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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
By: | Ratto, Marisa (Université Paris-Dauphine); Tominey, Emma (University of York); Vergé, Thibaud (CREST) |
Abstract: | The adoption of performance related pay schemes has become increasingly popular in the public sector of several countries. In the UK, the scheme designers favoured collective performance pay with the aim to foster cooperation across offices. The resulting team structure included several offices (subteams) within the same team, defined by the remuneration scheme. In this paper we analyse the strategic interactions across subteams created by a two-level team structure, in order to assess whether rewarding collective performance necessarily promotes cooperation. We show that such team structure creates conflicting incentives to free-ride across and within subteams. Moreover, the relative size of subteams can be a powerful means to deliver incentives when funds for performance rewards are limited. Using data for one of the incentive schemes piloted in the UK, we analyse the role of the target level and of the relative size of subteams on subteams' performance. |
Keywords: | incentives, teams performance, sub-teams, cooperation |
JEL: | M52 M54 J33 |
Date: | 2012–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6747&r=hrm |
By: | Jones, Melanie K.; Latreille, Paul L.; Sloane, Peter J. |
Abstract: | This paper uses matched employee-employer data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2004 to examine the determinants of employee job anxiety and work-related psychological illness. Job anxiety is found to be strongly related to the demands of the job as measured by factors such as occupation, education and hours of work. Average levels of employee job anxiety, in turn, are positively associated with work-related psychological illness among the workforce as reported by managers. The paper goes on to consider the relationship between psychological illness and workplace performance as measured by absence, turnover and labour productivity. Work-related psychological illness is found to be negatively associated with several measures of workplace performance. |
Keywords: | Employment, Stress, Mental health, Absence, Productivity, Anxiety, |
Date: | 2011 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fli:wpaper:26078&r=hrm |
By: | Robert Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam, CESifo, and IZA); Jan Tichem (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
Abstract: | This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that better social relationships sometimes lead to higher bonuses, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium. |
Keywords: | Altruism; spite; social relations; incentives; relational contracts; efficiency wages; subjective performance evaluation; Nash bargaining |
JEL: | D23 J33 M52 M55 |
Date: | 2012–05–16 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120054&r=hrm |
By: | Emre Ozdenoren (London Business School and CEPR); Kathy Yuan (London School of Economics and CEPR) |
Abstract: | We propose a new theory of suboptimal risk-taking based on contractual externalities. We examine an industry with a continuum of firms. Each firm's manager exerts costly hidden effort. The productivity of effort is subject to systematic shocks. Firms' stock prices reflect their performance relative to the industry average. In this setting, stock-based incentives cause complementarities in managerial effort choices. Externalities arise because shareholders do not internalize the impact of their incentive provision on the average effort. During booms, they over-incentivise managers, triggering a rat-race in effort exertion, resulting in excessive risk relative to the second-best. The opposite occurs during busts. |
Keywords: | Stock-Based Incentives, Excessive Risk-Taking, Insucient Risk-Taking, Contractual Externalities. |
JEL: | D86 G01 G30 |
Date: | 2012–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koc:wpaper:1222&r=hrm |
By: | Burgess, Simon (University of Bristol); Propper, Carol (University of Bristol); Ratto, Marisa (Université Paris-Dauphine); Tominey, Emma (University of York) |
Abstract: | This paper addresses a lack of evidence on the impact of performance pay in the public sector by evaluating a pilot scheme of incentives in a major government agency. The incentive scheme was based on teams and covered quantity and quality targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We use data from the agency's performance management system and personnel records plus matched labour market data. We focus on three main issues: whether performance pay matters for public service worker productivity, what the team basis of the scheme implies, and the impact of the differential measurement precision. We show that the use of performance pay had no impact at the mean, but that there was significant heterogeneity of response. This heterogeneity was patterned as one would expect from a free rider versus peer monitoring perspective. We found that the incentive scheme had a substantial positive effect in small teams, and a negative response in large teams. We found little impact of the scheme on quality measures, which we interpret as due to the differential measurement technology. We show that the scheme in small teams had non-trivial effects on output, and our estimates suggest that the use of incentive pay is much more cost effective than a general pay rise. |
Keywords: | incentives, public sector, teams, performance, personnel economics |
JEL: | J33 J45 D23 |
Date: | 2012–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6738&r=hrm |
By: | Gary Bolton; Peter Werner |
