Statutes

• Specific performance is relief which this Court will not give, unless in cases where the parties seeking it come promptly, and as soon as the nature of the case will permit.
  • Lord Cranworth, Eads v. Williams (1854), 4 D. M. & G. 691.

1 "The King sues by his attorney," or form to another. It is the King, who, by "the attorney sues for the King," are his attorney, gives the Court to underonly different forms of expressing the stand and be informed of the fact cornsame thing. It is equally good either plained of.—Wilmot. L.C.J. (1763), id., way, as appears by the cases in 2 Lev. 82, p. 1128.

and 3 Keb. 127; and no legal reason, but 2 See Co. ith Inst. cap. 11, "The

good manners and decency, as Lord Hale Councell Board," p. 52.

calls it, have given the preference of one 3 This is alluding to the law.

• Acts of Parliament are the works of the legislature, and the publication of them has always belonged to the King, as the Executive Part, and as the Head and Sovereign.
  • Lord Mansfield, Millar v. Taylor (1768), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2404.

• Notwithstanding all the care and anxiety of the persons who frame Acts of Parliament to guard against every event, it frequently turns out that certain cases were not foreseen.
  • Lord Kenyon, C.J., Farmer v. Legg (1797), 7 T. R. 190.

• There is nothing so common in the framing of instruments as that whilst the framer of them is studious to avoid one inconvenience, he incurs another which does not present itself to his view. This is often to be seen in Acts of Parliament.
  • Booke, J., Lord Nelson v. Tucker (1802), 3 Bos. & Pull. 275.

4. Inconvenience arising from the operation of an Act of Parliament can be no ground of argument in a Court of law.—Lord Alvanley, C.J., Grigby v. Oakes (1801), 1 Bos. & Pull. 528.

5. Un Act de Parlement poet fair aucun chose, comme de fair une feme Mayor ou Justice de Paix, car ceux sont les creatures des homes, mes ne poet alter le course del nature : An Act of Parliament can do anything, as it may make a woman Mayor or Justice of the Peace, but it cannot alter the course of nature.—Wild, J., Crow v. Ramsey (1670), Jones's (Sir Thos.) Rep. 12.

6. The language of statutes is peculiar, and not always that which a rigid grammarian would use; we must do what we can to construe them.—Grove, J., Lyons v. Tucker (1881), L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 664.

i Quoted by Stirling, J., in Levy v. Stogdon (1898), 1 Ch. D. [1898], p. 484.

Statutes—continued.

7. There are two ways of construing an Act of Parliament—one to extend it to every case reasonably within its operation, and the other to lay hold of every expression to limit and curtail the intention of the legislature.—Sir John Stuart, V.-C, In re Warner and Powell's Arbitration (1866), L. R. 3 Eq. Ca. 266.

8. All Acts of Parliament are to be expounded according to the true meaning to be collected from the words of 'em.1—North, C.J., Carter v. Crawley (1681), Sir Thos. Raym. Rep. 500.

9. It is safest to keep to the Statute.—Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Inhabitants of Hatfield (1758), 1 Burr. Part IV. 497.

10. We ought not to decide hastily against the words of an Act of Parliament.—Lord Kenyan, C.J., Kingv. Justices of Flintshire (1797), 7 T. R. 200.

11. The sense and meaning of an Act must be collected from what it says when passed into a law, and not from the history of changes it underwent in the House where it took its rise. That history is not known to the other House, or to the Sovereign.—Willes, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2332, cit. Caird v. Sime, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 356.

12. No stops are ever inserted in Acts of Parliament, or in deeds; but the Courts of law, in construing them, must read them with such stops as will give effect to the whole.—Lord Kenyon, C.J., Doe d. Willis and others v. Martin and others (1790), 4 T. R. 65.

13. I do exceedingly commend the Judges that are curious and almost subtil, Astuti (which is the word used in the Proverbs of Solomon in a good sense, when it is to a good end) to invent reasons and means to make Acts, according to the just intent of the parties, and to avoid wrong and injury which by rigid rules might be wrought out of the

1 We must give effect to the plain the Act.—Abbott, C.J., Baildon r. Pitter language of the legislature, according to (1819), 1 Chit. Rep. 639. the fair interpretation of the words of

Statutes—continued.

Act.—Hobart, CJ., Earl of Clanrickard's Case (1614), Lord Hobart's Rep. 277.

