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Martin Szydlowski

Personal Details

First Name:Martin
Middle Name:
Last Name:Szydlowski
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psz41
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/martinszydl/

Affiliation

Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota

Minneapolis, Minnesota (United States)
http://www.csom.umn.edu/
RePEc:edi:csumnus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Ivan Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2019. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," 2019 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Martin Szydlowski & Briana Chang, 2017. "The Market for Conflicted Advice," 2017 Meeting Papers 133, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking," Discussion Papers 1525, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Strulovici, Bruno & Szydlowski, Martin, 2012. "On the Smoothness of Value Functions," MPRA Paper 36326, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Jan 2012.
  5. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Jeffrey C. Ely & Martin Szydlowski, 2020. "Moving the Goalposts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 468-506.
  2. Szydlowski, Martin, 2019. "Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  3. Strulovici, Bruno & Szydlowski, Martin, 2015. "On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 1016-1055.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Ivan Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2019. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," 2019 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.

  2. Martin Szydlowski & Briana Chang, 2017. "The Market for Conflicted Advice," 2017 Meeting Papers 133, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Paula Onuchic, 2021. "Advisors with Hidden Motives," Papers 2103.07446, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
    2. Yang Sun, 2021. "Index Fund Entry and Financial Product Market Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 500-523, January.
    3. Utz Weitzel & Michael Kirchler, 2021. "The Banker's Oath And Financial Advice," Working Papers 2021-04, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    4. Dinev, Nikolay, 2017. "Voluntary Bankruptcy as Preemptive Persuasion," Economics Series 334, Institute for Advanced Studies.

  3. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking," Discussion Papers 1525, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.
    2. Felipe S. Iachan, 2020. "Capital Budgeting and Risk Taking Under Credit Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 4292-4314, September.
    3. Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022. "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    4. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2023. "Termination as an incentive device," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    5. Hackbarth, Dirk & Rivera, Alejandro & Wong, Tak-Yuen, 2018. "Optimal Short-Termism," CEPR Discussion Papers 12588, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Westerfield, Mark M., 2021. "Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 560-581.
    7. Zhang, Yuqian & Yang, Zhaojun, 2024. "Dynamic incentive contracts for ESG investing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    8. Morellec, Erwan & Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon, 2018. "Agency Conflicts over the Short and Long Run: Short-termism, Long-termism, and Pay-for-Luck," CEPR Discussion Papers 12720, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon & Morellec, Erwan, 2020. "Agency conflicts and short- versus long-termism in corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 718-742.
    10. Strulovici, Bruno & Szydlowski, Martin, 2015. "On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 1016-1055.

  4. Strulovici, Bruno & Szydlowski, Martin, 2012. "On the Smoothness of Value Functions," MPRA Paper 36326, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Jan 2012.

    Cited by:

    1. Fei Li, 2013. "Efficient Learning and Job Turnover in the Labor Market," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Martin Szydlowski, 2014. "Incentives, Project Choice, and Dynamic Multitasking," 2014 Meeting Papers 1240, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Dmitry Livdan & Alexander Nezlobin, 2017. "Accounting rules, equity valuation, and growth options," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 1122-1155, September.
    4. Nezlobin, Alexander, 2018. "Dynamic Investment Models in Accounting Research," Foundations and Trends(R) in Accounting, now publishers, vol. 12(3), pages 216-297, December.
    5. Jean-Paul Décamps & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2019. "A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory," Post-Print halshs-02282092, HAL.
    6. Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
    7. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    8. Fudenberg, Drew & Romanyuk, Gleb & Strack, Philipp, 2017. "Active learning with a misspecified prior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    9. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    10. Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 2012. "Breakdowns," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 396, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    11. J. Aislinn Bohren, 2011. "Stochastic Games in Continuous Time: Persistent Actions in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Aug 2014.
    12. John K.-H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2013. "Discounting, Values, and Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 896-939.
    13. Shangen Li, 2021. "Strategic Exploration for Innovation," Papers 2108.07218, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    14. Huang, Yao Tung & Kwok, Yue Kuen, 2014. "Analysis of optimal dynamic withdrawal policies in withdrawal guarantee products," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 19-43.
    15. Ke, T. Tony & Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, 2019. "Optimal learning before choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 383-437.
    16. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

  5. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Cheng, 2005. "Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12403, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    3. Thibaut Mastrolia & Dylan Possamaï, 2018. "Moral Hazard Under Ambiguity," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 179(2), pages 452-500, November.
    4. Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1405-1440, July.
    5. Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022. "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    6. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers 15, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, revised 02 Aug 2019.
    7. Hansen, Peter G., 2022. "New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    8. Li, Rui, 2017. "Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 74-91.
    9. Martin Dumav, 2021. "Moral Hazard, Dynamic Incentives, and Ambiguous Perceptions," Papers 2110.15229, arXiv.org.
    10. Yaoyao Wu & Jinqiang Yang & Zhentao Zou, 2018. "Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 141-157, July.
    11. Jaeyoung Sung, 2022. "Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(2), pages 593-642, September.
    12. Peter G. Hansen, 2021. "New Formulations of Ambiguous Volatility with an Application to Optimal Dynamic Contracting," Papers 2101.12306, arXiv.org.
    13. Qi Liu & Lei Lu & Bo Sun, 2018. "Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(4), pages 929-950, December.

Articles

  1. Jeffrey C. Ely & Martin Szydlowski, 2020. "Moving the Goalposts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 468-506.

