Paper 2020/1581
Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice
Jung Hee Cheon, Seungwan Hong, and Duhyeong Kim
Abstract
Recently, Li and Micciancio (ePrint 2020/1533) have proposed a passive attack on the CKKS approximate homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme, which allows an adversary to query decryption on valid ciphertexts. In this paper, we discuss for which applications such attack is applicable, and introduce an extension of the HEaaN library. In addition, we investigate the mitigation strategies of other HE libraries that support the CKKS scheme including HElib, PALISADE, Lattigo and SEAL.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- homomorphic encryptionapproximate encryptionpassive security
- Contact author(s)
-
jhcheon @ snu ac kr
swanhong @ snu ac kr
doodoo1204 @ snu ac kr - History
- 2020-12-21: revised
- 2020-12-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1581
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1581,
author = {Jung Hee Cheon and Seungwan Hong and Duhyeong Kim},
title = {Remark on the Security of {CKKS} Scheme in Practice},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1581},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1581}
}