14. With regard to the construction of statutes according to the intention of the legislature, we must remember that there is an essential difference between the expounding of modern and ancient Acts of Parliament. In early times the legislature used (and I believe it was a wise course to take) to pass laws in general and in few terms; they were left to the Courts of law to be construed so as to reach all the cases within the mischief to be remedied. But in modern times great care has been taken to mention the particular cases in the contemplation of the legislature, and therefore the Courts are not permitted to take the same liberty in construing them as they did in expounding the ancient statutes.—Lord Kenyon, C.J., Bradley and another v. Clark (1793), 5 T. R. 201.

15. We must decide according to the intention of the legislature, which is to be collected from the general object of the Act and from the particular words used in it.—Grose, J., Farmer v. Legg (1797), 7 T. R. 192.

16. These laws must be construed according to the intention of them: and the circumstances of things at the time of enacting them ought to be taken into consideration.1—Wilmot, J., Rex v. Inhabitants of Burton-Bradstock (1765), Burrow (Settlement Cases), 536.

17. If it were a doubtful point how the statute should be construed, I must consider myself as bound by the construction it has already received in two Courts in Westminster Hall.—Rooke, J., Cox v. Morgan (1801), 1 Bos. & Pull. 411.

18. In the absence of all authority, I can only look to the language of the statute.1—Chambre, J., Barnes v. Headley (1807), 1 Camp. 164.

n1 Our limited function is not to say ever we might wish to provide for what the legislature meant, but to ascer- every hardship that may occur, we are

tain what the legislature has said that it bound to put that construction on the

meant.—Mathen, J., Rothschild & Sons v. Act that the legislature intended.—Orose,

Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1894), J., Farmer v. Legg (1797), 7 T. B. 193. L. R. 2 Q. B. D. [1894], p. 145. How

Statutes—continued.

19. People cannot escape from the obligation of a statute by putting a private interpretation upon its language.—Lord Macnaghten, Netherseal Colliery Co. v. Bourne (1889), L. R. 16 Ap. Ca. 247.

See above, 17, 18; Construction, 25; Judges, 42; Jurisdiction, 13; Parliament, 17.

20. There is a great difference between the Purview of an Act of Parliament, and a Proviso in an Act of Parliament.—Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Jarvis (1756), 1 Burr. Part IV. 153.

21. A statute cannot alter by reason of time, but the common law may. —Ask, J., Anon. (1649), Style's Rep. 190.

22. A Court cannot give itself jurisdiction by misconstruing a document or statute.—Pollock, B., Queen v. County Court of Lincolnshire and Dixon (1887), L. J. (N. S.) 57 Q. B. D. 137.

23. The statute is like a tyrant; where he comes he makes all void; but the common law is like a nursing father, makes only void that part where the fault is, and preserves the rest.—Lord Hobart, C.J., quoted by Twisden, C.J., in Maleverer v. Redshaw (1670), 1 Mod. Rep. 36 ; and by Wilmot, L.C.J., in Collins v. Blantern (1767), 2 Wils. 351.

24. The statute law is the will of the legislature in writing; the common law is nothing else but statutes worn out by time; all our law began by consent of the legislature, and whether it is now law by usage or writing, it is the same thing.—Wilmot, L.C.J., Collins v. Blantern (1767), 2 Wils. 341.

25. Bind not the new statutes so to the common law, that their words increased for the King's advantage, should be deprived of their force. —Hobart, C.J., Sheffeild v. Ratcliffe (1614), Ld. Hob. Rep. 341.

1 It is the duty of Judges, not to supply namely, to give an Act of Parliament the

the defects of the legislature by providing plain, fair, literal meaning of its words,

a remedy, but simply to construe the pro- where we do not see from its scope that

visions of the statute it has enacted.— such meaning would be inconsistent, or

Pattemn, J., Gray r. The Queen (1844), would lead to manifest injustice.—Jervis,

6 St. Tr. (N. S.) 150. C.J., Mattison c. Hart and another (1854).

We ought to apply to this case what is 23 L. J. O. P. 114. called the golden rule of construction,

Statutes—continued.

26. A very ingenious attempt to drive a coach-and-four1 through this Act of Parliament.2—Lindley, L.J., Queen v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (1891), 61 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 6.

