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nep-afr New Economics Papers
on Africa
Issue of 2006‒03‒18
three papers chosen by
Suzanne McCoskey
Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State

  1. Does training benefit those who do not get any? Elasticities of complementarity and factor price in South Africa By Alberto Behar
  2. Donor coordination and the uses of aid By Bigsten, Arne
  3. Communautarist networks in African rainforests By Jean-Marc Roda; Nsitou Mabiala

  1. By: Alberto Behar
    Abstract: Commentators claim that a shortage of skills in South Africa is constraining output and that a rise in skill supply would benefit less skilled occupations. This assumes or implies skilled and unskilled labour are complements. Hicks Elasticities of Complementarity and elasticities of factor price are estimated between capital and five occupations. The results show that skilled/artisanal and unskilled labour are complements while semi-skilled and unskilled labour are substitutes. These results allow for imperfectly elastic product demand, rigid wages and inference on highly non-linear elasticities. Aggregated estimates suggest More skilled labour complements Less skilled labour.
    Keywords: Hicks Elasticity of Complementarity, South Africa, Training, Skill
    JEL: J23 J31
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:244&r=afr
  2. By: Bigsten, Arne (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: The paper discusses donor coordination and its implications for the uses of aid. The paper starts by specifying a simple framework for the discussion, and then reviews the theoretical literature. It then provides some data on donor proliferation and discusses how coordination modalities have evolved over time, in particular during the current phase with partnership and ownership. The following sections summarize the limited empirical evidence available on the impact of coordination on transaction costs and public-sector management and governance. A key issue with regard to the latter is how donor coordination affects the incentives of the recipient government. The paper concludes with a review of the policy debate and some policy conclusions. <p>
    Keywords: Aid; donor coordination; transaction costs; incentive effects
    JEL: F35 O19
    Date: 2006–02–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0196&r=afr
  3. By: Jean-Marc Roda; Nsitou Mabiala
    Abstract: Since the 1970s world trade in unprocessed wood or preprocessed wood reached a stable level between 150 and 200 million m3, while, since 1985, world consumption varies between 3.2 and 3.4 billion m3 annually1. Thus, woodwork networks seem to be caught between two worlds with virtually independent structures, on the one hand, in developed countries, and, on the other hand, in developing countries. However, this apparent period of stabilization was undoubtedly a period of development, preparing the implementation of new organizations of production, whose forerunners emerge since the mid-1990s. The determining criteria are the ability to react and the rigorous response to demand. The very flexible strategies of supply and the mobility of capital are organized by companies on a global scale, which casts doubts on forest policies.
    JEL: L73
    Date: 2004–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:epf:wpaper:40400&r=afr

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