[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/e/pja163.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Pedro Daniel Jara-Moroni

Personal Details

First Name:Pedro
Middle Name:Daniel
Last Name:Jara-Moroni
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pja163
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrojaramoroni/
Terminal Degree:2008 Paris School of Economics (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Departamento de Economía
Facultad de Administración y Economía
Universidad de Santiago de Chile

Santiago de Chile, Chile
http://www.economia.usach.cl/
RePEc:edi:deschcl (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2021. "Efficient Entry in Cournot (Global) games," FAE-USACH Working Papers Series 991944255606116, Facultad de Administración y Economía. Universidad de Santiago de Chile.
  2. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2021. "Endogenous stackelberg leadership: the symmetric case," FAE-USACH Working Papers Series 991943756506116, Facultad de Administración y Economía. Universidad de Santiago de Chile.
  3. Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2013. "A Dominance Solvable Global Game with Strategic Substitutes," Documentos de Trabajo 440, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  4. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2009. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts: concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substitutabilities," PSE Working Papers halshs-00574957, HAL.
  5. Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2008. "The Cournot outcome as the result of price competition," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587866, HAL.
  6. Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2008. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587863, HAL.
  7. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2007. "Expectational coordination in a class of economic models: Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities," Working Papers halshs-00587837, HAL.

Articles

  1. Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara‐Moroni, 2021. "Global Games With Strategic Substitutes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 141-173, February.
  2. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2018. "Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 153-156.
  3. Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2015. "A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-11.
  4. Cortés, Cristián E. & Jara-Moroni, Pedro & Moreno, Eduardo & Pineda, Cristobal, 2013. "Stochastic transit equilibrium," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-44.
  5. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
  6. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2011. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 205-246, June.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2021. "Efficient Entry in Cournot (Global) games," FAE-USACH Working Papers Series 991944255606116, Facultad de Administración y Economía. Universidad de Santiago de Chile.

    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Sunanda & Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2024. "Entry under placement uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 157-196.

  2. Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2013. "A Dominance Solvable Global Game with Strategic Substitutes," Documentos de Trabajo 440, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

    Cited by:

    1. Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara‐Moroni, 2021. "Global Games With Strategic Substitutes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 141-173, February.
    2. Roy, Sunanda & Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2024. "Entry under placement uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 157-196.
    3. Lee, Kyounghun & Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl, 2021. "The role of large players in global games with strategic complements and substitutes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    4. Roy, Sunanda & Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2021. "Entry under placement uncertainty," ISU General Staff Papers 202102240800001096, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    5. Aviad Heifetz, 2019. "Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1277-1296, December.

  3. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2009. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts: concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substitutabilities," PSE Working Papers halshs-00574957, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2013. "A Dominance Solvable Global Game with Strategic Substitutes," Documentos de Trabajo 440, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    2. Roger Guesnerie, 2008. "Macroeconomic and monetary policies from the "eductive" viewpoint," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586749, HAL.
    3. George W. Evans & William A.Branch, 2010. "Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2010-4, University of Oregon Economics Department.
    4. Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2013. "Asymmetric information and rationalizability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 789-804, November.
    5. Roy, Sunanda & Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2024. "Entry under placement uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 157-196.
    6. Shurojit Chatterji & Atsushi Kajii, 2020. "Decentralizability of efficient allocations with heterogenous forecasts," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 016, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. M. Ali Khan & Kali P. Rath & Yeneng Sun & Haomiao Yu, 2012. "Large Games with a Bio-Social Typology," Working Papers 035, Toronto Metropolitan University, Department of Economics.
    8. Khan, Mohammed Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Yongchao, 2017. "On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    9. Rabah Amir, 2019. "Supermodularity and Complementarity in Economic Theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 487-496, April.
    10. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
    11. George W. Evans & Roger Guesnerie & Bruce Mcgough, 2010. "Eductive stability in real business cycle models," PSE Working Papers halshs-00565011, HAL.
    12. Mordecai Kurz & Maurizio Motolese, 2007. "Diverse Beliefs and Time Variability of Risk Premia," Discussion Papers 06-044, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    13. Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2020. "The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    14. Haomiao Yu, 2014. "Rationalizability in large games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 457-479, February.
    15. Qiao, Lei & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2016. "On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: A complete characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 89-98.
    16. Fu, Haifeng & Yu, Haomiao, 2015. "Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 7-15.
    17. He, Wei & Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng, 2017. "Modeling infinitely many agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    18. Łukasz Balbus & Paweł Dziewulski & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2019. "A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 497-523, April.
    19. Mordecai Kurz, 2011. "Symposium: on the role of market belief in economic dynamics, an introduction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 189-204, June.