27. The Court is not bound to a strictness at once harsh and pedantic in the application of statutes. The law permits the qualification implied in the ancient maxim, de minimis non curat lex. Where there are irregularities of very slight consequence, it does not intend that the infliction of penalties should be inflexibly severe. If the deviation were a mere trifle, which, if continued in practice, would weigh little or nothing on the public interest, it might properly be overlooked.— Sir W. Scott, "The Reward " (1820), 2 Dods. Adm. R. 269, 270.

1. Working days in England are not the same as working days in foreign ports, because working days in England, by the custom and habits of the English, if not by their law, do not include Sundays.— Lord Esher, M.R., Nielsen v. Wait (1885), L. R. 16 Q. B. 71.

2. Anciently, the Courts of justice did sit on Sundays.—Lord Mansfield, Swann v. Broome (1764), 3 Burr. Part TV., p. 1597.8

3. It would hardly be decent to adjourn the Court to Sunday.— Cockburn, C.J., Reg. v. Charlotte Winsor (1866), 10 Cox, C. C. 298.

4. It is laid down in distinct terms by high authority, that of Lord Coke* and Comyns,6 that Sunday is not a juridical day.—Cockburn, C.J., Winsor v. The Queen (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 308.

5. I do not think there can be the smallest doubt that to sit judicially on Sunday on any business would be indecent and improper, and ought never to be done if it can be helped.—Blackburn, J., Winsor v. The Queen (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 317.

1. It is to my mind much to be regretted, and it is a regret which I believe every Judge on the bench shares, that text-books are more and more quoted in Court—I mean, of course, text-books by living authors—and some Judges have gone so far as to say that they shall not be quoted.1—Kekewieh, J., Union Bank v. Munster (1887), L. R. 37 CD. 54.

i This remark has been most generally 2 Wh. & T. Eq. Cas. 475, 513. made of the 4th section of the Statute of a Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict.

Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3) in regard to c. 89).

contracts concerning land having to be in i For a full exposition of this subject,

writing. Equity, deeming great injustice

might occur by this rule being inflexibly , 135 (a).

adhered to, in certain cases allows thesc ^| >itf. Temps, (B. 3 and

contracts to be enforced if unwritten.— See Seton v. Slade; Woullam v. Hear it, Text Books—continued. [graphic]

2. Brother,3 Viner is not an authority. Cite the cases that Viner quotes: that you may do.—Foster, J., Far v. Denn (1757), 1 Burr. Part IV. 364.

3. I must treat with reverence everything which Lord Kenyon has said: but not everything which text writers have represented him to have said, which he did not say.—Lefroy, C.J., Persse v. Kinneen (1859), (Lr. Rep.) L. T. Vol. 1 (N. S.), 78.

4. Stereotyped rules laid down by judicial writers cannot be accepted as infallible canons of interpretation in these days, when commercial transactions have altered in character, and increased in complexity; and there can be no hard-and-fast rule by which to construe the multiform commercial agreements with which in modern times we have to deal.—Bowen, L.J., Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais (1884), L. R. 12 Q. B. D. 601; 53 L. J. Q. B. 159.

It is not very often that our leading text-books are judicially declared to be inaccurate, partly, it may be, because text-book writers generally travel along roads which have been, so to speak, consolidated by the ample weight of statu-tory and judicial authority, and partly because they forbear, as a rule, to ramble along the by-paths of speculation. Says Austin (" Jurisprudence," Vol. I., p. 37): "Respect for a law-writer whose works have gotten reputation, may determine the legislator or Judge to adopt his opinions, or to turn the speculative conclusions of a private man into actually binding rules. . . . Now till the legislator or Judge impress them with the character of law . . . the conclusions are the speculative conclusions of a private or unauthorised writer." Fry ("Specific Performance" (1881), 2nd ed. v.) remarks that "there is one notion often expressed with regard to works written or revised by authors on the Bench, which seems to me in part at least erroneous, the notion, I mean, that they possess a quasi-judicial authority. It is hardly enough remembered how different are the circumstances under which a book is written and a judgment pronounced, or how much the weight and value of the latter are due to the discussions at the Bar which precede the judgment."

• I do not wish to shake titles, and I shall do precisely what our predecessors have always done—leave the case where it is. It is a rock ahead that everybody knows.
  • Lindley, L.J., In re Lashmar (1890), L. J. Rep. (N S.) 60 Ch. 146.

• God forbid, that a man should lose his estate by losing his title deeds.
  • Eyre, C.J., Bolton v. Bishop of Carlisle (1793), 2 H. B. 263.