    Cited by:

    1. Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2018. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    2. Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2024. "Contracting over persistent information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    3. Chang Liu, 2021. "Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards," Papers 2110.05643, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2017.
    5. Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022. "Shuttle Diplomacy," CEPR Discussion Papers 16934, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Aleksandr Alekseev, 2019. "Give Me a Challenge or Give Me a Raise," Working Papers 19-21, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    7. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon, 2023. "Markovian persuasion with two states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 292-314.
    8. Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Dynamic Evaluation Design," MPRA Paper 84133, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Patrick DeJarnette & David Dillenberger & Daniel Gottlieb & Pietro Ortoleva, 2014. "Time Lotteries and Stochastic Impatience," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 13 Jun 2018.
    10. Pietro Ortoleva & Evgenii Safonov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities," Papers 2108.12025, arXiv.org.
    11. Hebert, Benjamin & Zhong, Weijie, 2022. "Engagement Maximization," Research Papers 4035, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    12. Du, Ninghua & Shahriar, Quazi, 2024. "Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 284-299.
    13. Andrew Koh & Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, 2022. "Attention Capture," Papers 2209.05570, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    14. Jan Knoepfle, 2024. "Dynamic Competition for Attention," Papers 2409.18595, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    15. Kaya, Ayça, 2023. "Paying with information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
    16. Marco Serena, 2021. "The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 377-397, June.
    17. Gleb Romanyuk & Alex Smolin, 2019. "Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 250-276, May.
    18. Oleg Muratov, 2023. "Entrepreneur–Investor Information Design," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1431-1467, November.
    19. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon, 2023. "Markovian persuasion with two states," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119970, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Nuta, Shunya, 2024. "Starting rough, Dynamic persuasion with partial information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    21. Ian Ball, 2023. "Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1363-1391, July.
    22. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 705-721, October.
    23. Maxim Senkov, 2022. "Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp734, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    24. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    25. Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020. "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers 2009.05518, arXiv.org.
    26. Raphael Boleslavsky, 2023. "Waiting for Fake News," Papers 2304.04053, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    27. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    28. Zeinab Aboutalebi & Ayush Pant, 2021. "Believe ... and you are there. On Self-Confidence and Feedback," Working Papers 64, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    29. Teddy Mekonnen & Zeky Murra-Anton & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023. "Persuaded Search," Papers 2303.13409, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    30. Tal Alon & Paul Dutting & Yingkai Li & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2022. "Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts," Papers 2211.06850, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.

  2. Szydlowski, Martin, 2019. "Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Strulovici, Bruno & Szydlowski, Martin, 2015. "On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 1016-1055.

    Cited by:

    1. Dmitry Livdan & Alexander Nezlobin, 2017. "Accounting rules, equity valuation, and growth options," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 1122-1155, September.
    2. Weidong Tian & Zimu Zhu, 2020. "A Portfolio Choice Problem Under Risk Capacity Constraint," Papers 2005.13741, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    3. Nezlobin, Alexander, 2018. "Dynamic Investment Models in Accounting Research," Foundations and Trends(R) in Accounting, now publishers, vol. 12(3), pages 216-297, December.
    4. Jean-Paul Décamps & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2019. "A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory," Post-Print halshs-02282092, HAL.
    5. Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
    6. Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2021. "Renegotiation and Dynamic Inconsistency: Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting," Working Papers 2021-58, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    7. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    8. Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022. "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    9. Jean-Paul Décamps & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2022. "Learning about profitability and dynamic cash management," Post-Print hal-04164661, HAL.
    10. Teulings, Coen & Lange, Rutger-Jan, 2021. "The option value of vacant land: Don't build when demand for housing is booming," CEPR Discussion Papers 16023, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Weidong Tian & Zimu Zhu, 2022. "Smoothness of the Value Function for Optimal Consumption Model with Consumption-Wealth Utility and Borrowing Constraint," Papers 2210.01016, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    12. Jonas Al-Hadad & Zbigniew Palmowski, 2020. "Perpetual American options with asset-dependent discounting," Papers 2007.09419, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
    13. Lange, Rutger-Jan & Teulings, Coen N., 2024. "Irreversible investment under predictable growth: Why land stays vacant when housing demand is booming," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    14. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    15. Hackbarth, Dirk & Rivera, Alejandro & Wong, Tak-Yuen, 2018. "Optimal Short-Termism," CEPR Discussion Papers 12588, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Shangen Li, 2021. "Strategic Exploration for Innovation," Papers 2108.07218, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    17. Gorno, Leandro & Iachan, Felipe S., 2020. "Competitive real options under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    18. Kolb, Aaron M., 2019. "Strategic real options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 344-383.
    19. Daniel Krv{s}ek & Dylan Possamai, 2023. "Randomisation with moral hazard: a path to existence of optimal contracts," Papers 2311.13278, arXiv.org.
    20. Weidong Tian & Zimu Zhu, 2022. "A portfolio choice problem under risk capacity constraint," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 285-326, September.
    21. Ke, T. Tony & Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, 2019. "Optimal learning before choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 383-437.
    22. Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2020. "Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's principal-agent problem?," Papers 2007.05529, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (3) 2011-04-30 2012-01-25 2015-03-05
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2012-01-25 2015-03-05 2017-07-23
  3. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (2) 2012-09-09 2015-03-05
  4. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (2) 2011-04-30 2015-03-05
  5. NEP-ACC: Accounting and Auditing (1) 2019-10-14
  6. NEP-FLE: Financial Literacy and Education (1) 2017-07-23
  7. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2011-04-30
  8. NEP-MFD: Microfinance (1) 2015-03-05
  9. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2019-10-14
  10. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2012-01-25

Corrections

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