  4. Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2008. "The Cournot outcome as the result of price competition," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587866, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. A. Bërdëllima, 2021. "Duopoly price competition with limited capacity," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 143-154, April.

  5. Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2008. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587863, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Hector Calvo Pardo, 2005. "Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a walrasian auctioneer," Working Papers halshs-00590718, HAL.
    2. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2007. "Expectational coordination in a class of economic models: Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities," Working Papers halshs-00587837, HAL.
    3. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2018. "Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 153-156.
    4. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2009. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts: concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substitutabilities," PSE Working Papers halshs-00574957, HAL.
    5. Khan, Mohammed Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Yongchao, 2017. "On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    6. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Chen Qu, 2020. "Iterated elimination procedures," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(2), pages 437-465, September.
    7. Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & David Schmeidler, 2020. "Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games," Papers 2005.01839, arXiv.org.
    8. Haomiao Yu, 2014. "Rationalizability in large games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 457-479, February.
    9. Qiao, Lei & Yu, Haomiao, 2014. "On the space of players in idealized limit games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 177-190.
    10. Qiao, Lei & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2016. "On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: A complete characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 89-98.
    11. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo & Chen Qu, 2016. "Rationalizability in general situations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 147-167, January.

  6. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2007. "Expectational coordination in a class of economic models: Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities," Working Papers halshs-00587837, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Roger Guesnerie, 2008. "Macroeconomic and monetary policies from the "eductive" viewpoint," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586749, HAL.
    2. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.

Articles

  1. Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara‐Moroni, 2021. "Global Games With Strategic Substitutes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 141-173, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Sunanda & Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2024. "Entry under placement uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 157-196.
    2. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2024. "Panics and prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).

  2. Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2015. "A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-11.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Cortés, Cristián E. & Jara-Moroni, Pedro & Moreno, Eduardo & Pineda, Cristobal, 2013. "Stochastic transit equilibrium," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-44.

    Cited by:

    1. Du, Muqing & Chen, Anthony, 2022. "Sensitivity analysis for transit equilibrium assignment and applications to uncertainty analysis," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 175-202.
    2. Dea van Lierop & Madhav G. Badami & Ahmed M. El-Geneidy, 2018. "What influences satisfaction and loyalty in public transport? A review of the literature," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(1), pages 52-72, January.
    3. André de Palma & Moez Kilani & Stef Proost, 2015. "Discomfort in mass transit and its implication for scheduling and pricing," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01311131, HAL.
    4. Suman, Hemant & Larrain, Homero & Muñoz, Juan Carlos, 2021. "The impact of using a naïve approach in the limited-stop bus service design problem," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 45-61.
    5. Hamdouch, Younes & Szeto, W.Y. & Jiang, Y., 2014. "A new schedule-based transit assignment model with travel strategies and supply uncertainties," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 35-67.
    6. Trozzi, Valentina & Gentile, Guido & Bell, Michael G.H. & Kaparias, Ioannis, 2013. "Dynamic user equilibrium in public transport networks with passenger congestion and hyperpaths," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 266-285.
    7. Cortés, Cristián E. & Donoso, Pedro & Gutiérrez, Leonel & Herl, Daniel & Muñoz, Diego, 2023. "A recursive stochastic transit equilibrium model estimated using passive data from Santiago, Chile," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    8. Soto, Guillermo & Larrain, Homero & Muñoz, Juan Carlos, 2017. "A new solution framework for the limited-stop bus service design problem," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 67-85.
    9. Szeto, W.Y. & Jiang, Y., 2014. "Transit route and frequency design: Bi-level modeling and hybrid artificial bee colony algorithm approach," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 235-263.
    10. Jiang, Y. & Szeto, W.Y., 2016. "Reliability-based stochastic transit assignment: Formulations and capacity paradox," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 93(PA), pages 181-206.

  4. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2011. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 205-246, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2014-02-02 2022-09-12 2022-09-19
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2022-09-12 2022-09-19
  3. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2014-02-02
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2014-02-02

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Pedro Daniel Jara-Moroni should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.