Talk:Sino-Indian War

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A recent monograph on the 1962 war^[1] has a section on "Historiography" which lists about two dozen scholarly sources. Out of all these sources, Neville Maxwell is the only source used in this article to any great extent. However, two other sources Calvin and Guruswamy, who are not listed by scholars but toe the same line as Maxwell, have also been used extensively. Consequently, this article is too narrowly focused and displays extreme POV. I am tagging it for now, and will be working on fixing the problem in due course. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:14, 22 September 2017 (UTC)Reply

There are sources galore on Sino-Tibetan relations since the 8th century as well as on Tibetan history and Chinese history. Of course practically each source has its own context and slant, and that is why it is important to read up as many books - I mean books, as distinct from newspaper or magazine articles - as time and interest in the topic permit. For instance, one finds from William Dalrymple's book "Return of a King" on Afghanistan an appreciation of the "great game" between the British and the Russians in Central Asia that considerably distracted the British from the developing situation to the immediate north of India. Or on Dr. Alastair Lamb as to how Sir John Morley, then Secretary of State for India in 1890s, influenced British policy towards China and Tibet.To rely only on one or two sources will only lead the "Talk" astray. Pidiji (talk) 03:25, 16 November 2017 (UTC)Reply

Can you give examples of this "extreme POV"? I am curious of reader how this article is supposed to be biased Mateusz Konieczny (talk) 11:02, 31 May 2018 (UTC)Reply

You can look at this edit that I made after studying the new sources (i.e., sources other than Maxwell, Calvin and Guruswamy), especially the paragraph starting with W. H. Johnson. The old text makes it appear as if a British civil servant, with self-gain in mind, defined an extended territory for the Maharaja of Kashmir, who then declared it as his territory. Sure enough, the civil servant then got a plum post as the Governor of Ladakh. And notice the severe demonisation as well: Johnson's work was severely criticised as inaccurate. His boundary line was described as "patently absurd", and extending further north than the Indian claim. The fact, it turns out, is that the Mahraja's dynasty claimed all that territory ever since they conquered Ladakh (even before they came under British control). Their general Zorawar Singh Kahluria was even itching to invade Chinese Turkestan. The fact is also that the Chinese Turkestan never had any interest in that territory. It was the British that made persistent efforts to give it to them (to create a buffer zone between Russia and India). The civil servant, it turns out, was basically documenting the situation as it existed. And the faults in his survey work were entirely understandable given the state of knowledge at that time, and the constraints under which he was operating. You can see the W. H. Johnson page for details. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:35, 31 May 2018 (UTC)Reply

Neville Maxwell is a reliable source who has valid authority knowledge of the event. In addition, the Indian government has not 'solidly' denied any of his specific reports despite being very much aware of his significance. They simply refused to admit he's correct and continue to refuse to declassify the reports out of avoidance. That speaks for itself. 😒 120.17.233.32 (talk) 20:21, 4 March 2019 (UTC)Reply

I have no idea what is meant by a "valid authority". It is fine to say that he is a "reliable source", mainly because he has been cited in plenty of scholarly articles, even if to disagree with what he says. But, at the end of day, he is just a journalist, who sees, hears and reports. He is not a scholar. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:53, 19 October 2019 (UTC)Reply

Looking at the Mohan Gurswamy article again, which has been used here for all kinds of things, I find this rather surprising passage:

This was the MacCartney-Macdonald line that excluded most of the Aksai Chin. The British tried to get the Chinese to sign an agreement to this effect. The Chinese did not respond to these moves and Lord Curzon concluded their silence could be taken as acquiescence and decided that, henceforth, this should be considered the border, and so it was. Interestingly this line, by and large, corresponds with the Chinese claim line, which in turn, by and large, coincides with the Line of Actual Control.

Even lay readers know that the MacDonald line goes beyond the Lanak La pass whereas the "Line of Actual Control" is at the Kongka Pass. It seems that this man does not really know his head from his tail. I am tagging all citations to his article as unreliable. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:50, 19 October 2019 (UTC)Reply

I agree, Guruswamy's writings, especially his works hosted on Rediff, have several errors and inconsistencies. The Discoverer (talk) 07:39, 20 October 2019 (UTC)Reply

And, be aware this his book, coauthored with Daulet Singh and published by something called "Viva Books", has very much the same problems. And, another book by some one called "Anna Orton" (appears to be a fake name) has plagiarised large parts of it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:48, 20 October 2019 (UTC)Reply

