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An Information Theoretic Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance. (1998). Aoki, Masahiko .
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:wop:stanec:99004.

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Cited: 5

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Cites: 17

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Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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  1. Grounding a Theory of Firms in the Natural Sciences. (2017). Turnbull, Shann.
    In: Humanistic Management Journal.
    RePEc:spr:humman:v:1:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s41463-016-0017-z.

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  2. Financial systems, innovation and economic performance. (2002). Block, Thorsten H..
    In: Research Memorandum.
    RePEc:unm:umamer:2002013.

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  3. Variation sur le thème A la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance dentreprise. (2002). Charreaux, Gerard.
    In: Working Papers CREGO.
    RePEc:dij:wpfarg:011201.

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  4. Variation sur le thème:À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance dentreprise. (2002). Charreaux, Gerard.
    In: Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.
    RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:5:y:2002:i:q3:p:5-68.

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  5. Corporate Governance and the Governance of Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceutical Industry. (2001). Lacetera, Nicola.
    In: Journal of Management & Governance.
    RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:5:y:2001:i:1:p:29-59.

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References

References cited by this document

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  4. Aoki, M. and S. Dinc (1997), Relational Financing as an Institution and its Viability Under Competition, http://www-econ. stanford. edu/econ/ workp/ 97-011.

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  9. Hansmann,H.(1996), The Ownership of Enterprise, Harvard University Press.
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  11. Hellmann, T. (1995), The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, Rand Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
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  17. Saxenian, A. (1984), Regional Advantage, Harvard University Press.
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Cocites

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  2. Banks versus venture capital when the venture capitalist values private benefits of control. (2010). Inci, Eren ; Barlo, Mehmet.
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  3. Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority. (2010). Englmaier, Florian ; Filipi, Ales ; Singh, Ravi .
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  4. Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes. (2008). Guriev, Sergei ; Bhattacharya, Sudipto.
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  5. You cant make an omelette without breaking eggs: the impact of venture capitalists on executive turnover. (2007). Heger, Diana ; Tykvova, Tereza.
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  6. The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?. (2007). Weill, Laurent ; BLAZY, Régis.
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  8. When Should Control Be Shared?. (2007). Milgrom, Paul ; Singh, Ravi .
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  9. Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts. (2006). Muehlheusser, Gerd.
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  13. Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights. (2005). Bester, Helmut.
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  19. Financial constraints and capacity adjustment in the United Kingdom: evidence from a large panel of survey data. (2005). von Kalckreuth, Ulf ; Murphy, Emma .
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  27. Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics. (2002). Matthews, Steven ; Legros, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias.
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  44. An Information Theoretic Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance. (1998). Aoki, Masahiko .
    In: Working Papers.
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