Paper 2017/306
Cube Attacks on Non-Blackbox Polynomials Based on Division Property (Full Version)
Yosuke Todo, Takanori Isobe, Yonglin Hao, and Willi Meier
Abstract
The cube attack is a powerful cryptanalytic technique and is especially powerful against stream ciphers. Since we need to analyze the complicated structure of a stream cipher in the cube attack, the cube attack basically analyzes it by regarding it as a blackbox. Therefore, the cube attack is an experimental attack, and we cannot evaluate the security when the size of cube exceeds an experimental range, e.g., 40. In this paper, we propose cube attacks on non-blackbox polynomials. Our attacks are developed by using the division property, which is recently applied to various block ciphers. The clear advantage is that we can exploit large cube sizes because it never regards the cipher as a blackbox. We apply the new cube attack to Trivium, Grain128a, ACORN and Kreyvium. As a result, the secret keys of 832-round Trivium, 183-round Grain128a, 704-round ACORN and 872-round Kreyvium are recovered. These attacks are the current best key-recovery attack against these ciphers.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2017
- Keywords
- Cube attackStream cipherDivision propertyHigher-order differential cryptanalysisMILPTriviumGrain128aACORN
- Contact author(s)
- todo yosuke @ lab ntt co jp
- History
- 2017-10-25: last of 3 revisions
- 2017-04-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/306
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/306,
author = {Yosuke Todo and Takanori Isobe and Yonglin Hao and Willi Meier},
title = {Cube Attacks on Non-Blackbox Polynomials Based on Division Property (Full Version)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/306},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/306}
}