Paper 2023/1771
A note on ``HAKECC: highly efficient authentication and key agreement scheme based on ECDH for RFID in IOT environment''
Abstract
We show that the Nikooghadam-Shahriari-Saeidi authentication and key agreement scheme [J. Inf. Secur. Appl., 76, 103523 (2023)] cannot resist impersonation attack, not as claimed. An adversary can impersonate the RFID reader to cheat the RFID tag. The drawback results from its simple secret key invoking mechanism. We also find it seems difficult to revise the scheme due to the inherent flaw.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- AuthenticationAnonymityKey agreementInternet of Things
- Contact author(s)
- caozhj @ shu edu cn
- History
- 2023-11-17: approved
- 2023-11-16: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1771
- License
-
CC0
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1771,
author = {Zhengjun Cao},
title = {A note on ``{HAKECC}: highly efficient authentication and key agreement scheme based on {ECDH} for {RFID} in {IOT} environment''},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1771},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1771}
}