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Robert W. Rosenthal

(deceased)

Personal Details

This person is deceased (Date: 07 Feb 2002)
First Name:Robert
Middle Name:W.
Last Name:Rosenthal
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pro267
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_W._Rosenthal
Terminal Degree:1970 Graduate School of Business; Stanford University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Books

Working papers

  1. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and Seek in Arizona," Experimental 0312001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Maria Angeles de Frutos & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1997. "On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions," Papers 0077, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  3. Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1996. "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability," Papers 0065, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  4. Robert W. Rosenthal & Ruqu Wang, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Papers 0060, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  5. Krishna, V. & Rosenthal, R.W., 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Papers 04-95-06, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  6. Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1994. "On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitments by Monopolists," Papers 0045, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  7. Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1993. "Asking Prices as Commitment Devices," Papers 0042, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  8. Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods," Papers 0035, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  9. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Rules of Thumb in Games," Papers 0034, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  10. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Bargaining Rules of Thumb," Papers 0033, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  11. Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Dynamic Duopoly with Slowly Changing Customer Loyalties," Papers 0037, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  12. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1990. "Some Inefficiency Implication of Generational Politics and Exchange," NBER Working Papers 3354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Raquel Fernandez & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1989. "Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations Revisted," NBER Working Papers 2981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Raquel Fernandez & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1988. "Sovereign-debt Renegotiations: A Strategic Analysis," NBER Working Papers 2597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Assaf Razin & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1988. "A Strategic Altruism Model In Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold," NBER Working Papers 2699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Jovanovic, Boyan & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "Anonymous Sequential Games," Working Papers 86-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  17. Ehud Kalai & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance," Discussion Papers 215, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Market Games with Production and Public Commodities," Discussion Papers 156, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. CHAMPSAUR, Paul & ROBERTS, Donald John & ROSENTHAL, Robert W., 1975. "On cores in economies with public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE 233, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "Lindahl's Solution and Values for A Public-Goods Example," Discussion Papers 132, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "An Arbitration Model for Normal-Form Games," Discussion Papers 121, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "Induced Outcomes in Cooperative Normal-Form Games," Discussion Papers 178, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  23. ROSENTHAL, Robert W., 1975. "Voting majority sizes," LIDAM Reprints CORE 221, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  24. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1974. "Sufficient Conditions for Insensitivity in Linear Models," Discussion Papers 91, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  25. Andrew Postlewaite & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1973. "Disadvantageous Syndicates," Discussion Papers 40, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  26. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1973. "Correlated Equilibria in Some Classes of Two-Person Games," Discussion Papers 45, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 114-133, July.
  2. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and seek in Arizona," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(2), pages 273-293, December.
  3. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 278-295, November.
  4. Dale, Donald J. & Morgan, John & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2002. "Coordination through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 52-88, January.
  5. Robert W. Rosenthal, 2001. "Trust and social efficiencies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(3), pages 413-428.
  6. Gale, Douglas & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2001. "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability: Addendum," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 164-174, March.
  7. Lang, Kevin & Rosenthal, Robert W, 2001. "Bargaining Piecemeal or All at Once?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 526-540, July.
  8. Gale, Douglas & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1999. "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-40, January.
  9. Angeles de Frutos, Maria & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1998. "On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 201-221, May.
  10. Rosenthal, Robert, 1997. "Some issues in the replication of social science research," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 121-123, June.
  11. Chen, Yongmin & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Dynamic duopoly with slowly changing customer loyalties," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 269-296, May.
  12. Krishna, Vijay & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-31, November.
  13. Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1996. "On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitments by Monopolists," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 207-220, Summer.
  14. Rosenthal, Robert W. & Wang, Ruqu, 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 32-55, November.
  15. Chen, Yongmin & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1996. "Asking Prices as Commitment Devices," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(1), pages 129-155, February.
  16. Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1994. "Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 590-607, Winter.
  17. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1993. "Some Inefficiency Implications Of Generational Politics And Exchange," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 27-42, March.
  18. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Suicide attempts and signalling games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-33, July.
