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Philip J. Reny

Personal Details

First Name:Philip
Middle Name:J.
Last Name:Reny
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pre196
https://economics.uchicago.edu/directory/philip-j-reny
Terminal Degree:1988 Department of Economics; Princeton University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Chicago

Chicago, Illinois (United States)
http://economics.uchicago.edu/
RePEc:edi:deuchus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny, 2017. "The Better Half of Selling Separately," Discussion Paper Series dp712, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  2. Ufuk Akcigit & Fernando Alvarez & Stephane Bonhomme & George M Constantinides & Douglas W Diamond & Eugene F Fama & David W Galenson & Michael Greenstone & Lars Peter Hansen & Uhlig Harald & James J H, 2017. "The Past, Present, and Future of Economics: A Celebration of the 125-Year Anniversary of the JPE and of Chicago Economics," Natural Field Experiments 00635, The Field Experiments Website.
  3. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2015. "Why Sex? and Why Only in Pairs?," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 07, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  4. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J., 2015. "How To Count Citations If You Must," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 08, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  5. Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny, 2012. "Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000625, David K. Levine.
  6. Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny, 2011. "Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization," Discussion Paper Series dp594, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  7. P. Reny, 2010. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 386, David K. Levine.
  8. Philip J Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000413, David K. Levine.
  9. Reny, Phil & Robson, Arthur, 2004. "Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views," Microeconomics.ca working papers robson-04-02-12-12-44-46, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 12 Feb 2004.
  10. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp292, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  11. Khanman, M. & Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1996. "An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism : Imperfect Information without Common Priors," Discussion Paper 1996-24, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1995. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Papers 9581, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  13. Reny, Philip J., 1995. "Local Payoff Security and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games," Working Paper Series 435, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  14. Reny, P.J. & Bhattacharya, U. & Reny, P.J. & Spiegel, M., 1993. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9318, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  15. Reny, P.J. & Winter, E. & Wooders, M.H., 1993. "The Partenered Core of a Game With Side Payments," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9317, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  16. McAfee, R. Preston & Reny, Philip J., 1990. "A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema," Working Papers 727, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Articles

  1. Philip J. Reny, 2021. "A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 7-9, April.
  2. Budish, Eric & Reny, Philip J., 2020. "An improved bound for the Shapley–Folkman theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 48-52.
  3. Roger B. Myerson & Philip J. Reny, 2020. "Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 495-531, March.
  4. Philip J. Reny, 2017. "Assignment Problems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(6), pages 1903-1914.
  5. Ohad Kadan & Philip J. Reny & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2017. "Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal‐Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 769-823, May.
  6. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny & Arthur J. Robson, 2017. "Why Sex? And why only in Pairs?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(607), pages 2730-2743, December.
  7. Philip J. Reny, 2016. "Introduction to the symposium on discontinuous games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 423-429, March.
  8. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2016. "How to Count Citations If You Must," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2722-2741, September.
  9. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Reny, Philip J., 2016. "Matching to share risk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  10. Philip J. Reny, 2016. "Equilibrium in discontinuous games without complete or transitive preferences," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 1-4, April.
  11. Philip J. Reny, 2016. "Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 553-569, March.
  12. Philip J. Reny, 2015. "A Characterization of Rationalizable Consumer Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 175-192, January.
  13. Philip J. Reny & Michael A. Williams, 2015. "The Deterrent Effect of Cable System Clustering on Overbuilders: An Economic Analysis of Behrend v. Comcast," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 519-527.
  14. Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny, 2015. "Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterization," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(1), pages 1-8, April.
  15. , & , J., 2015. "Maximal revenue with multiple goods: nonmonotonicity and other observations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
  16. Reny, Philip J., 2013. "A simple proof of the nonconcavifiability of functions with linear not-all-parallel contour sets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 506-508.
  17. Philip Reny & Eyal Winter & Myrna Wooders, 2012. "The partnered core of a game with side payments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 521-536, July.
  18. Reny, Philip J. & Wilkie, Simon J. & Williams, Michael A., 2012. "Tax incidence under imperfect competition: Comment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 399-402.
  19. Philip J. Reny, 2011. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure‐Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(2), pages 499-553, March.
  20. Philip Reny, 2011. "Strategic approximations of discontinuous games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 17-29, September.
  21. Reny, P.J., 2008. "2004 World Congress Special Issue," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 431-434, July.
  22. R. McAfee & Philip Reny, 2007. "The role of excess capacity in determining market power in natural gas transportation markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 209-223, December.
  23. Philip J Reny & Motty Perry, 2006. "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1231-1269, September.
  24. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2005. "An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(2), pages 567-592.
  25. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, July.
  26. Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2004. "Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 355-384, August.
  27. Reny, Philip J., 2003. "The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Vol. 1, 720 pp; Vol. 2, 672 pp," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 327-332, February.
  28. Govindan, Srihari & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2003. "A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 369-374, November.
  29. Arthur J. Robson & Philip J. Reny, 2002. "Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(24), pages 1-8.
  30. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2002. "An Efficient Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1199-1212, May.
  31. Reny, Philip J., 2001. "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-105, January.
  32. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
  33. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
  34. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J., 1999. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-285, January.
  35. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1998. "An extension of the KKMS theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 125-134, March.
  36. Kohlberg, Elon & Reny, Philip J., 1997. "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 280-313, August.
  37. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1996. "The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 298-311, August.
  38. Harris, Christopher & Reny, Philip & Robson, Arthur, 1995. "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 507-544, May.
  39. Bhattacharya Utpal & Reny Philip J. & Spiegel Matthew, 1995. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 136-170, February.
  40. Philip J. Reny, 1995. "Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-16, February.
  41. Elmes Susan & Reny Philip J., 1994. "On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-23, February.
  42. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
  43. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February.
  44. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April.
  45. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
  46. Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 627-649, May.
  47. Philip J. Reny, 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 103-118, Fall.
  48. Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 1990. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 406-422, December.
  49. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John & Reny, Philip J, 1989. "Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1451-1459, November.
  50. Chow, Gregory C. & Reny, Philip J., 1985. "On two methods for solving and estimating linear simultaneous equations under rational expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-75, September.

Chapters

  1. Philip J. Reny, 2008. "Philip J. Reny on Hugo F. Sonnenschein," Springer Books, in: Matthew O. Jackson & Andrew McLennan (ed.), Foundations in Microeconomic Theory, chapter 17, pages 395-424, Springer.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  3. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  6. Number of Citations
  7. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  8. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  18. h-index
  19. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  20. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  21. Number of Journal Pages
  22. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  23. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  24. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  27. Euclidian citation score
  28. Closeness measure in co-authorship network
  29. Betweenness measure in co-authorship network
  30. Wu-Index
  31. Record of graduates

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 13 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (8) 2005-09-17 2006-03-18 2009-12-19 2012-01-03 2012-01-18 2012-12-15 2012-12-22 2018-02-26. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2003-05-15 2005-09-17 2006-03-18 2009-12-19
  3. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (3) 2015-12-08 2016-01-18 2018-02-26
  4. NEP-SOG: Sociology of Economics (2) 2015-12-08 2016-01-18
  5. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic and Financial History (1) 2018-02-26
  6. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2018-02-26
  7. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2003-05-15

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