Paper 2020/1383
Novel Single-Trace ML Profiling Attacks on NIST 3 Round candidate Dilithium
Il-Ju Kim, Tae-Ho Lee, Jaeseung Han, Bo-Yeon Sim, and Dong-Guk Han
Abstract
Dilithium is a lattice-based digital signature, one of the finalist candidates in the NIST's standardization process for post-quantum cryptography. In this paper, we propose a first side-channel attack on the process of signature generation of Dilithium. During the Dilithium signature generation process, we used NTT encryption single-trace for machine learning-based profiling attacks. In addition, it is possible to attack masked Dilithium using sparse multiplication. The proposed method is shown through experiments that all key values can be exposed 100% through a single-trace regardless of the optimization level.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACM ICEA 2020
- Keywords
- Side-Channel AttackPost-Quantum CryptographyLattice-base CryptographyCrystals-DilithiumDigital signature
- Contact author(s)
- kimij2905 @ kookmin ac kr
- History
- 2020-11-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1383
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1383,
author = {Il-Ju Kim and Tae-Ho Lee and Jaeseung Han and Bo-Yeon Sim and Dong-Guk Han},
title = {Novel Single-Trace {ML} Profiling Attacks on {NIST} 3 Round candidate Dilithium},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1383},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1383}
}