Abstract: | We investigate how the introduction of a salient norm for pay differentiation influences wage offers and effort exertion in a gift exchange experiment. Exogenously induced claims indeed lead to substantial differentiation in wages. At the same time, unequal wage schemes do not crowd out effort exertion. In particular, we do not observe strong detrimental effects resulting from disadvantageous relative wage positions. Finally, we find that specific communication patterns have a significant impact on effort exertion. |
Keywords: | Communication, entitlements, fairness norms, gift exchange, relative wages |
JEL: | J31 M52 D63 C92 |
Date: | 2012–08–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kls:series:0056&r=hrm |
By: | Mirta Díaz (Department of Business Organization and Marketing, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville, Spain); Susana Pasamar (Department of Business Organization and Marketing, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville, Spain); Ramón Valle (Department of Business Organization and Marketing, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville, Spain) |
Abstract: | Organizational learning has become increasingly important for strategic renewal. Ambidextrous organizations are specially succesfull in current environment, where firms require efficiency and adaptation to changes. Organizational ambidexterity is still in the process of developing into a new research paradigm in organizational research. In this study, we discuss arguments about the ambidextrous character, we identify the intellectual capital characteristics that better support learning types, the HRM practices adequate for the components of intellectual capital, and if the organizational intellectual capital plays any mediating role in the relationship between HRM practices and organizational learning. |
Keywords: | ambidextrous learning, organizational learning, intellectual capital, HRM practices |
Date: | 2012–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpboam:12.01&r=hrm |
By: | Elena Pastorino |
Abstract: | This paper develops and structurally estimates an equilibrium model of the labor market that integrates learning, job assignment, and human capital acquisition to account for the main patterns of job and wage mobility characteristic of careers in firms. A key innovation is the modeling of firms’ incentives to experiment that arise from the ability of firms, through job assignment, to affect the rate at which they acquire information about workers. The resulting trade-off between output and information implies that a firm’s retention and job assignment policy solves an experimentation problem: a so-called multi-armed bandit with dependent arms. The model is estimated using longitudinal administrative data from one U.S. firm in a service industry (the same data used by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994a,b)) and fits the data remarkably well. My estimates indicate that learning during employment accounts for a significant fraction of measured wage growth on the job, whereas experimentation through job assignment primarily contributes to explaining the patterns of job mobility within the firm. Since learning is gradual, however, persistent uncertainty about workers’ abilities is responsible for a substantial compression of wage growth with tenure. |
Keywords: | Wages |
Date: | 2012 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedmsr:469&r=hrm |
By: | Scholz, Theresa (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany]) |
Abstract: | "During the recession of 2008-09 Germany experienced a huge decrease in GDP. Employment, however, remained surprisingly stable. The so-called German labor market miracle is often ascribed to the intensive usage of short-time work. Despite the resurgence of this instrument, little is known about the employees affected by it. This paper analyzes whether employers select certain individuals for short-time work, where special focus is given on the effect of human capital. The analysis is based on a unique linked-employer-employee data set on short-time workers in the district of the employment agency of Nuremberg. We use methods of event history analysis to estimate transition rates from regular employment to short-time work. Our results indicate that employers select a broad range of workers for STW, irrespective of their level of human capital. Fears that short-time work is mainly applied to a certain group of workers are not confirmed." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) |
JEL: | J23 J24 J3 |
Date: | 2012–08–15 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iab:iabdpa:201218&r=hrm |
By: | Caliendo, Lorenzo; Monte, Ferdinando; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban |
Abstract: | We use a comprehensive dataset of French manufacturing firms to study their internal organization. We first divide the employees of each firm into `layers' using occupational categories. Layers are hierarchical in that the typical worker in a higher layer earns more, and the typical firm occupies less of them. In addition, the probability of adding (dropping) a layer is very positively (negatively) correlated with value added. We then explore the changes in the wages and number of employees that accompany expansions in layers, output, or markets (by becoming exporters). The empirical results indicate that reorganization, through changes in layers, is key to understand how firms expand and contract. For example, we find that firms that expand substantially add layers and pay lower average wages in all pre-existing layers. In contrast, firms that expand little and do not reorganize pay higher average wages in all pre-existing layers. |
Keywords: | Firm Dynamics; Firm Growth; Organizational Change; Organizations; Skills; Wages |
JEL: | D22 F16 J24 J31 |
Date: | 2012–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9073&r=hrm |