  19. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Bargaining rules of thumb," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 15-24, September.
  20. Robert W. Rosenthal & Ruqu Wang, 1993. "An Explanation of Inefficiency in Markets and a Justification for Buy-and-Hold Strategies," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(3), pages 609-624, August.
  21. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Rules of thumb in games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-13, September.
  22. Glazer, Jacob & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1992. "A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1435-1438, November.
  23. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1991. "On the incentives associated with sovereign debt," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 167-176, February.
  24. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1991. "A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 237-243, May.
  25. Kevin Lang & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1991. "The Contractors' Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 329-338, Autumn.
  26. Raquel Fernandez & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1990. "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 331-349.
  27. Brown, James N & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1065-1081, September.
  28. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Razin, Assaf & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1261-1268, December.
  29. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1989. "A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(3), pages 273-291.
  30. Masso, Jordi & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1989. "More on the "anti-folk theorem"," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 281-290, June.
  31. Robert W. Rosenthal & Richard H. Spady, 1989. "Duopoly with Both Ruin and Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(4), pages 834-851, November.
  32. Jovanovic, Boyan & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1988. "Anonymous sequential games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 77-87, February.
  33. Friedman, James W. & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "A positive approach to non-cooperative games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 235-251, September.
  34. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1986. "Dynamic Duopoly with Incomplete Customer Loyalties," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 399-406, June.
  35. Fishburn, Peter C. & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "Noncooperative games and nontransitive preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-7, August.
  36. Constantinides, George M. & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1984. "Strategic analysis of the competitive exercise of certain financial options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 128-138, February.
  37. Robert W. Rosenthal & Andrew Weiss, 1984. "Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in a Market with Asymmetric Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(2), pages 333-342.
  38. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1982. "A Dynamic Oligopoly Game with Lags in Demand: More on the Monotonicity of Price in the Number of Sellers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 353-360, June.
  39. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1982. "A dynamic model of duopoly with customer loyalties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 69-76, June.
  40. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1982. "A model of far-sighted electoral competition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 289-297, April.
  41. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
  42. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1980. "A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1575-1579, September.
  43. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1980. "Congestion tolls: Equilibrium and optimality," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(2), pages 231-232, June.
  44. Rosenthal, R W, 1979. "Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1353-1366, November.
  45. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1978. "Arbitration of Two-party Disputes under Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 595-604.
  46. Aumann, R. J. & Gardner, R. J. & Rosenthal, R. W., 1977. "Core and value for a public-goods economy: An example," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 363-365, August.
  47. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1976. "Lindahl's solution and values for a public-goods example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 37-41, March.
  48. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Technical Note—Sufficient Conditions for Insensitivity in Linear Models," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(1), pages 183-188, February.
  49. Champsaur, Paul & Roberts, Donald John & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1975. "On Cores in Economies with Public Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(3), pages 751-764, October.
  50. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1975. "Voting Majority Sizes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(2), pages 293-299, March.
  51. Joseph T. Howson, Jr. & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1974. "Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(3), pages 313-315, November.
  52. Postlewaite, Andrew & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1974. "Disadvantageous syndicates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 324-326, November.
  53. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1973. "Taxation vs. Prohibition of an External Diseconomy by Direct Vote: A Game Theoretic Approach," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 14(2), pages 414-420, June.
  54. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1972. "Cooperative games in effectiveness form," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 88-101, August.
  55. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1971. "External economies and cores," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 182-188, June.
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:1:y:1976:i:1:p:82-88 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:8:y:1983:i:3:p:327-341 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:7:y:1982:i:3:p:401-409 is not listed on IDEAS

Books

  1. Rosenthal,Robert, 2009. "Judgment Studies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521101479, January.

More information

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Statistics

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Rankings

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  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
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  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  15. h-index
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  20. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  21. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  22. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  23. Closeness measure in co-authorship network
  24. Betweenness measure in co-authorship network
  25. Record of graduates

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2003-12-14

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