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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
By: | Tim Barmby; Alex Bryson; Barbara Eberth |
Abstract: | Using a model of wage determination developed by Stevens (2003) we offer an explanation of why tenure has a negative effect when entered in job satisfaction equations. If job satisfaction measures match quality, then the explanation follows from a model of the labour market in which workers accumulate specific human capital at the firm they work and the way in which this accumulation affects the way workers react to outside job opportunities. |
Keywords: | Job satisfaction, job match quality, human capital, job tenure |
JEL: | J24 J28 |
Date: | 2012–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1151&r=hrm |
By: | Johnston, David W. (Monash University); Schurer, Stefanie (Victoria University of Wellington); Shields, Michael A. (University of Melbourne) |
Abstract: | Using data from the 1970 British Cohort Study, we investigate the role of maternal gender role attitudes in explaining the differential educational expectations mothers have for their daughters and sons, and consequently their children's later educational outcomes and labour supply. We find that mothers' and children's gender role attitudes, measured some 25 years apart, are significantly correlated, equally so for sons and daughters. Moreover, daughters are significantly more likely to continue school beyond the minimum school-leaving age, participate in the labour force, and work more hours, if their mothers held non-traditional (pro-gender-equality) beliefs, even if they were not working themselves. Consistent with the hypothesis that maternal gender role attitudes affect daughters' economic opportunities only, we find no effect on sons' education outcomes and labour supply. However, we find that mothers' attitudes are significantly correlated with sons' partners' (daughter-in-law) labour supply. All these results suggest that the intergenerational transmission of non-traditional attitudes from mothers to their children explain a substantive part of gender inequalities in economic opportunities, and that attitudes and outcomes persevere across generations through assortative mating. |
Keywords: | maternal gender role attitudes, intergenerational transmission, labour supply, human capital investment, expectations, cohort data |
JEL: | J62 |
Date: | 2012–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6656&r=hrm |
By: | Jonathan B. Berk; Jules H. van Binsbergen |
Abstract: | Using the dollar-value a mutual fund manager adds as the measure of skill, we find that not only does skill exist (the average mutual fund manager adds about $2 million per year), but this skill is persistent, as far out as 10 years. We further document that investors recognize this skill and reward it by investing more capital with skilled managers. Higher skilled managers are paid more and there is a strong positive correlation between current managerial compensation and future performance. |
JEL: | G11 G2 G20 G23 |
Date: | 2012–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18184&r=hrm |
By: | Chinchilla, Nuria (IESE Business School); Moragas, Maruja (IESE Business School); Kim, Sowon (IESE Business School) |
Abstract: | We introduce motivation theory as a way of understanding the decision-making process in the work and family context. We use core concepts from motivation theory - extrinsic, intrinsic and prosocial motivation - and link them to motivational learning to build our framework. We then propose a framework illustrating motivational factors that influence work-family decision-making and offer propositions focusing on the motivational consequences for individuals which will impact their future decision-making processes. |
Keywords: | decision-making; motivational learning; motivational structure; work-family; |
Date: | 2012–06–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0956&r=hrm |
By: | Moen, Espen R. (Norwegian Business School (BI)); Yashiv, Eran (Tel Aviv University) |
Abstract: | This paper studies the value of firms and their hiring and firing decisions in an environment where the productivity of the workers depends on how well they match with their co-workers and the firm acts as a coordinating device. Match quality derives from a production technology whereby workers are randomly located on the Salop circle, and depends negatively on the distance between the workers. It is shown that a worker's contribution in a given firm changes over time in a nontrivial way as co-workers are replaced with new workers. The paper derives optimal hiring and replacement policies, including an optimal stopping rule, and characterizes the resulting equilibrium in terms of employment, wages and distribution of firm values. The paper stresses the role of horizontal differences in worker productivity, as opposed to vertical, assortative matching issues. Simulations of the model show the dynamics of worker replacement policy, the resulting firm value and age distributions, and the connections between them. |
Keywords: | firm value, complementarity, worker value, Salop circle, hiring, firing, match quality, optimal stopping |
JEL: | E23 J62 J63 |
Date: | 2012–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6657&r=hrm |
By: | Gertler, Paul; Vermeersch, Christel |
Abstract: | This study examines the effect of performance incentives for health care providers to provide more and higher quality care in Rwanda on child health outcomes. The authors find that the incentives had a large and significant effect on the weight-for-age of children 0-11 months and on the height-for-age of children 24-49 months. They attribute this improvement to increases in the use and quality of prenatal and postnatal care. Consistent with theory, They find larger effects of incentives on services where monetary rewards and the marginal return to effort are higher. The also find that incentives reduced the gap between provider knowledge and practice of appropriate clinical procedures by 20 percent, implying a large gain in efficiency. Finally, they find evidence of a strong complementarity between performance incentives and provider skill. |
Keywords: | Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Population Policies,Health Systems Development&Reform,Disease Control&Prevention,Adolescent Health |
Date: | 2012–06–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6100&r=hrm |