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Charles J. Thomas

Not to be confused with: Charles Phipps Thomas

Personal Details

First Name:Charles
Middle Name:J.
Last Name:Thomas
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pth114
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Economic Science Institute (ESI)
Argyros School of Business and Economics
Chapman University

Orange, California (United States)
http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/
RePEc:edi:esichus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Charles J. Thomas, 2017. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Working Papers 17-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  2. Cary Deck & Charles J. Thomas, 2016. "Using Experiments to Compare the Predictive Power of Models of Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 16-29, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  3. Charles J. Thomas, 2012. "An Alternating-Offers Model of Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 12-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  4. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 08-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

Articles

  1. Burns, Nathaniel A. & Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2023. "Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  2. Charles J. Thomas, 2021. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 730-741, September.
  3. Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2020. "Using experiments to compare the predictive power of models of multilateral negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  4. Charles J. Thomas, 2019. "A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 459-491, November.
  5. Thomas, Charles J., 2018. "An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 269-293.
  6. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2014. "Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(324), pages 768-787, October.
  7. Dougan William R. & Thomas Charles J., 2014. "Coase, Hayek, Pigou and Walras: Taxes vs Permit Auctions in Environmental Policy," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 159-170, December.
  8. Charles J. Thomas, 2014. "How the Nature of Product Differentiation Affects Procurement Competition," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 323-344, October.
  9. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.
  10. Charles Thomas, 2011. "The Price Effects of Using Firewalls as an Antitrust Remedy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(2), pages 209-222, March.
  11. Charles J. Thomas, 2010. "Information Revelation And Buyer Profits In Repeated Procurement Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 79-105, March.
  12. Thomas, Charles J. & Willig, Robert D., 2006. "The risk of contagion from multimarket contact," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1157-1184, November.
  13. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2005. "Verifiable Offers and the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1016-1031, October.
  14. Charles J. Thomas, 2005. "Using Reserve Prices To Deter Collusion In Procurement Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 301-326, September.
  15. Thomas, Charles J., 2004. "The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 679-692, May.
  16. Thomas, Charles J., 2002. "The effect of asymmetric entry costs on Bertrand competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 589-609, May.
  17. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2002. "A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 140-155, Spring.
  18. Thomas, Charles J., 1997. "Disincentives for cost-reducing investment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 359-363, December.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Charles J. Thomas, 2017. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Working Papers 17-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Charles J. Thomas, 2019. "A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 459-491, November.
    2. Bakaouka, Elpiniki & Escrihuela-Villar, Marc & Ferrarese, Walter, 2024. "Horizontal mergers with Bertrand competition and convex costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 60-67.

  2. Cary Deck & Charles J. Thomas, 2016. "Using Experiments to Compare the Predictive Power of Models of Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 16-29, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Burns, Nathaniel A. & Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2023. "Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).

  3. Charles J. Thomas, 2012. "An Alternating-Offers Model of Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 12-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2020. "Using experiments to compare the predictive power of models of multilateral negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    2. Burns, Nathaniel A. & Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2023. "Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).

  4. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 08-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2011. "Information revelation in procurement auctions with two-sided asymmetric information," Working Papers - Economics wp2011_14.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    2. Gregory E. Kersten & Tomasz Wachowicz & Margaret Kersten, 2016. "Competition, Transparency, and Reciprocity: A Comparative Study of Auctions and Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 693-722, July.
    3. Charles J. Thomas, 2014. "How the Nature of Product Differentiation Affects Procurement Competition," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 323-344, October.
    4. Li, Sherry Xin & Dogan, Kutsal & Haruvy, Ernan, 2011. "Group identity in markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 104-115, January.
    5. Thomas, Charles J., 2018. "An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 269-293.
    6. Burns, Nathaniel A. & Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2023. "Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    7. Charles J. Thomas, 2019. "A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 459-491, November.
    8. Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2015. "Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(3), pages 211-238, April.

Articles

  1. Charles J. Thomas, 2021. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 730-741, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2020. "Using experiments to compare the predictive power of models of multilateral negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Charles J. Thomas, 2019. "A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 459-491, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Stephen Martin, 2019. "Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs—Introduction to the Special Issue," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 327-338, November.
    2. Charles J. Thomas, 2021. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 730-741, September.

  4. Thomas, Charles J., 2018. "An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 269-293.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2014. "Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(324), pages 768-787, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Dougan William R. & Thomas Charles J., 2014. "Coase, Hayek, Pigou and Walras: Taxes vs Permit Auctions in Environmental Policy," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 159-170, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Casey B. Mulligan, 2015. "In-Kind Taxes, Behavior, and Comparative Advantage," NBER Working Papers 21586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  7. Charles J. Thomas, 2014. "How the Nature of Product Differentiation Affects Procurement Competition," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 323-344, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Charles J. Thomas, 2021. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 730-741, September.

  8. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Jeddy, Mohamed & Larue, Bruno, 2012. "Mergers, concurrent marketing mechanisms and the performance of sequential auctions," Working Papers 126945, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
    2. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2014. "Preferred Suppliers in Asymmetric Auction Markets," Working Papers 791, Barcelona School of Economics.