By: | Kandy Dayaram (School of Management, Curtin University.); Gail Pacheco (Department of Economics, Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand.) |
Abstract: | This paper presents an investigation into the impact of three hierarchical levels of learning (individual, team and organizational) on job satisfaction. Through the employment of logit regression, this study assesses the relative influence of each level of learning on satisfaction in the workplace. A key finding of this study is the high level of significance across all specifications for individual learning. Consequently, this results in a two-fold postulation. First, the proposition of an alternative methodology, namely a bivariate probit which allows for a sequential process between an employee’s attitude towards individual learning and job satisfaction. Second, from a training perspective, a rethinking and realignment of learning strategies at various levels within a firms’ organizational architecture. |
Keywords: | Job satisfaction; individual learning; team learning; organizational learning. |
JEL: | J28 L0 |
Date: | 2012–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aut:wpaper:201203&r=hrm |
By: | Gerards Ruud; Grip Andries de; Witlox Maaike (METEOR) |
Abstract: | This article studies the use and impact of a firm-sponsored training (“Employability-miles”)voucher scheme that aims to stimulate employees to develop a more active attitude toward their ownemployability. Using data from two surveys of the firm’s workforce, we find that voucher use isrelated to various personality traits and personal characteristics. In particular, a worker’sambition, goal setting, and education level are positively related to voucher use. In addition,women and those with longer tenure spend their vouchers more often. Conversely, workers with amore positive self-image as well as those who are negatively reciprocal spend their vouchers lessoften. The negative relation between voucher use and negative reciprocity suggests that workerswho are more negatively reciprocal perceive the voucher as a threat. Further, we find that voucheruse positively affects worker employability awareness and willingness to train.Remarkably, participation in non-voucher training shows little relation to personality traits.From a human resources perspective, this finding suggests that by employing a voucher scheme, thefirm makes training participation more dependent on employee personality and individualcharacteristics instead of human resources practices. |
Keywords: | labour economics ; |
Date: | 2012 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2012043&r=hrm |
By: | John Morgan (University of California, Berkeley); Dana Sisak (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Felix Vardy (University of California, Berkeley and IMF) |
Abstract: | We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent distribution, while a higher base wage attracts talent only if total promotion opportunities are sufficiently plentiful. |
Keywords: | career choice; promotion competition; selection; meritocracy |
JEL: | J45 J24 M52 |
Date: | 2012–07–20 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120077&r=hrm |
By: | Sander Hoogendoorn (University of Amsterdam); Mirjam van Praag (University of Amsterdam) |
Abstract: | One of the most salient and relevant dimensions of team heterogeneity is ethnicity. We measure the causal impact of ethnic diversity on the performance of business teams using a randomized field experiment. We follow 550 students who set up 45 real companies as part of their curriculum in an international business program in the Netherlands. We exploit the fact that companies are set up in realistic though similar circumstances and that we, as outside researchers, had the unique opportunity to exogenously vary the ethnic composition of otherwise randomly composed teams. The student population consists of 55% students with a non-Dutch ethnicity from 53 different countries of origin. We find that a moderate level of ethnic diversity has no effect on team performance in terms of business outcomes (sales, profits and profits per share). However, if at least the majority of team members is ethnically diverse then more ethnic diversity has a positive impact on the performance of teams. In line with theoretical predictions, our data suggest that this positive effect could be related to the more diverse pool of relevant knowledge facilitating (mutual) learning within ethnically diverse teams. |
Keywords: | Ethnic diversity; team performance; field experiment; entrepreneurship; (mutual) learning |
JEL: | J15 L25 C93 L26 M13 D83 |
Date: | 2012–07–13 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120068&r=hrm |
By: | Yoshitaka Yamazaki (International University of Japan); Jeewhan Yoon (The George Washington University) |
Abstract: | We explored how fairness perceptions of HR practices affect job satisfaction among Asian managers of MNC subsidiaries, controlling age, gender, job tenure, previous work experiences, and management positions. Our fairness study focus described the effect of procedural justice and that of the transparency, which we have added as a new justice construct that is an organizational level of informational justice. We applied a performance evaluation system as an HR practice implemented over the MNC subsidiaries. Our research participants comprised of 903 Asian managers who worked for a leading Japanese multinational strategically expanding retail business markets in Asian locations: Japan, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand. Our key results revealed that both procedural and transparent fairness perceptions of the HR practice significantly influenced job satisfaction of Asian managers as a whole group. Each regional group also mostly exhibited a strong connection between their fairness perceptions of both procedures and transparency, and their job satisfaction. Finally, we discussed the implication of this study. |