Both of those book publishers, Viva and Epitome, are vanity press and can not be considered reliable sources, per WP:RSSELF. GA-RT-22 (talk) 17:41, 2 January 2021 (UTC)Reply

So I recently updated the section about Kongka Pass incident, without knowing there was this discussion here. In the write up, I tried to stay away from any controversial stuff (where's the border is/was, who shot first, etc), focused mostly on the facts on the ground, and mainly only used Indian sources -- the Indian published diplomatic white paper (memos between the 2 countries) & special edition of Indian Police Journal on the Police Memorial. Any objections to me just replacing Mohan cite for the sentence about Kongka camp incident? --Voidvector (talk) 00:28, 7 January 2020 (UTC)Reply

Please do. Mohan Guruswamy cites are meant to be replaced. Even though this particular citation is actually harmless, there are plenty of others that are POV-ridden. I wouldn't him being entirely banished from this page. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:47, 8 January 2020 (UTC)Reply

Another heavily used source (some 52 times) is a paper/thesis by James Bernard Calvin, at the US Marine Corp Staff College. Admittedly, this is a good piece of work and covers a lot of the detail of the hostilities. However it is student research. Even if we deem it to be equivalent to a PhD thesis, as per WP:SCHOLARSHIP, it should be used cautiously. Statements like "According to James Bernard Calvin" have no place here. If the issue calls for judgement, a student's judgement cannot be taken as authentic or encyclopaedic. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:23, 22 October 2019 (UTC)Reply

this is an article on military history and Calvin is a professional soldier, which is the expertise the other authors lack. He is writing at a major research center for military studies. Note that university history departments rarely have faculty who specialize in military history. Rjensen (talk) 08:41, 8 May 2023 (UTC)Reply

Used extensively for a total of 17 times to support mostly otherwise unsourced and somewhat controversial claims. I hardly think that a government source from one of the belligerents is appropriate for an article such like this. Similarly, this applies to the website of Chushi Gangdruk, which was an Indian backed Tibetian militant group.

Also quoted throughout the article are articles from various Indian newspapers, including Times of India, which is known to publish unverified news stories, paid news and right wing conspiracy theories. Given the pervasiveness in the article, India's low press freedom as well as a history of publishing unverified erroneous news, I believe that they should be replaced by alternate scholarly sources, or a review of articles conducted. Dark-World25 (talk) 00:48, 17 July 2021 (UTC)Reply

John Garver's book chapter called "China's decision for war with India" (2006) has been cited over 30 times on this page. In addition to this substantial work, he has written a book called Protracted Contest (2011), which is supposed to be about Sino-Indian rivalry, and another book called China's Quest (2015). Garver works in International Relations with special expertise in China's foreign policy [1].

His writings seem to be based mostly on Chinese sources, which are often not even cited, and the quality of these materials is questionable. Even top strategic experts in China rarely know what their government has actually claimed or done, and the government sources themselves just put out self-serving propaganda. One would expect a scholar relying on such materials to critically evaluate the sources and information which, in my view, Garver does not do. Here are some examples:

• In China's Quest, I notice the statements: The road crossed a high, remote, desolate, and cold desert region known as Aksai Chin. China believed this region had traditionally been part of Tibet. It is news to me that China ever regarded Aksai Chin as part of Tibet. It is officially marked as part of Xinjiang. (The difference matters, because we need to know which history is being used as the basis for the claim.)
• In China's decision for war, we see the statement: India's policies along the border, and especially the Forward Policy adopted in November 1961, were seen by China's leaders as constituting incremental Indian seizure of Chinese-controlled territory, and there is little basis for deeming that view inaccurate. The last clause gives the appearance that Garver evaluated the claim and found it to be accurate. No explanation can be found as to how he arrived at this conclusion.

He is squarely contradicted by other sources. For instance, Hoffmann's India and the China Crisis states: On the basis of this information, the [Indian] MEA (..) concluded that the Chinese were attempting to move up to their 1960 claim line in some strength. The Forward Policy was designed to forestall this possibility. In fact, no mention of the "1960 claim line" or its antecedent, the "1956 claim line", can be found in any of Garver's writings. He only knows of one "claim line". His Protracted Contest has a chapter called "The Territorial Dispute" without a single map of the contested border. This is ironic, because Hoffmann's book (as well Dorothy Woodman and even Neville Maxwell) has numerous maps, practically all of which document the various claim lines. Garver seems oblivious of all such subtleties.

