Paper 2023/326
A weakness in OCB3 used with short nonces allowing for a break of authenticity and confidentiality
Abstract
OCB3 is a mature and provably secure authenticated encryption mode of operation which allows for associated data (AEAD). This note reports a small flaw in the security proof of OCB3 that may cause a loss of security in practice, even if OCB3 is correctly implemented in a trustworthy and nonce-respecting module. The flaw is present when OCB3 is used with short nonces. It has security implications that are worse than nonce-repetition as confidentiality and authenticity are lost until the key is changed. The flaw is due to an implicit condition in the security proof and to the way OCB3 processes nonce. Different ways to fix the mode are presented.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Information Processing Letters
- Keywords
- OCB3Authenticated EncryptionForgeryPlaintext recovery
- Contact author(s)
-
jean lienardy @ mil be
frederic lafitte @ mil be - History
- 2023-03-06: approved
- 2023-03-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/326
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/326,
author = {Jean Liénardy and Frédéric Lafitte},
title = {A weakness in {OCB3} used with short nonces allowing for a break of authenticity and confidentiality},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/326},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/326}
}