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Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements

Author

Listed:
  • Moshe Babaioff

    (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel)

  • Tomer Ezra

    (Sapienza University of Rome, 00185 Rome, Italy)

  • Uriel Feige

    (Weizmann Institute, Rehovot 7610001, Israel)

Abstract
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well-established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion for which, to qualify as fair, an allocation needs to give every agent at least a substantial fraction of the agent’s MMS. In this paper, we consider the case of arbitrary (unequal) entitlements. We explain shortcomings in previous attempts that extend the MMS to unequal entitlements. Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a new notion of a share, the AnyPrice share (APS), that is appropriate for settings with arbitrary entitlements. Even for the equal entitlements case, this notion is new and satisfies APS ⩾ MMS , for which the inequality is sometimes strict. We present two equivalent definitions for the APS (one as a minimization problem, the other as a maximization problem) and provide comparisons between the APS and previous notions of fairness. Our main result concerns additive valuations and arbitrary entitlements, for which we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives every agent at least a 3 5 - fraction of the agent’s APS. This algorithm can also be viewed as providing strategies in a certain natural bidding game, and these strategies secure each agent at least a 3 5 - fraction of the agent’s APS.

Suggested Citation

  • Moshe Babaioff & Tomer Ezra & Uriel Feige, 2024. "Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 49(4), pages 2180-2211, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:49:y:2024:i:4:p:2180-2211
    DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.0199
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