Garver knows that India disagreed with the claim. He writes: According to the official Indian history, before 1961 a "wide corridor of empty area" separated Chinese forward outposts from lndian outposts. But he seems disinterested in finding out what the truth is. (He cites Hoffmann off and on, but there is no evidence that he has processed his information.)

To sum up, the Chinese claimed that the Indians were capturing their territory; the Indians claimed that they were capturing empty area. Garver, without explanation, sided with the Chinese claim. He is oblivious of other scholars who actually studied the issue.

• The passage that I found the most troublesome is this one (Protracted Contest, p.83): The westerly route via Aksai Chin was an old caravan route and in many ways the best. It was the only route that was open year-round, throughout both the winter and the monsoon season. The Dzungar army that had reached Lhasa in 1717, precipitating the Qing counter-intervention mentioned in the previous chapter, had followed this route. A detachment of PLA cavalry also followed this route in 1951 to participate in the occupation of Tibet.

This makes two strong historical claims, with absolutely no evidence and no citations. (The Chinese routinely make these same claims, again with no evidence.) Strangely, Garver himself gave the accurate route of the Dzungars on pp. 25-26, though he doesn't seem to realize that it is a different route that is well to the east of (what we now call) Aksai Chin. In the early eighteenth century a Dzungar Mongol army marched from the Ili Valley [Khotan Valley] via Hetian [Yutian, also called Keriya]) in today's southern Xinjiang to atop the Tibetan plateau and thence to Lhasa. The 1951 PLA cavalry also followed a similar route. They reached a place called Zhama Mangbao (Shenchen/Xianqian), where most of them perished due to some disease.^[1][2]

In summary, I think Garver can at best be used to discuss China's foreign policy. He is unreliable for the Indian side of the dispute, and even more so for geographical and historical matters. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:12, 14 November 2022 (UTC)Reply

The latest research on the India China war of 1962 is to be found in my published book- "The 1962 India China War : What They Don't Want You To Know". Please refer to it for the general background and for hitherto unpublished information on specific operational and policy details focused on the Namka Chu debacl in Nefa. The Wikipedia article as it stands now, carried extrame and fundamental inaccuracies all over the page. They are so many in number that it will be a voluminous task to just list them down, let alone correct them. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Libertarian196 (talk • contribs) 08:14, 1 November 2023 (UTC)Reply

What I do not understand is why there is no mention of the USAF squadron of C-130s with support personnel that was sent to New Delhi in November 1962 and stayed in India for several months is not mentioned. I was there, operating out of a hangar on the Military side of Palam Airdrome seven days a week from sometime in November until the early part of January '63. We made flights into Jammu and Kashmir and Leh in the Ladakh region and occasionally out to Assam.

I read things in the Wiki discussion saying that President Kennedy was to involved with the Cuban missile crisis to get involved with India on this matter but I strongly doubt that our division commander took it upon himself to rotate squadrons on aircraft to India for several months. Alas, trying to sort this out myself on Wikipedia is too complicated, especially as it seems there are people in India that don't want to include U.S. help in flying troops and supplies into the mountains and evacuating wounded. Sgt Toot (talk) 23:51, 12 June 2023 (UTC)Reply

Sgt Toot, while I don't doubt you, the problem is to have WP:RSs we can rely on that not only state US involvement but would ideally give some context as to how/why the US was involved. Cinderella157 (talk) 23:36, 14 June 2023 (UTC)Reply

Isn't "Sino-Indian War" a bit pro-Chinese term? For Chinese conflicts, the prefix Sino- is used while for Indian conflicts, the suffix Indo-. I would propose that this article be moved to China–India War as a neutral title. Ayubist (talk) 2:01, 11 July 2023

Per WP:AT, we use the common name. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:11, 11 July 2023 (UTC)Reply

According to the Indian general Niranjan Prasad, commander of 4 Division, the war began when General Kaul had begun the Indian assault on October 10. The Chinese wasn't going to wait to be further attacked and allow the Indians to build up strength for another assault. So that's when they did a preemptive charge but after that event. But if the Indians had done an assault first on October 10,[2] that was repelled back, wouldn't October 10 technically be the correct start date of the war?