• There is not more difference betwixt a grant and feoffment, than betwixt one egg and another.
  • Bridgman, C.J., Jemot v. Cooley (1666), Sir Thos. Raymond's Rep. 159.

• No man ought to be so absurd as to make a purchase without looking at the title deeds; if he is, he must take the consequence of his own negligence.
  • Ashhurst, J., Goodtitle v. Morgan (1787), 1 T. R. 762.

• Immemorial enjoyment is the most solid of all titles.
  • Tindal, C.J., In the Matter of the Serjeants-at-Law (1840), 6 Bing. New Cases, 238.

1. The general principle is, that in order that an action may be maintained in this country in respect of a tort committed outside the jurisdiction, the act complained of must be a wrongful act, both by the law of this country and by the law of the country where it was committed; but it is not necessary that it should be the subject of civil proceedings in the foreign country.—Lopes, L.J., Machado v. Fontes (1897), 66 L. J. Q. B. D. 543.

2. To entitle a plaintiff to maintain an action, it is necessary to shew a breach of some legal duty due from the defendant to the plaintiff.— Erie, C.J., Cox v. Burbidge (1863), 13 C. B. (N. S.) 436.

3. That great principle of the common law which declares that it is your duty so to use and exercise your own rights as not to cause injury to other people.—Williams, J., Gray v. North-Eastern Rail. Co. (1883), 48 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 905.

4. The well-known maxim that you must not, when you have the choice, elect to use your property so as to cause injury to your neighbour.1—

1 The maxim is Sic utere tuo vt alienum non ladat.—9 Rep. 59. See Br, Leg. Max., tith ed., 347.

Tort—continued.

Brett, M.R., Whalley v. Lancashire, &c. Rail. Co. (1884), 13 L: R. Q. B. D. 137.

5. Surely every injury imports a damage, though it does not cost the party one farthing, and it is impossible to prove the contrary; for a damage is not merely pecuniary, but an injury imports a damage, when a man is hereby hindered of his right.—Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Raym. 955.

6. La ley est un egal dispenser de Justice, et ne relinque aucun sans remedy sur son droit, sans son propre laches: The law is an equal dispenser of Justice, and leaves none without a remedy, for his right, without his own laches.—Vaughan, J., Tustian v. Roper (1670), Jones's (Sir Thos.) Rep. 32.

7. Personal injury is a more serious matter than damage to property.— Cockburn, C.J., Reg. v. Heppinstale (1859), 7 W. R. 178.

8. An injured party may proceed in Westminster Hall notwithstanding any order of the House.1—Willes, C.J., Wynne v. Middleton (1745), 1 Wils. 128.

9. If a man sustains damage by the wrongful act of another, he is entitled to a remedy, but to give that title two things must concur, damage to himself and a wrong committed by the other. That he has sustained damage is not of itself sufficient.—Bayley, J., R. v. Commissioners of Pagham (1828), 8 B. & C. 362.

10. Actual perceptible damage is not indispensable as the foundation of an action; it is sufficient to show the violation of a right, in which case the law will presume damage.'—Lord Holt, Ashby v. White (1703), 3 Ld. Raym. 938.

1 See per Cockburn, C.J., in Onslow and an action will not lie even in the case of

Whalley's Case, L. K. 9 Q. B. 225, and a wrong or a violation of a right, unless it

per Iienman, C.J.,in Stockdaler. Hansard, is followed by some perceptible damage

i» A. Si E. 142. which can be established as a matter of

- 1 am not able to understand how it fact; in other words, that injuria tine

can be correctly said in a legal sense, that damno is not actionable. On the contrary,

Tort—continued.

11. I am by no means sure that if a man kept a tiger, and lightning broke his chain, and he got loose and did mischief, that the man who kept him would not be liable.1—Bramwell, B., Nichols v. Marsland (1875), L. R. 10 Ex. 260.

12. To say that whenever the world grows wiser it convicts those that came before of negligence.2—Bramwell, B., Carstairs v. Taylor (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 222.

13. The public can have no rights springing from injustice to others.3— Lord Romilly, M.R., Walker v. Ware, Hadham, &c. Rail. Co. (1866), 12 Jur. (N. S.) 18.

14. It is our duty to take care that persons in pursuing their own particular interests do not transgress those laws which were made for the benefit of the whole community.—Lord Kenyon, C.J., King v. Waddington (1800), 1 East, 158.

15. Every man that is injured ought to have his recompence.4— Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Lord Raym. 955.

