Report NEP-DES-2021-09-27
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Julien Combe & Vladyslav Nora & Olivier Tercieux, 2021. "Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms," Working Papers 2021-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Hugo Gimbert & Claire Mathieu & Simon Mauras, 2021. "Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Information," Papers 2109.09089, arXiv.org.
- Ata Atay & Eric Bahel & Tam'as Solymosi, 2021. "Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility," Papers 2109.05456, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
- Jibang Wu & Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru & Haifeng Xu, 2021. "Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders," Papers 2109.04888, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2021. "Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2300, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Zhou, Yu, 2021. "Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Masayuki Odora, 2021. "Potentials and Solutions of Cooperative Games," Working Papers 2115, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.