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on Insurance Economics |
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Issue of 2017‒09‒24
five papers chosen by Soumitra K. Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management |
| By: | Canta, Chiara; Cremer, Helmuth |
| Abstract: | We study the design of long-term care (LTC) policy when children differ in their cost of providing informal care. Parents do not observe this cost, but they can commit to a "bequests rule" specifying a transfer conditional on the level of informal care. Care provided by high-cost children is distorted downwards in order to minimize the rent of low-cost ones. Social LTC insurance is designed to maximize a weighted sum of parents' and children's utility. The optimal uniform public LTC provision strikes a balance between insurance and children's utility. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion less than full insurance is provided to mitigate the distortion on informal care which reduces children's rents. A nonuniform policy conditioning LTC benefits on bequests provides full insurance even against the risk of having children with a high cost of providing care. Quite surprisingly the level of informal care induced by the optimal (uniform or nonuniform) policy always increases in the children's' welfare weight. |
| Keywords: | Long-term care; informal care; strategic bequests; asymmetric information |
| JEL: | H2 H5 I13 J14 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:31970&r=ias |
| By: | Melanie Au; Claire Postman; James Verdier |
| Abstract: | This brief explores the experience of six states that have achieved varying levels of behavioral health and physical health integration or coordination for dually eligible beneficiaries in a managed care environment. |
| Keywords: | behavioral, physical health, integration, dually eligible |
| JEL: | I J |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:489cf24678c04f08bb52c996a70dc800&r=ias |
| By: | Cahuc, Pierre; Nevoux, Sandra |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that the reforms which expanded short-time work in France after the great 2008-2009 recession were largely to the benefit of large firms which are recurrent short-time work users. We argue that this expansion of short-time work is an inefficient way to provide insurance to workers, as it entails cross-subsidies which reduce aggregate production. An efficient policy should provide unemployment insurance benefits funded by experience rated employers' contributions instead of short-time work benefits. We find that short-time work entails significant production losses compared to an unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating. |
| Keywords: | experience rating; Short-time work; Unemployment insurance |
| JEL: | J63 J65 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12269&r=ias |
| By: | Christopher J. O'Leary (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research) |
| Abstract: | Research in the 1970s based on observational data provided evidence consistent with predictions from economic theory that paying unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to involuntarily jobless workers prolongs unemployment. However, some scholars also reported estimates that the additional time spent in subsidized job search was productive. That is, UI receipt tended to raise reemployment wages after work search among the unemployed. A series of field experiments in the 1980s investigated positive incentives to overcome the work disincentive effects of UI. These were followed by experiments in the 1990s that evaluated the effects of restrictions on UI eligibility through stronger work search requirements and alternative uses of UI. The new century has seen some related field experiments in employment policy, and reexamination of the earlier experimental results. This paper reviews the experimental evidence and considers it in the context of the current federal-state UI system. |
| Keywords: | field experiments, public employment policy, unemployment insurance, UI, employment service, ES, job search assistance, JSA, targeting employment services, profiling, WPRS, self-employment, short-time compensation, work sharing |
| JEL: | J65 J68 J48 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upj:weupjo:17-279&r=ias |
| By: | Jody Beauchamp; Valerie Cheh; Robert Schmitz; Peter Kemper; John Hall |
| Abstract: | PACE is a Medicare managed care benefit intended to prolong the independence and enhance the quality of life of frail beneficiaries by providing solutions to the service delivery problems encountered by those who remain living in the community. |
| Keywords: | PACE , Care for the Elderly , Quality of Care |
| JEL: | I |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:b15f567862b840d9ac9bac681301d1d4&r=ias |