We at the front knew that since Nehru had said he was going to attack, the Chinese were certainly not going to wait to be attacked” — and of course they didn’t. That’s how the war began. The Chinese attack was both reactive, in that General Kaul had begun the Indian assault on October 10, and pre-emptive because after that failure the Indian drive had been suspended to build up strength for a resumed attack

[3]Raulgu (talk) 08:15, 9 September 2023 (UTC)Reply

1. The Thag La operation (Leghorn) was conducted on the ground by 9 Punjab and NOT 2 Rajput, as stated in the article. 2 Rajput was deployed on the south bank of Namka Chu and for some strange reason, had been ordered to move up to the crossing points, in broad daylight, under the Chinese guns, after 9 Punjab had already commenced its attack towards the Thag la ridge, on the north of the river. The 9 Punjab force was led by Major M.S.Chaudhary, MVC. It consisted of 2 platoons. One was from Maj Chaudhary's own D Company and the other, under Subedar Chhail Singh, was borrowed from A Company which was deployed on the extreme left flank, around the Tsangle hut, north of the river.

2. For some unfathomable reason, Nehru has been blamed for the failure of the Thagla Operation, in this article and held responsible for Indian troops carrying 35 kgs battle load! This comes from ignorance in military matters. Government of India had ordered the occupation of the Thagla pass since it was the "watershed mark" in that sub sector of the border. As per the usual practice in border demarcations and as practiced elsewhere along the Mc Mahon Line, the highest crest line becomes the border, in any area. Captain Mahavir Prasad of 1 Sikh, had led the first Indian Army patrol in the Namka Chu area in May-June 1962. He had set up the Dhola Post south of the Namka Chu river, on the Tse Dong pasture. he had patrolled the entire border area and decided that no single specific location, including the Thag la pass area, was tactially tenable, by itself, in case of war. He chose the Dhola Post's location since it was below the snow line in June and had better accessability for supply and administration. Thag la was a further 9 miles north from Dhola Post, over a very difficult climb. And this would involve crossing rickety bridges over the Namka Chu. No infantry man prefers a river obstacle behind him, sitting on his line of communication. Its always preferable to have a river obstacle ahead of one's position which the potential enemy needs to cross under fire! However he had marked out Thagla pass as a possible CDL (Company Defended Locality). The Indian Army hierarchy didnt take a decision to occupy Thag la for two months after Captain Prasad returned from his patrol. It was only after the Chinese climbed over the Thag la feature, crossed Namka Chu and surrounded the Dhola Post (manned by an Assam Rifles platoon)on 8th September 1962, that the decision was taken to occupy Thag la. By that time the PLA was present there in strength.Tactical operations are planned and directed by the Army hierarchy and not by the PM of a country! Battle loads are determnined by tactical, operational considerations and NOT by the PM of a country! While puerile comments on "35 kgs" battleload slowing down operations, have been made here, the reality is that 9 Punjab troops were carrying less resources than would be required in battle!

3. In the actual battle for Thag la ridge, the battle plan was made by Brigadier John Dalvi (local commander of 7 infantry brigade) himself. He had chosen the Tseng Jong pasture, some way below the Thag la pass, as the goal. Major Chaudhary's force occupied it easily and defended it bravely against superior Chinese forces on the morning of 10th october 1962. Major Chaudhary had posted a section under Havildar Malkiat Singh on the flanks, on the Karpola II pass, which commanded the path to Tseng Jong from the west. Havildar Singh descended from the pass when he saw the Chinese approach Tseng Jong, in large numbers from the west. His section opened up with a LMG (Bren Gun) on the approaching PLA troops and mowed them down! The Chinese suffered heavy casualties through this unexpected ambush. After this, a full PLA battalion of 600-800 men attacked the 9 Punjab force of 50 odd men from both west and east. At this point Major Chaudhary requested heavy weapons support from Brigadier Dalvi over wireless. It is to be noted that Major Chaudhary, during his briefing for the operation, had been promised MMG (Medium Machine Gun) and Mortar support, by his two superiors - Brigadier Dalvi (7 Brigade) and Major General Niranjan Pershad (GOC 4 Mountain Division). However, when the time came to provide the promised support, Brigadier Dalvi REFUSED! He later misrepresented the situaion in his self exculpatory book on the battle (The Himalayan Blunder). He gave three reasons- a) There was low ammunition for the MMGs. b) 2 Rajput battalion's men were just moving up in the open for crossing the river and were thus exposed to Chinese counter fire from the opposite heights. c) If the chinese reacted to India's MMG and Mortar fire then there will be high casualties!

