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nep-env New Economics Papers
on Environmental Economics
Issue of 2006‒09‒16
five papers chosen by
Francisco S.Ramos
Federal University of Pernambuco

  1. A Matter of Opinion : How Ecological and Neoclassical Environmental Economists Think about Sustainability and Economics By Lydia Illge; Reimund Schwarze
  2. The Political Economy of Natural Disaster Insurance : Lessons from the Failure of a Proposed Compulsory Insurance Scheme in Germany By Reimund Schwarze; Gert G. Wagner
  3. Playing Chiken with Salmon By Jon Olaf Olaussen
  4. Environmental Liability and Redevelopment of Old Industrial Land By Hilary Sigman
  5. Massachusetts’ Clean Energy Cluster By David Levy andDavid Terkla

  1. By: Lydia Illge; Reimund Schwarze
    Abstract: The differing paradigms of ecological and neoclassical environmental economics have been described in various articles and books and are also embedded in different institutional settings. However, we cannot take for granted that the paradigm debates described in the literatu-re are actually mirrored in exactly the same way in the perceptions and opinions of researchers looking at sustainability from an economic perspective. This paper presents empirical results from a German case study on how economists and others involved in economic sustainability research from different schools of thought think about the issues of sustainability and economics, how they group around these issues, how they feel about the current scientific divide, and what they expect to be future topics of sustainability research. Knowing that sustainability research is highly and still increasingly internationally intertwined, and assuming that the opinions of German economic sustainability researchers do not dramatically differ from those in other countries, we think that these results will be of interest to the inter-national scientific community [...]
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp619&r=env
  2. By: Reimund Schwarze; Gert G. Wagner
    Abstract: This paper studies the politico-economic reasons for the refusal of a proposed compulsory flood insurance scheme in Germany. It provides the rationale for such scheme and outlines the basic features of a market-orientated design. The main reasons for the political down-turn of this proposal were the misperceived costs of a state guarantee, legal objections against a compulsory insurance, distributional conflicts between the federal government and the Ger-man states (Länder) on the implied administrative costs, and the well-known charity hazard of ad-hoc disaster relief. The focus on pure market solutions proved to be an ineffective strategy for policy advice in this field.
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp620&r=env
  3. By: Jon Olaf Olaussen (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)
    Abstract: Wild Atlantic salmon are traditionally harvested from both the sea and spawning rivers during spawning runs. From an economic point of view, the return from sport fishing in rivers is several times higher than marine ‘for meat only’ harvests. This situation calls for a side payment regime where river owners pay marine fishermen not to fish, and where both parties gain. This paper argues that the reason why such side payment regimes are rarely seen, despite the obvious mutual gain, is due to the potential free-riding incentives among river owners. Although it is shown that the decision each river owner faces can be described as a game of chicken, taking the stochastic ecology into account may reveal a different pay-off structure. It is also demonstrated that the stochastic ecology of salmon, combined with price rigidities in the rivers, may explain the lack of side payment regimes.
    Keywords: Atlantic salmon; game of chicken; recreational versus commercial fishing; side payment; stochastic ecology
    JEL: Q22 Q26 D81
    Date: 2006–08–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nst:samfok:7406&r=env
  4. By: Hilary Sigman (Rutgers University)
    Abstract: Many communities are concerned about the reuse of potentially contaminated land ("brownfields") and believe that environmental liability is a hindrance to redevelopment. However, with land price adjustments, liability might not impede the reuse of this land. Existing literature has found price reductions in response to liability, but few studies have looked for an effect on vacancies. This paper studies variations in state liability rules --- specifically, strict liability and joint and several liability --- that affect the level and distribution of expected private cleanup costs. It explores the effects of this variation on industrial land prices and vacancy rates and on reported brownfields in a panel of cities across the United States. In the estimated equations, joint and several liability reduces land prices and increases vacancy rates in central cities. Neither a price nor quantity effect is estimated from strict liability. The results suggest that liability is at least partly capitalized, but does still deter redevelopment.
    Keywords: Environmental policy, Tort reform, Real estate, Brownfields
    JEL: Q5 K32 R33
    Date: 2006–08–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rut:rutres:200609&r=env
  5. By: David Levy andDavid Terkla
    Abstract: The renewable energy industry in Massachusetts is identified through a “topdown” and “bottom-up” processes to determine the total employment and boundaries of this sector. Related sectors are also identified that are linked to the core renewable energy sector in the state and policies for enhancing this cluster are suggested.
    Keywords: Massachusetts, Energy, Cluster
    JEL: Q42 L99 R58
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mab:wpaper:4&r=env

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