  9. Charles J. Thomas, 2010. "Information Revelation And Buyer Profits In Repeated Procurement Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 79-105, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Yao, Zhiyong & Xiao, Zhiguo, 2013. "A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 276-281.
    2. Timothy N. Cason & Karthik N. Kannan & Ralph Siebert, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 667-688, April.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Horner, 2010. "Should Auctions be Transparent?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1764, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Information feedback in first price auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 491-508, June.
    5. Azacis, Helmuts, 2017. "Information Disclosure by a Seller in Sequential First-Price Auctions," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2017/2, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    6. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Shuang Xu & Yong Zhao & Yeming Gong, 2021. "Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 261-292, December.
    8. Karthik N. Kannan, 2012. "Effects of Information Revelation Policies Under Cost Uncertainty," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 23(1), pages 75-92, March.

  10. Thomas, Charles J. & Willig, Robert D., 2006. "The risk of contagion from multimarket contact," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1157-1184, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Silva, Rosario, 2015. "Multimarket contact, differentiation, and prices of chain hotels," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 305-315.
    2. Lefouili, Yassine & Roux, Catherine, 2012. "Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 624-640.
    3. Amir Fazli & Jeffrey D. Shulman, 2018. "Implications of Market Spillovers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(11), pages 4996-5013, November.
    4. Armel Jacques, 2024. "Increased fines for repeat offenders and conglomerate dynamics," TEPP Working Paper 2024-06, TEPP.
    5. Paolo Coccorese & Alfonso Pellecchia, 2009. "Multimarket Contact and Profitability in Banking: Evidence from Italy," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 35(3), pages 245-271, June.
    6. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 153-176, March.
    7. Hwa Ryung Lee, 2010. "Multimarket contact effect on collusion through diversification," IEW - Working Papers 501, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    8. Cruz-García, Paula & Fernández de Guevara, Juan & Maudos, Joaquín, 2021. "Bank competition and multimarket contact intensity," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    9. Ma, Wenliang & Wang, Qiang & Yang, Hangjun & Zhang, Yahua, 2019. "An analysis of price competition and price wars in Australia's domestic airline market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 163-172.
    10. Jose N. Uribe, 2020. "Multipoint contact without forbearance? How coverage synergies shape equity analysts' forecasting performance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(10), pages 1901-1932, October.
    11. Coccorese, Paolo & Pellecchia, Alfonso, 2013. "Multimarket contact, competition and pricing in banking," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 187-214.
    12. Leheyda, Nina, 2008. "Market Power, Multimarket Contact and Pricing: Some Evidence from the US Automobile Market," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-118, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    13. Saadet Kasman & Adnan Kasman, 2016. "Multimarket contact, market power and financial stability in the Turkish banking industry," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 361-382, March.
    14. Degl’Innocenti, Marta & Girardone, Claudia & Torluccio, Giuseppe, 2014. "Diversification, multimarket contacts and profits in the leasing industry," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 231-252.

  11. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2005. "Verifiable Offers and the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1016-1031, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Bacchiega, Emanuele & Bonroy, Olivier & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2020. "Auctions vs. negotiations in vertically related markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    2. Koen V. Hindriks & Dmytro Tykhonov & Mathijs M. Weerdt, 2012. "Qualitative One-to-Many Multi-Issue Negotiation: Approximating the QVA," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 49-77, January.
    3. Gregory E. Kersten & Tomasz Wachowicz & Margaret Kersten, 2016. "Competition, Transparency, and Reciprocity: A Comparative Study of Auctions and Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 693-722, July.
    4. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 08-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    5. Thomas, Charles J., 2018. "An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 269-293.
    6. Nicolas Fugger & Elena Katok & Achim Wambach, 2016. "Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(2), pages 518-533, February.
    7. Burns, Nathaniel A. & Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2023. "Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    8. Bo Yu & Gregory E. Kersten & Rustam Vahidov, 2022. "An experimental examination of credible information disclosure, perception of fairness, and intention to do business in online multi-bilateral negotiations," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 32(1), pages 217-237, March.

  12. Charles J. Thomas, 2005. "Using Reserve Prices To Deter Collusion In Procurement Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 301-326, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Zarate, 2021. "Signaling corruption through conspicuous consumption," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4531, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    2. Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal, 2010. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-120/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 28 Mar 2013.
    3. Sümeyra Atmaca & Riccardo Camboni & Elena Podkolzina & Koen Schoors & Paola Valbonesi, 2022. "Setting reserve prices in repeated procurement auctions," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0289, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".

