Molinism: Difference between revisions

'''Molinism''', named after 16th-century Spanish [[Jesuit]] theologian [[Luis de Molina]], is the thesis that God has middle knowledge (or ''scientia media''): the knowledge of [[Counterfactual conditional|counterfactuals]], particularly counterfactuals regarding human action.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/751726095|title=Molinism : the contemporary debate|date=2011|publisher=Oxford University Press|others=Kenneth J. Perszyk|isbn=978-0-19-959062-9|location=Oxford|pages=Introduction|oclc=751726095}}</ref> It seeks to reconcile the apparent tension of [[Divine Providence|divine providence]] and human [[free will]].<ref name=KeathleySS />{{rp|20}} Prominent contemporary Molinists include [[William Lane Craig]], [[Alfred J. Freddoso|Alfred Freddoso]], [[Alvin Plantinga]], [[Michael Bergmann (philosopher)|Michael Bergmann]], Thomas Flint, Kenneth Keathley,<ref name=KeathleySS /> [[Dave Armstrong (Catholic apologist)|Dave Armstrong]], John D. Laing, Timothy A. Stratton,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Stratton |first1=Tim |last2=Erasmus |first2=Jacobus |date=2018-06-01 |title=Mere Molinism: A Defense of Two Essential Pillars |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/perc-2018-0008 |journal=Perichoresis |volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=17–29 |doi=10.2478/perc-2018-0008 |issn=2284-7308|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Stratton |first=Timothy |title=Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism. |date=October 2, 2020 |publisher=Wipf and Stock |year=2020 |isbn=978-1725276116}}</ref> Kirk R. MacGregor, and [[J. P. Moreland|J.P. Moreland]].

According to Kenneth Keathley, author of ''Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach,'' Molinists argue that God perfectly accomplishes His will in the lives of genuinely free creatures through the use of His [[omniscience]].<ref name=KeathleySS>{{cite book|last=Keathley|first=Kenneth|title=Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach|year=2010|publisher=B&H Publishing Group|location=Nashville|isbn=978-0-8054-3198-8|pages=16–41 }}</ref> Molinists, following Luis de Molina himself, present God's knowledge in a sequence of three logical moments. The first is God's knowledge of necessary truths or natural knowledge. These truths are independent of God's will and are non-contingent. This knowledge includes the full range of logical possibilities. Examples include such statements as "All bachelors are unmarried" or "X cannot be A and non-A at the same time, in the same way, at the same place" or "It is possible that X obtain." The second is called "middle knowledge" and it contains the range of possible things that would happen given certain circumstances. The third kind of knowledge is God's free knowledge.

This type of knowledge consists of contingent truths that are dependent upon God's will, or truths that God brings about, that He does not have to bring about. Examples might include statements such as "God created the earth" or something particular about this world which God has actualized. This is called God's "free knowledge" and it contains the future or what will happen. In between God's natural and free knowledge is His middle knowledge by which God knows what His free creatures would do under any circumstance.<ref name="KeathleySS" />{{RP|31}} These are "truths" that do not have to be true, but are true without God being the primary cause of them. In ''[[The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'', John D. Laing has provided an example of middle knowledge: "If John Laing were given the opportunity to write an article on middle knowledge for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he would freely do so."<ref name="The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP)">{{cite web|last1=Laing|first1=John D.|title=Middle Knowledge|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/middlekn/|website=The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP)|access-date=17 April 2018}}</ref>

Molinists believe that God has knowledge not only of [[necessary truth]]s and contingent truths, but also of [[counterfactuals]]. (God's knowledge of counterfactuals is often referred to as his ''middle knowledge'', although technically that term is more broad than simply the knowledge of counterfactuals.) A counterfactual is a statement of the form "If it were the case that P, it would be the case that Q." An example would be, "If Bob were in Tahiti he would freely choose to go swimming instead of sunbathing." The Molinist claims that even if Bob is never in Tahiti, God can still know whether Bob would go swimming or sunbathing. The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all [[possible world]]s and then actualized a particular one.{{Citation needed|date=May 2023|reason=Lack of sources on the concept of the 'surveying' possible worlds and the determination of an optimal one in normative Molinist expounding.}} God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this "choosing" of a particular world.

Craig gives three reasons for holding that counterfactual statements are true: "First, we ourselves often appear to know such true counterfactuals. Second, it is plausible that the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle (LCEM) holds for counterfactuals of a certain special form, usually called 'counterfactuals of creaturely freedom'. Third, the Scriptures are replete with counterfactual statements, so that the Christian theist, at least, should be committed to the truth of certain counterfactuals about free, creaturely actions."<ref name=craig2001>{{cite journal |first1=William Lane |last1=Craig |year=2001 |title=Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the Grounding Objection |url=http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html |journal=Faith and Philosophy |volume=18 |pages=337–52 |doi=10.5840/faithphil200118329 |editor1-last=l. Peterson |editor1-first=Michael |issue=3|s2cid=170723396 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

Molinists have internal disagreements about the extent to which they agree with Calvinism, some holding to unconditional election, others holding to conditional election and others still holding to an election that is partly both. Alfred Freddoso explains: “Some Molinists, including Bellarmine and Suárez, agree with the Bañezians that God antecedently elects certain people to eternal glory and only then consults His middle knowledge to discover which graces will guarantee their salvation. Thus, in Peter's case, God would have chosen different graces if those He actually chose had been foreknown to be merely sufficient and not efficacious for Peter's salvation. Other Molinists, including Molina himself, vigorously reject any such antecedent absolute election of Peter to salvation. They insist instead that God simply chooses to create a world in which He infallibly foresees Peter's good use of the supernatural graces afforded him, and only then does he accept Peter among the elect in light of his free consent to those graces.” <ref>Feddoso. "Molinism," in Edward Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998).</ref> Other Molinists avoid the issue altogether by holding to the view of trans-world damnation, the idea that the unsaved in this world would have rejected Christ in any world.