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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Ellul, Andrew; Pagano, Marco; Scognamiglio, Annalisa |
| Abstract: | Employees in finance are known to earn higher wages and returns to talent than non-finance workers since the 1990s, suggesting that finance may have attracted talent at the expense of other industries. However, the allocation of talent is likely to respond to differences in career paths across industries, not in wages at a given date. We analyze the careers of 9,964 individuals from 1980 to 2017 based on their resumes, and find that they tend to remain in the same industry for most of their working lives, consistently with them choosing occupations based on comparisons of entire career paths. Comparing various aspects of careers - levels, slopes, PDV and risk of pay profiles - we document that finance as a whole offers a career premium compared to manufacturing and high tech, through higher and steeper pay pro files. This however masks significant diversity within finance: while asset managers enjoy a large career premium and no commensurate career risks, the opposite applies to banking and insurance employees. Furthermore, relative to manufacturing, the asset management career premium has risen for cohorts entering soon before and during the financial crisis, even after controlling for career risk, while the high-tech career premium has become commensurately large for the latest cohorts. |
| Keywords: | asset managers; careers; Hedge Funds; market discipline; scarring effects |
| JEL: | G20 G23 J24 J62 J63 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14767&r=all |
| By: | Fischer, Mira; Rilke, Rainer Michael (WHU Vallendar); Yurtoglu, B. Burcin (WHU Vallendar) |
| Abstract: | We analyze how the team formation process influences the ability composition and performance of teams, showing how self-selection and random assignment affect team performance for different tasks in two natural field experiments. We identify the collaboration intensity of the task as the key driver of the effect of self-selection on team performance. We find that when the task requires low collaborative efforts, the team performance of self-selected teams is significantly inferior to that of randomly assigned teams. When the task involves more collaborative efforts, self-selected teams tend to outperform randomly assigned teams. We observe assortative matching in self-selected teams, with subjects more likely to match with those of similar ability and the same gender. |
| Keywords: | team performance, self-selection, field experiment, education |
| JEL: | I21 M54 C93 |
| Date: | 2020–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13201&r=all |
| By: | Minnich, Aljoscha; Rau, Holger A.; Schlüter, Jan |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes in a large-scale field experiment (N = 2,980) the incentive effects of monetary vs. non-monetary incentives on the usage of a sustainable Demand Responsive Transport (DRT) system. Financial incentives were implemented by offering customers vouchers, which were received when they reached a certain threshold of rides with the DRT service (EcoBus). In the non-financial incentive treatment, we applied the same thresholds. In this case, we exploited the sustainable character of the EcoBus and offered environmental certificates which documented the saved level of carbon dioxide because of the bus usage. The data show strong support that financial incentives excellently work to increase the demand for a sustainable transport service. EcoBus rides nearly doubled during the intervention phase. Interestingly, non-financial incentives also have a positive effect on the demand for the bus service. However, the effect is attenuated at the end of the treatment phase. Thus, financial incentives outperform non-financial incentives. |
| Keywords: | Demand Responsive Transport,Field Experiment,Incentive Effects |
| JEL: | C93 D12 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:394&r=all |
| By: | Matthias Stefan (University of Innsbruck); Jürgen Huber (University of Innsbruck); Michael Kirchler (University of Innsbruck); Matthias Sutter; Markus Walzl (University of Innsbruck; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed. |
| Keywords: | multi-tasking decision problem, rank incentives, framed field experiment, finance professionals |
| JEL: | C93 D02 D91 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_10&r=all |
| By: | Woodcock, Simon D. (Simon Fraser University) |
| Abstract: | We use linked longitudinal data on employers and employees to estimate how the 2003-2005 Hartz reforms affected the wages of displaced German workers after they returned to work. We also present a simple new method to decompose the wage effects into components attributable to selection on unobservables, and to changes in the way that displaced workers are sorted across firms and worker-firm matches upon re-employment. We find that the Hartz reforms substantially reduced the wages of displaced workers after their return to work. Women experienced smaller wage losses than men. For both sexes, over 80 percent of the increased wage loss was because displaced workers found re-employment in lower-wage firms after the reforms. A disproportionate share of these low-wage firms offer temporary employment services to other firms, and we document a large increase in post-displacement employment in the temporary work sector after the reforms. Sorting into worse matches with employers explains a smaller 5-9 percent of the wage loss experienced by men, and 12.5-23 percent of the female wage loss. Collectively, the sorting and matching channels explain almost all of the Hartz reforms' effect on post-displacement wages. |
| Keywords: | Hartz reforms, displacement, unemployment insurance, reallocation, sorting, matching, selection, linked employer-employee data, fixed effects |
| JEL: | J65 J64 J62 J68 J63 J31 C23 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13300&r=all |
| By: | Alessandra Allocca |
| Abstract: | Many organizations rely on decentralized arrangements where employees choose their projects and teams. Most of the empirical literature on working collaborations instead focuses on teams that are exogenously formed. I develop a structural entry model with heterogeneous strategic interactions where agents decide whether to join a project. The decision depends on who else may potentially join the project, the project quality, as well as other individual and project characteristics. In turn, this decision affects the probability of project completion. I estimate the model using a novel dataset from an important scientific collaboration. I find that agents' decisions to select into projects highly depend on the pool of teammates and the size of the team whereas projects' quality is of lesser importance. Heterogeneity in agents' characteristics explains this selection, which needs to be accounted for to obtain unbiased estimates of teams' performance. With a counterfactual experiment, I show that moving from a decentralized to a centralized arrangement leads to fewer completed projects. |
| Keywords: | Teamwork, Entry Game, Innovation, Personnel Economics |
| JEL: | C57 C72 L2 M50 O32 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_174&r=all |