[go: up one dir, main page]

nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2005‒05‒23
three papers chosen by
Anna Y. Borodina
Perm State University

  1. Equilibrium Exchange Rates in Southeastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey: Healthy or (Dutch) Diseased? By Balázs Égert; ;
  2. Barter, Credit, and Welfare: A theoretical inquiry into the barter phenomenon in Russia By José Noguera; Susan J. Linz;
  3. Attitudes and Performance: An Analysis of Russian Workers By Susan J. Linz; Anastasia Semykina;

  1. By: Balázs Égert; ;
    Abstract: This paper investigates the equilibrium exchange rates of three Southeastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania), of two CIS economies (Russia and Ukraine) and of Turkey. A systematic approach in terms of different time horizons at which the equilibrium exchange rate is assessed is conducted, combined with a careful analysis of country-specific factors. For Russia, a first look is taken at the Dutch Disease phenomenon as a possible driving force behind equilibrium exchange rates. A unified framework including productivity and net foreign assets completed with a set control variables such as openness, public debt and public expenditures is used to compute total real misalignment bands.
    Keywords: Balassa-Samuelson, Dutch Disease, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey
    JEL: E31 O11 P17
    Date: 2005–05–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-770&r=cis
  2. By: José Noguera; Susan J. Linz;
    Abstract: This paper develops a model to investigate the welfare implications of barter in Russia and other transition economies during the 1990s. We argue that barter is a welfare-improving phenomenon that acts as a defense mechanism against monetary instability. When firms react to tighter credit markets by switching to barter, the risk they face diminishes, allowing for a higher level of production.
    Keywords: Barter, welfare, Russia, money, credit, payment system, interest rate
    JEL: E0 E6 P20 P21 P23 P26
    Date: 2005–03–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-757&r=cis
  3. By: Susan J. Linz; Anastasia Semykina;
    Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between locus of control and performance among Russian employees, using survey data collected at 28 workplaces in 2002 in Taganrog and at 47 workplaces in 2003 in Ekaterinburg. We develop a measure that allows us to categorize the Russian employees participating in our survey as exhibiting an internal or external locus of control. We then assess the extent to which there are significant differences between “internals” and “externals” in work-related attitudes that may affect performance. In particular, we focus on (1) attitudes about outcomes associated with hard work, (2) level of job satisfaction, (3) expectation of receiving a desired reward, and (4) loyalty to and involvement with one’s organization. In each case we identify where gender and generational differences emerge. Our main objective is to determine whether Russian employees who exhibit an internal locus of control perform better than employees with an external locus of control. Our performance measures include earnings, expected promotions, and assessments of the quantity and quality of work in comparison to others at the same organization doing a similar job. Controlling for a variety of worker characteristics, we find that (1) individuals who exhibit an internal locus of control perform better, but this result is not always statistically significant; (2) even among “internals,” women earn significantly less than men and have a much lower expectation of promotion; (3) even among “internals,” experience with unemployment has a negative influence on performance.
    Keywords: locus of control, Russia, motivation, performance, gender
    JEL: P23 J24
    Date: 2005–03–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-758&r=cis

This nep-cis issue is ©2005 by Anna Y. Borodina. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.