with more effective regulations are likely to be lower.
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  153. Tebaldi, E. and Elmslie, B. (2008). Institutions, innovation and economic growth. Journal of Economic Development, 33(2): 1-27.

  154. Tebaldi, E., and Elmslie, B. (2013), ‘Does institutional quality impact innovation? Evidence from cross-country patent grant data’, Applied Economics, Vol. 45, pp. 887-900.

  155. The participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty: a spatial probit analysis Helsinki protocol ratification and sulfur emissions (1990 levels minus 1980 levels) Democracy proxy - civil and political freedom Gastil (1989) Two-stage game and spatial probit 25 European countries Democracy reduces probability of protocol ratification.
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  44. Regional policy makers and adult learning: a methodological framework. (2014). Testa, Giuseppina.
    In: QUADERNI DI ECONOMIA DEL LAVORO.
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  45. Governance, Growth and the Recent Economic Crisis: The Case of Greece and Cyprus. (2014). Rapanos, Vassilis ; Kaplanoglou, Georgia .
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    RePEc:erc:cypepr:v:8:y:2014:i:1:p:3-34.

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  46. Ethnic conflict, power dynamics and growth. (2013). Pecher, Pierre.
    In: Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales).
    RePEc:ctl:louvir:2014008.

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  47. From Political to Economic Awakening in the Arab World : The Path of Economic Integration - Deauville Partnership Report on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, Volume 1. Overview Report. (2012). Bank, World.
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  48. Total Public Debt and Growth in Developing Countries. (2012). Presbitero, Andrea.
    In: The European Journal of Development Research.
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  49. The Economic History of European Growth. (2011). Barbezat, Daniel .
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  50. Total Public Debt and Growth in Developing Countries. (2010). Presbitero, Andrea.
    In: Development Working Papers.
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