Keywords: | Procedural justice, transparency, job satisfaction, HR practices, Asian managers, Japanese MNCs |
Date: | 2012–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iuj:wpaper:ems_2012_05&r=hrm |
By: | Annie Tubadji (Institut für Arbeidsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), and University of Regensburg); Peter Nijkamp (VU University Amsterdam) |
Abstract: | This paper seeks to identify relationships between human capital and cultural capital, in the context of local labour market productivity. The key constituents of human capital, identified in the literature, are jointly examined in a close-to-reality-model. The main advantage of our model of productivity is that, in addition to accounting for the filigree composition of human capital, it also takes into consideration the cultural capital present in a locality. In this manner, we are able to examine the interaction between the quality of the incoming human capital and the cultural encounter context (generating the cultural "milieu" effect) of the modern diverse city. To this end, we operationalize one model with data on the 'melting pot' of EU15, at NUTS2 level. The sources of our data are the Eurostat Regional Database and the World Value Survey, which have served to construct both a cross-section for the year 2001. These datasets allows us: (1) to exa mine the different groups of migrating and local human capital, their interaction and joint impact on local productivity, and (2) to cross-check for the causality direction behind our model. Our findings suggest that benefits from immigrants differ, not only due to their human capital, but also due to their culturally biased different bargaining power on the labour market. |
Keywords: | human capital; cultural capital; diversity; productivity; growth; Weber |
JEL: | Z10 O31 O43 R11 |
Date: | 2012–07–27 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120079&r=hrm |
By: | D'Este,Pablo; Rentocchini,Francesco; Vega Jurado,Jaider M. |
Abstract: | This paper focuses on the role of human capital in attenuating the barriers that block firms from engaging in innovation activities. The paper distinguishes between firms facing deterring barriers to innovation (firms deterred from engaging in innovation activities) and firms confronting revealed barriers (firms that experience barriers alongside their engagement in innovation activities). We investigate whether human capital has a particularly strong impact in lowering barriers among the former group of firms, since a strong skill base is likely to compensate for the lack of previous experience in innovation-related activities or the necessary complementary assets associated to innovation. We draw on four waves of the Spanish Innovation Survey and examine the impact of human capital on three types of obstacles to innovation: cost, knowledge and market obstacles. Results reveal that human capital has a significant impact in attenuating deterring barriers to innovation associated to knowledge shortages and market uncertainties. |
Keywords: | Barriers to innovation, Innovative firms, Human Capital |
JEL: | O31 O32 O33 |
Date: | 2012–08–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ing:wpaper:201206&r=hrm |
By: | Edward P. Lazear; Kathryn L. Shaw; Christopher T. Stanton |
Abstract: | Do supervisors enhance productivity? Arguably, the most important relationship in the firm is between worker and supervisor. The supervisor may hire, fire, assign work, instruct, motivate and reward workers. Models of incentives and productivity build at least some subset of these functions in explicitly, but because of lack of data, little work exists that demonstrates the importance of bosses and the channels through which their productivity enhancing effects operate. As more data become available, it is possible to examine the effects of people and practices on productivity. Using a company-based data set on the productivity of technology-based services workers, supervisor effects are estimated and found to be large. Three findings stand out. First, the choice of boss matters. There is substantial variation in boss quality as measured by the effect on worker productivity. Replacing a boss who is in the lower 10% of boss quality with one who is in the upper 10% of boss quality increases a team’s total output by about the same amount as would adding one worker to a nine member team. Using a normalization, this implies that the average boss is about 1.75 times as productive as the average worker. Second, boss’s primary activity is teaching skills that persist. Third, efficient assignment allocates the better bosses to the better workers because good bosses increase the productivity of high quality workers by more than that of low quality workers. |
JEL: | J01 J24 J3 |
Date: | 2012–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18317&r=hrm |
By: | N. CECI-RENAUD (Insee); V. COTTET (Insee) |
Abstract: | This study describes the human resources management along several dimensions, based on administrative data (DADS and tax data): wage schedule both in terms of level but also dispersion, stability of the workforce, proportion of different qualifications and age, share of subsidized jobs ... A typology of these companies is available from these dimensions. Then we compare these wage structures with the performance. We observe that the most productive firms are also those who pay the highest wages, even after taking into account their specific characteristics (size, sector) and those of their employees. The link between wage dispersion and the productivity is more difficult to characterize: the estimate parameters are very sensitive to the empirical specification. |
Keywords: | wage dispersion, wage structure, productivity |