  13. Thomas, Charles J., 2004. "The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 679-692, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2013. "Mergers in Bidding Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-012/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation," Working Papers 0503E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    3. Gudmundsson, Sveinn Vidar & Merkert, Rico & Redondi, Renato, 2020. "Cost structure effects of horizontal airline mergers and acquisitions," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 136-144.
    4. Dalkir, Serdar & Logan, John W. & Masson, Robert T., 2000. "Mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets: the effects on prices and efficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 383-413, April.
    5. Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2013. "Information concentration in common value environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 183-203, September.
    6. Bouckaert, Jan & Van Moer, Geert, 2021. "Joint bidding and horizontal subcontracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    7. Charles J. Thomas, 2021. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 730-741, September.
    8. Tong Li & Bingyu Zhang, 2015. "Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 188-214, May.
    9. Jeddy, Mohamed & Larue, Bruno, 2012. "Mergers, concurrent marketing mechanisms and the performance of sequential auctions," Working Papers 126945, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
    10. Charles J. Thomas, 2019. "A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 459-491, November.
    11. Thomas, Charles J., 1997. "Disincentives for cost-reducing investment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 359-363, December.
    12. Steven Tschantz & Philip Crooke & Luke Froeb, 2000. "Mergers in Sealed versus Oral Auctions," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 201-212.

  14. Thomas, Charles J., 2002. "The effect of asymmetric entry costs on Bertrand competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 589-609, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Israel J. Muñoz & Elena Huergo, 2005. "Entrada y competencia en los servicios de telecomunicaciones," Industrial Organization 0504002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Sela, Aner & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Auctions with Private Entry Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Thomas, Charles J., 2004. "The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 679-692, May.
    4. Montez, João & Schutz, Nicolas, 2018. "All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices," CEPR Discussion Papers 12963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Meza, Sergio & Tombak, Mihkel, 2009. "Endogenous location leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 687-707, November.
    6. Todd Kaplan & Aner Sela, 2022. "Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-14, September.
    7. Vintila Alexandra & Roman Mihai Daniel, 2021. "Bertrand competition under asymmetric conditions," Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence, Sciendo, vol. 15(1), pages 235-244, December.

  15. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2002. "A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 140-155, Spring.

    Cited by:

    1. Bacchiega, Emanuele & Bonroy, Olivier & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2020. "Auctions vs. negotiations in vertically related markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    2. Yuen Leng Chow & Isa E. Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, 2015. "Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 432-470, June.
    3. Gregory E. Kersten & Tomasz Wachowicz & Margaret Kersten, 2016. "Competition, Transparency, and Reciprocity: A Comparative Study of Auctions and Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 693-722, July.
    4. Charles J. Thomas, 2014. "How the Nature of Product Differentiation Affects Procurement Competition," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 323-344, October.
    5. Shakun D. Mago & Anya C. Savikhin & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Facing Your Opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests," Working Papers 12-15, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    6. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 08-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    7. Charles J. Thomas, 2021. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 730-741, September.
    8. Jim Engle-Warnick & Bradley Ruffle, 2006. "Buyer Concentration As A Source Of Countervailing Power: Evidence From Experimental Posted-Offer Markets," Departmental Working Papers 2006-12, McGill University, Department of Economics.
    9. Jim Engle-Warnick & Bradley Ruffle, 2002. "Buyer Countervailing Power versus Monopoly Power: Evidence from Experimental Posted-Offer Markets," Economics Papers 2002-W14, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    10. Thomas, Charles J., 2018. "An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 269-293.
    11. Ping Cheng & Zhenguo Lin & Yingchun Liu, 2021. "Competing Selling Strategies in the Housing Market," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 394-413, October.
    12. Cary A. Deck & Bart J. Wilson, 2005. "Auction Markets for Evaluations," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 42-62, July.
    13. Burns, Nathaniel A. & Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2023. "Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    14. Georgia Kosmopoulou & Xueqi Zhou, 2014. "Price Adjustment Policies in Procurement Contracting: An Analysis of Bidding Behavior," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 77-112, March.
    15. Charles J. Thomas, 2019. "A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 459-491, November.
    16. Bo Yu & Gregory E. Kersten & Rustam Vahidov, 2022. "An experimental examination of credible information disclosure, perception of fairness, and intention to do business in online multi-bilateral negotiations," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 32(1), pages 217-237, March.

  16. Thomas, Charles J., 1997. "Disincentives for cost-reducing investment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 359-363, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Aditi Sengupta, 2013. "Incentive to Reduce Cost under Incomplete Information," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2013-10, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    2. Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 1-18.
    3. Lebrun, Bernard, 2009. "Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1341-1351, May.
    4. Charles J. Thomas, 2010. "Information Revelation And Buyer Profits In Repeated Procurement Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 79-105, March.
    5. Robert Gérin-Lajoie & Yves Richelle & Jacques Robert, 2000. "Appels d'Offres et Enchères Ouvertes : Enjeux de Design et Propositions," CIRANO Project Reports 2000rp-09, CIRANO.
    6. Charles J. Thomas, 2021. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 730-741, September.
    7. Bernard Lebrun, 2004. "Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions," Working Papers 2004_2, York University, Department of Economics.
    8. Kyung Hwan Baik & Sang-Kee Kim, 2020. "Observable versus unobservable R&D investments in duopolies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 37-66, June.
    9. Charles J. Thomas, 2019. "A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 459-491, November.
    10. Sengupta Aditi, 2016. "Investment Secrecy and Competitive R&D," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(3), pages 1573-1583, September.

More information

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2012-12-15 2017-04-23
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2012-12-15
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2017-04-23
  4. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2016-12-11
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2016-12-11
  6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2017-04-23

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