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Land and Power

Author

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  • Robinson, James A.
  • Baland, Jean-Marie
Abstract
We study the implications of electoral corruption for resource allocation, factor market equilibrium and inequality. We focus on the control of the voting of agricultural workers by landlords and show that if the employment relationship is subject to moral hazard then the resulting rents conceded by employers give them a comparative advantage in controlling the political activities of their workers. This generates an added incentive to own land and leads to inefficiently high land concentration. We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958.

Suggested Citation

  • Robinson, James A. & Baland, Jean-Marie, 2003. "Land and Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 3800, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3800
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan Conning, 2002. "Latifundia Economics," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 02/1, Hunter College Department of Economics.
    2. Benabou, Roland, 2005. "Inequality, Technology and the Social Contract," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 25, pages 1595-1638, Elsevier.
    3. Bandiera Oriana & Levy Gilat, 2004. "Robin Hood's Compromise: The Economics of Moderate Land Reforms," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, December.
    4. Mohammad Omrani & Mohammad Nabi Shahiki Tash & Ahmad Akbari, 2017. "Price Transmission in Iranian Wholesale-retail Meat Market: Implications for Market Power," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(3), pages 594-601.
    5. Jonathan H. Conning & James A. Robinson, 2001. "Land Reform and the Political Organization of Agriculture," Department of Economics Working Papers 2001-10, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    6. Conning, Jonathan H. & Robinson, James A., 2007. "Property rights and the political organization of agriculture," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 416-447, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Employment; Land; Inequality; Productivity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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