Paper 2020/264
Plaintext Recovery Attacks against Linearly Decryptable Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
Nicholas Mainardi, Alessandro Barenghi, and Gerardo Pelosi
Abstract
Homomorphic encryption primitives have the potential to be the main enabler of privacy preserving computation delegation to cloud environments. One of the avenues which has been explored to reduce their significant computational overhead with respect to cleartext computation is the one of the so-called noise-free homomorphic encryption schemes. In this work, we present an attack against fully homomorphic encryption primitives where a distinguisher for a single plaintext value exists. We employ two noise-free homomorphic encryption schemes where such a property holds as our case studies, providing detailed attack procedure against them. We validate the effectiveness and performance of our attacks on prototype implementations of the said schemes, and suggest two countermeasures to our attack tailored to the schemes at hand.
Note: The final version of this work is published in the International Journal of Computers & Security, Volume 87, November 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101587
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. International Journal of Computers & Security, Volume 87
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.cose.2019.101587
- Keywords
- cryptanalysisfully homomorphic encryptionplaintext-recovery attack
- Contact author(s)
- nicholas mainardi @ polimi it
- History
- 2020-03-04: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/264
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/264,
author = {Nicholas Mainardi and Alessandro Barenghi and Gerardo Pelosi},
title = {Plaintext Recovery Attacks against Linearly Decryptable Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/264},
year = {2020},
doi = {10.1016/j.cose.2019.101587},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/264}
}