Now let us check the facts on the ground vis a vis this bizarre set of excuses given by Brigadier Dalvi: a) Jemadar Mohan Lal, commnanding the MMG platoon ex- 6 Mahar, by the river side, testified in the enquiry commission held later, that he had 12000 rounds of ammunition that day, which was enough to mow down the advancing PLA battalion! So the excuse about ammunition was a lie. b) 2 Rajput was supposed to advance behind Major Chaudahry's small 9 Punjab force and attack towards Thag la pass, once Tseng Jong had been secured. To be noted, this entire battle raged through the late morning hours. So why was 2 Rajput not in a position by that time, on the northern side of the river, ready to exploit 9 Punjab's initial success? Why were troops moving up willy nilly, late in the morning, in broad daylight, in the open and vulnerable to PLA fire from opposite heights? To be further noted, the 2 platoons from 9 Punjab had started deploying north of the river, on the heights, starting 8th October. By 9th october evening they were all in place. So why hadn't 2 Rajput been deployed across the river overnight, under darkness on the night of 9th - 10th October? How is this "Nehru's fault"? c) Jemadar Mohanlal testified after the war that he was ready and keen to open up with his MMGs when the PLA unit was deploying, to attack Major Chaudhary's men, across his line of sight, in the open. He said that when Brig Dalvi expressed concern about Chinese reaction and counter fire, he advised Dalvi and the seniors to move away fromn the river side and to remain under cover, when he opened up with MMGs. But Dalvi simply refused to give the order to provide the promised fire support to 9 Punjab. At that moment there were three senior officers present by the river side- Brigadier Dalvi, Maj General Pershad and Lt. Genral B.M. Kaul, the GOC IV Corps. Not one of them could bring themsleves to do the needful as per the standard operation drill, in an infantry attack!

Subsequently on the day of the actual battle of Namka Chu (20th October 1962), when the chinese having stealthily crossed the river overnight and having surrounded the 2 Rajput area, actually attacked, the expected happened. Except for 2 Rajput which was directly attacked and some sub units of 1/9 Gurkhas behind the Rajputs, on the heights, no other infantry stood and fought! 9 Punjab (less company) and 4 Grenadiers (less 2 companies) on the right flank of 7 Brigade's positions, simply withdrew when ordered (by 4 Div's Tac HQ) and didnt deploy tactically to hold the fall-back positions on the Hathung la heights. The Chinese came and swamped the entire right flank, at leisure, the next morning, having wrapped up the left flank on 20th. The same 9 Punjab which displayed such valour on the 10th simply melted away! Military logic would put the responsibility squarely on Brigadier Dalvi and to a lesser extent on Maj Gen Pershad. By letting down Major Chaudhary's force on the 10th and denying them heavy weapons support as promised, they had destroyed the command credibility of 7 Brigade and sapped the fighting morale of its men. They knew that their commanders would not support them when it came to the actual fight. To make matters worse Brig Dalvi had not tested the wire-less communication devices for effectiveness under prevailing conditions. So on the morning of the 20th, no signals devise worked! Dalvi had NO Command and Control of his brigade and abandoned them to their fate by mid morning. It was a pure military failure later on politicsed and rationalised. My sources are impeccable and incontrovertible- 1. HBR (Henderson Brooks Report) available in the open net. 2. Indian Army's Official history of the war by Colonel Athvale and Dr. Sinha 3. 1 Sikh's Brigadier Injo Gakhal (R) who provided information on Capt Prasad's patrol. 4. Maj General Krish Khorana (R) who was then with 1 Sikh, was Captain Prasad's friend and junior and who fought in the victorious battle on the Bumla axis, on 23rd October. 5. Brigadier A.J.S(Tiger)Behl, who fought in the Namka Chu battle as the Gun Position Officer, of the 17 Para Field (artillery)Regiment, E Troop and held on to his position with 34 men, till 3.30 in the afternoon, long after Brigadier Dalvi had fled! Libertarian196 (talk) 10:27, 1 November 2023 (UTC)Reply

I appreciate the time you have taken in writing this; However, it would be more productive if you could propose specific changes in the format change X to Y as an edit request. Alternatively, once you are a WP:AUTOCONFIRMED editor, you will be able to directly contribute to the ongoing improvement of this article. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:43, 2 November 2023 (UTC)Reply

Thanks. I have given these inputs vis a vis the section on "Confrontation at Thagla Ridge (Sino India War). There a

re other corrections/additions I wish to make, once I get used to how this thing works. The section of Forward Policy, for instance needs improvement. As do sections on political and higer command role in the build up to the debacle. Libertarian196 (talk) 10:37, 8 November 2023 (UTC)Reply