JEL: | L25 M52 J31 J33 |
Date: | 2012 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crs:wpdeee:g2012-02&r=hrm |
By: | Mirta Diaz Fernandez (Department of Business Organization and Marketing, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville, Spain); Mar Bornay Barrachina (Department of Business Organization and Marketing, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville, Spain); Alvaro Lopez Cabrales (Department of Business Organization and Marketing, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville, Spain) |
Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between HR practices and innovative performance in the Spanish industry. Specifically, we will focus on innovativeness, measured through the production of patents, analyzing the extent to which this innovative result is favoured by some HRM practices as investments on training and whether it is also affected by the use of full time workers. We propose the assessment of these relationships by means of the Spanish Survey of Industrial Strategic Behaviour. We focus our longitudinal analysis on the period 2001-2008, years of high economic growth in Spain during the last decades. Our findings show that the most innovative firms are also the most competitive ones in terms of added value, and they also use full time workers. Finally, training investments on new technologies, languages and data processes have an impact on innovativeness. The paper is closed with a discussion about some lessons we may learn from these wealthy years and the role played by HRM investments on firms. |
Keywords: | Innovativeness, HRM, Training, change environment. |
Date: | 2012–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpboam:12.04&r=hrm |
By: | Jesper Bagger (Royal Holloway College, UK); Rune Vejlin (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark); Kenneth L. Sørensen (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark) |
Abstract: | Using a population-wide Danish Matched Employer-Employee panel from 1980-2006, we document a strong trend towards more positive assortative wage sorting. The correlation between worker and firm fixed effects estimated from a log wage regression increases from -0.07 in 1981 to .14 in 2001. The nonstationary wage sorting pattern is not due to compositional changes in the labor market, primarily occurs among high wage workers, and comprises 41 percent of the increase in the standard deviation of log real wages between 1980 and 2006. We show that the wage sorting trend is associated with worker reallocation via voluntary quits. |
Keywords: | Matched Employer-Employee Data, Firmfixed effects, Worker fixed effects, Wage sorting, Wage inequality, Voluntary quits. |
JEL: | J30 J31 J62 |
Date: | 2012–08–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-17&r=hrm |
By: | Guido Friebel (Goethe University Frankfurt); Helena Schweiger (EBRD) |
Abstract: | We investigate whether management quality explains firm performance in Russia. We find that it explains relatively little in terms of firm performance, but it does explain some of the differences between firms in Russia’s Far East and the rest of Russia. While management practices may not yet affect firm performance in a measurable way, they may do so in the future. This conjecture motivates us to look at the determinants of firms’ adoption of good management practices. We find that market pressure, both in the product and the labour market, has some impact on adoption of management practices, in particular in the Far East. It thus appears that the economy in Russia’s Far East may function according to different rules than in the rest of Russia, as market forces seem to be stronger there because the Far East is more exposed to foreign competition than the rest of Russia. |
Keywords: | transition, firm restructuring, open economies |
JEL: | L2 M2 P2 |
Date: | 2012–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebd:wpaper:144&r=hrm |
By: | Anat Bracha; Uri Gneezy |
Abstract: | The authors use a labor supply; relative pay; experimental economics laboratory experiment to examine the impact of relative wages on labor supply. They test the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, making a given wage high (low) relative to other wage levels will lead to an increase (decrease) in labor supply. They find that labor supply does respond significantly to relative pay, and in the expected direction. However, when a strong enough reason is given for the relative low pay, this difference disappears. |
Keywords: | Labor supply ; Wages |
Date: | 2012 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedbwp:12-6&r=hrm |
By: | Bertrand Candelon (Department of economics, Maastricht University); Arnaud Dupuy (Corresponding address: ROA and department of economics, Maastricht University PO Box 616, NL-6200 MD, The Netherlands. Email: a.dupuy@roa.unimaas.nl) |
Abstract: | This paper proposes an equilibrium theory of the organization of work in an economy with an implicit market for productive time. In this market, agents buy or sell productive time. This implicit mar- ket gives rise to the formation of teams, organized in hierarchies with one leader (buyer) at the top and helpers (sellers) below. Relative to autarky, hierarchical organization leads to higher within and between team payo¤s/productivity inequality. This prediction is tested empir- ically in the context of professional road cycling. We show that the observed rise in performance inequality in the peloton since the 1970s is merely due to a rise in help intensity within team and consistent with a change in the hierarchical organization of teams. |
Keywords: | Hierarchical organization, productive time, helping time, inequality, professional cycling |
JEL: | D2 D3 L22 |
Date: | 2012–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:msm:wpaper:2012/12&r=hrm |