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Sungho Yun

Personal Details

First Name:Sungho
Middle Name:
Last Name:Yun
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pyu80
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

College of Economics and Business Administration
Hanyang University

Ansan, South Korea
http://ibus.hanyang.ac.kr/
RePEc:edi:cbhaykr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2007. "Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils," CESifo Working Paper Series 1993, CESifo.

Articles

  1. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2023. "Information acquisition and countervailing incentives," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
  2. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2021. "Supervisory information and loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  3. Sungho Yun, 2021. "Regulating corruptible certifier behavior," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 109-135, April.
  4. Sungho Yun, 2018. "Minimum safety standards with asymmetric safety costs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 152-173, April.
  5. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2017. "Limited Communication and Responsibility Budgeting," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(3), pages 548-564, September.
  6. Sungho Yun, 2017. "Parallel Imports, their Deterrence and Accommodation with Service Differentiation," The International Trade Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 217-231, May.
  7. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2014. "Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 1069-1078, June.
  8. Yun Sungho, 2012. "Costs of Engaging in Corruption: Equilibrium with Extortion and Framing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, December.
  9. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2011. "Granting An Exit Option To Conduct An Audit," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 438-463, October.
  10. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2010. "Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 179-198, March.
  11. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2008. "Informed principal and information gathering agent," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(4), pages 229-244, December.
  12. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2006. "Gathering Information By A Partially Informed Agent," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(04), pages 675-694.
  13. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2007. "Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils," CESifo Working Paper Series 1993, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. J. Atsu Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara & Eric Strobl, 2007. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," Working Papers 0702, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    2. Bond Philip, 2009. "Contracting in the Presence of Judicial Agency," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-34, November.

Articles

  1. Sungho Yun, 2017. "Parallel Imports, their Deterrence and Accommodation with Service Differentiation," The International Trade Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 217-231, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Li, Hai & Shao, Jing & Zhu, Stuart X., 2018. "Parallel importation in a supply Chain: The impact of gray market structure," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 220-241.

  2. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2014. "Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 1069-1078, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Thanh Tran & Kanghyun Yoon & Stefan Genchev, 2017. "Lump‐Sum versus Pay‐As‐You‐Go: The Moderating Effect of Contract Types on the Optimal Logistics Decisions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(4), pages 547-555, June.

  3. Yun Sungho, 2012. "Costs of Engaging in Corruption: Equilibrium with Extortion and Framing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2021. "Supervisory information and loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Sungho Yun, 2021. "Regulating corruptible certifier behavior," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 109-135, April.

  4. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2010. "Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 179-198, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/417, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Anh‐Tuan Doan & Bich‐Thanh Truong & Chi‐Cuong Nguyen & Phan‐Tam‐Nhu Nguyen & Hai‐Yen Truong & Anh‐Tuan Le, 2023. "Corruption and corporate leverage in an emerging economy: The role of economic freedom," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(2), pages 599-629, June.
    3. Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 425-442.
    4. Bac, Mehmet, 2018. "Wages, performance and harassment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 232-248.
    5. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco Alexander Schwarz, 2021. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," CESifo Working Paper Series 8968, CESifo.
    6. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty corruption and citizen feedback," Working Papers 2015/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    7. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2021. "Supervisory information and loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    8. Gao, Ruoxin & Yao, Shiqing & Yang, Ruina, 2024. "Responsible audit and consumer awareness under collusion risk," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 314(2), pages 466-476.
    9. Sungho Yun, 2021. "Regulating corruptible certifier behavior," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 109-135, April.
    10. Seung Han Yoo, 2014. "Competition, Corruption and Institutional Design," Discussion Paper Series 1406, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    11. Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
    12. Rashedul Hasan & Muhammad Ashfaq, 2021. "Corruption and its diverse effect on credit risk: global evidence," Future Business Journal, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-13, December.
    13. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
    14. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Preemptive Bribery with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 13/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    15. Yun Sungho, 2012. "Costs of Engaging in Corruption: Equilibrium with Extortion and Framing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, December.
    16. Di Liddo, Giuseppe & Vinella, Annalisa, 2024. "Global public good provision in emergency states: A model of (asymmetric) yardstick competition between rent-seeking governments," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    17. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015. "Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
    18. Mehmet Baç, 2023. "Quid pro quo harassment, contracts and liability," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 24-45, February.
    19. Benjamin Florian Siggelkow & Jan Trockel & Oliver Dieterle, 2018. "An inspection game of internal audit and the influence of whistle-blowing," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 88(7), pages 883-914, September.
    20. Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio, 2012. "Truthful Reporting, Moral Hazard and Purely Soft Information," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2012-029, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    21. Andrew Samuel & Amy Farmer & Fabio Mendez, 2020. "Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits, tickets, or both?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(4), pages 420-441, September.
    22. Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023. "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    23. Erica L. Plambeck & Terry A. Taylor, 2016. "Supplier Evasion of a Buyer’s Audit: Implications for Motivating Supplier Social and Environmental Responsibility," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 18(2), pages 184-197, May.
    24. Mawani, Amin & Trivedi, Viswanath Umashanker, 2021. "Collusive vs. coercively corrupt tax auditors and their impact on tax compliance," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C).
    25. Angelucci, Charles & Russo, Antonio, 2012. "Moral Hazard in Hierarchies and Soft Information," TSE Working Papers 12-343, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    26. Leonardo Felli & Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2015. "Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing," CESifo Working Paper Series 5343, CESifo.
    27. Andrew Samuel & Ajit Mishra, 2022. "Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(3), pages 328-344, July.
    28. De Chiara, Alessandro & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Corruption, regulation, and investment incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    29. Kim, Sahrok & Praveen Parboteeah, K. & Cullen, John B. & Jeong, Nara, 2022. "Social institutions approach to women’s firm ownership and firm bribery activity: A study of small-sized firms in emerging markets," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1333-1349.
    30. An, Weihua & Kweon, Yesola, 2017. "Do higher government wages induce less corruption? Cross-country panel evidence," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 809-826.
    31. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty Corruption and Citizen Reports," CESifo Working Paper Series 5528, CESifo.

  5. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2008. "Informed principal and information gathering agent," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(4), pages 229-244, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Eulerich, Marc & Welge, Martin K., 2010. "Strategische Unternehmensüberwachung durch den mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrat in Krisenzeiten: Eine empirische Untersuchung der Überwachungspraxis von Arbeitnehmer- und Arbeitgebervertretern in DAX-Untern," Arbeitspapiere 225, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf.
    2. Justin Downs, 2021. "Information gathering by overconfident agents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 554-568, August.

  6. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2006. "Gathering Information By A Partially Informed Agent," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(04), pages 675-694.

    Cited by:

    1. Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.

  7. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Finkle, Aaron, 2005. "Relying on information acquired by a principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 263-278, April.
    2. Dongsoo Shin & S. Andrew Starbird, 2009. "Risk Taking as Self Discipline in Contractual Relationships," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 289-304.
    3. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2008. "Informed principal and information gathering agent," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(4), pages 229-244, December.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

Featured entries

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki entries:
  1. Korean Economists

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