16. If a man who makes to another person, upon a solemn occasion, an assertion, upon which that person acts, he lies under an obligation to make good his assertion.—Sir J. Romilly, M.R., Re Ward, (1862), 31 Beav. 7.

from my earliest reading I have considered not, when standing alone, evidence of

it laid up among the very elements of the previous negligence.

common law, that wherever there is a 3 Ex dolo main non oritur actio.—

wrong there is a remedy to redress it; and Cowp. 343.

that every injury imports damage in the * This again brings in the maxim Ubi

nature of it; and if no other damage is jus ibi remedium. But this dictum

established, the party injured is entitled (supra) is crowded with exception. For

to a verdict for nominal damages.—Mr. instance, if a person is wrongfully accused

Justice Story, Webb v. Portland Manu- of a crime and put to worry and

facturing Co., 3 Sumn. Rep. 189. expense and perhaps imprisoned, he is

1 This is a dictum in relation to the entitled to no recompense: again, if a maxim Actus Dei nemini facit injuriam. person is injured by a person not Sec ante Miscellaneous, 12, n. Also responsible, e.g., an ambassador, or the Br. Leg. Max., 6th ed. 224. Crown. Perhaps this is why Ilolt, C.I.,

2 This remark is made to show that uses the word " ought" and not "can "— increased precautions after accidents are and that it is used advisedly.

Tort—continued.

• None shall take advantage of his own wrong.
  • Lord Coke, Dumpor's Case (1603), 4 Co. 119.

• He whose dirt it is must keep it that it may not trespass.
  • Holt, C.J., Tenant v. Goldwin (1704), 1 Salk. 361.

• I know of no duty of the Court which it is more important to observe, and no powers of the Court which it is more important to enforce, than its power of keeping public bodies within their rights. The moment public bodies exceed their rights] they do so to the injury and oppression of private individuals, and those persons are entitled to be protected from injury arising from such operations of public bodies.
  • Lindley, M.R., Roberts v. Gwyrfai District Council (1899), L. R. 2 C. D. 614.

• It is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal.
  • Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Raym. 953.

• Where a man has but one remedy to come at his right, if he loses that he loses his right.
  • Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Raym. 954.

• It is not very consonant with the simplicity of the old law to give two remedies for the same evil.
  • Eyre, C.J., Jefferson v. Bishop of Durham (1797), 2 Bos. & Pull. 122.

• Better that an individual should suffer an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience.
  • Ashhurst, J., Russell v. The Mayor of Devon (1788), 1 T. R. 673.

• The advantage to the community outweigh the injury to the individual.
  • Drove, J., Henwood v. Harrison (1872), L. R. 7 Com. PI. Ca. 613.

• What a man does in his closet ought not to affect the rights of third persons.
  • Lord Kenyan, C.J., Outram v. Morewood (1793), 5 T. R. 123.

1 Ex dolo mala non oritur actio (suprd, 2 Quoted by Charles, J., in Ponting v.

13, n.). "Nul prendra advantage de son Noakes, L. E. 2 Q. B. D. 1894, p. 285.

tort demesne."—2 Inst. 718. Commodum » An illustration of this occurs in the

ex injtirid rud nemo habere debet: No compulsory service of jurymen: that

person ought to have advantage from his however great the private pecuniary loss,

own wrong.—Jenk. Cent. 161. they must serve for the public weal.

Tort— continued.

• No tort is assignable, in law or equity. It is not within any species of action at common law.
  • Yates, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part. IV. 2386.

• The Court would not endure that a mere form or fiction of law, introduced for the sake of justice, should work a wrong, contrary to the real truth and substance of the thing.
  • Lord Mansfield, Johnson v. Hargreaves (1760), 2 Burr. Part IV. 962.

• Trade unions up to a certain point have been recognised now as organs for good. They are the only means by which workmen can protect themselves from the tyranny of those who employ them. But the moment that trade unions become tyrants in their turn, they are engines for evil: they have no right to prevent people from working on any terms that they choose.—Lindley, J., Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins (1896), 74 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 364. See also Mogul Steamship Co. v. MacGregor, Gow, & Co., 66 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 1; Temperton v. Russell and others, 69 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 78.

• It was the policy of the common law to forbid the transfer of rights of action. If this were not forbidden men would often pay the debts of others and bring actions upon them to the great increase of litigation.
  • Heath, J., Scholey v. Daniel (1801), 1 Bos. & Pull. 541.