Battle of Hatcher's Run

As 1865 dawned, Union commander-in-chief, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had reasons for optimism. Major General William T. Sherman’s army prepared to march northward through South Carolina. Federal troops had crushed Confederate armies in Tennessee and the Shenandoah Valley. Wilmington, the last Rebel Atlantic port, was cut off and soon would fall.^[2] The Confederates’ main force, commanded by Gen. Robert E. Lee, remained confined around Richmond and Petersburg. Everything had remained relatively quiet there since Grant’s seventh offensive in early December, which disrupted the Weldon Railroad to Bellfield, 40 miles south of Petersburg.^[3]

 

On February 3, a peace conference occurred on the steamship River Queen, moored in Hampton Roads. Although cordial, the negotiations quickly collapsed.^[4][5] As the Confederate delegates returned to Richmond and the winter weather temporarily abated, Grant was eager for further action around Petersburg. Intelligence reached Grant that Confederate supply trains reaching Belfield were unloaded into wagons and floated up the Meherrin River and onto Petersburg via Boydton Plank Road. With this in mind, Grant developed a plan targeting the Belfield Confederate stores.         

 

Around noon on Saturday, February 4, Grant explained his idea to the Army of the Potomac commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade. Grant proposed sending Maj. Gen. David McM. Gregg’s cavalry division on a raid to Belfield to destroy or capture as much as possible of this supply route that was supporting the Rebel war effort about Petersburg. An infantry corps would travel towards Stony Creek to support the cavalry. Grant wanted the cavalry to move out at 3:00 a.m. the next day if possible. To maximize speed, they should take no wagons, artillery, few ambulances, and minimal forage and rations. Similarly, the infantry would travel lightly, with accompanying artillery kept to no more than one battery per division.^[6]

 

After reflection, at 4:30 p.m. Meade wrote to Grant proposing a substantive modification. Rather than sending Gregg’s cavalry 40 miles south to Belfield, Meade suggested they move south for ten miles before heading west to Dinwiddie Court House on Boydton Plank Road. He reasoned they could intercept Confederate supply wagons there just as easily as at Belfield. The 5th Corps would march to the western end of Vaughan Road to support the cavalry. To cover Warren’s rear, two 2nd Corps divisions (Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys commanding) would move a few miles southwest and take up positions on two Hatcher’s Run crossings. Here, they would block Confederate forces in their works defending Boydton Plank Road from moving out and cutting off any Federal troops from the main Union lines.^[6]

Meade’s plan retained the same objective as Grant’s initial idea but involved traveling shorter distances with the three Union forces remaining closer. This reduced the chances of the Rebels isolating and attacking one of them. Furthermore, a Confederate cavalry division known to be around Belfield would have a greater distance to cover to trouble the Union forces.

Acutely aware of public backlash to failed military operations, Meade asked Grant, if the objectives of the raid were commensurate with any disappointment the public would express if the mission didn’t achieve some striking result?” At 6:45 p.m., Grant replied to Meade, agreeing to all the changes, and assured him that the objects of the mission were important and that the subsequent operation reports, would satisfy the public.^[7]

 

An hour later, Meade messaged Grant, saying that the orders were all issued; the cavalry would move at 3.00 a.m. and the infantry at 7.00 a.m. The Union’s eighth Petersburg offensive was about to commence.

Commentators have claimed that the offensive's aim was to threaten the Confederate right flank and seize the Southside Railroad,^[8] which, if accomplished, would have doomed both Petersburg and Richmond. Grant’s sixth Petersburg offensive (October 27, 1864) had this aim,^[9] but the February offensive was not a rerun of that offensive. The goal was a cavalry raid supported by infantry to disrupt an enemy supply route.

February 5, 1865

David Gregg’s Cavalry Raid

Gregg’s cavalry division left their camps around Fort Blaisdell at 3.00 a.m. and headed south to Malone’s Crossing, before riding west to Malone’s Bridge, spanning Rowanty Creek. About 30 Confederate pickets (13th Virginia Cavalry) defended the crossing. After a brief skirmish, troopers from the 13th and 2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry overwhelmed the Confederates, who fled, losing over ten men captured.^[10][11] Confederate cavalry commander, Maj. Gen. W. H. F. "Rooney" Lee one of Robert E. Lee’s sons, was inspecting the pickets and narrowly avoided capture.^[12][13]

The Union cavalry continued west along difficult winter roads. They reached Dinwiddie C.H. around 1.00 p.m. to discover the Confederate supply route effectively abandoned. They patrolled up and down Boydton Plank Road but added little to their meager haul. Meade’s official report claimed that the raid captured 18 wagons and 50 prisoners.^[14][15] Grant’s intelligence had been outdated, and the offensive, as defined, was futile. Around 3.30 p.m., Gregg’s cavalry headed back towards Malone’s Bridge, where they would bivouac and await further orders. At 4.20 p.m., Gregg sent dispatches to Meade and Warren outlining his activities.^[16][17]

Warren’s Activities

Warren’s 5th Infantry Corps left their camps along Jerusalem Plank Road at 7.00 a.m. and headed south to Rowanty Post Office before heading west for three miles to Monk’s Neck Bridge spanning Rowanty Creek. Here, Warren discovered the bridge destroyed and 100 Confederates in rifle pits defending the crossing on the opposite bank. The 190th Pennsylvania and 4th Delaware of Brig. Gen. James Gwyn’s brigade (Maj. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres' division) were tasked with securing the crossing.^[18][19][20] The creek was deep and partially frozen over. Some soldiers felled trees across the water and carefully walked across. Where the ice was thick, soldiers could reach the opposite bank. Some soldiers tried swimming across the frozen creek. By whatever means, sufficient Federals eventually got across the creek and overpowered the Confederates who fled. Around 11.00 a.m., the crossing was in Union hands at a cost of eight wounded, including Maj. Daniel H. Kent, the 4th Delaware commander. The Confederates (affiliation unknown) lost 25 men captured.^[21] Both Lt. David E. Buckingham and Capt. S. Rodmond Smith of the 4th Delaware received Medals of Honor for their heroics in swimming the frozen Rowanty Creek.^[22] Warren’s engineers constructed a bridge suitable for infantry and cavalry by 12:45 p.m. However, they only completed a sturdy structure to support artillery and wagon trains by about 3:45 p.m ^{[23] [24]}.  The 5th Corps continued marching west. As they reached Vaughan Road, they took up their agreed positions near the Hargrave house, around three miles from Dinwiddie C.H. By around 5.00 p.m., all the soldiers had reached their base, and after a march exceeding 15 miles, the 5th Corps settled down by their early-evening campfires and awaited further orders.^[25]

Humphreys’ Activities

The third Federal force in the Offensive entailed two divisions of the 2nd Infantry Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Humphreys. They left their camps around Fort Seibert at 7.00 a.m. and reached the McDowell house on Vaughan Road within an hour. Humphreys ordered Brig. Gen. Régis de Trobriand’s brigade ( Maj. Gen. Gershom Mott’s division) to capture the Hatcher’s Run crossing of Vaughan Road two miles hence. Colonel William A. Olmstead’s brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas Alfred Smyth’s division) was ordered to secure the Hatcher’s Run ford at Armstrong’s Mill.^[26][27][28] Confederate pickets from Brig. Gen. John Pegram’s division defended both crossings.^[29] By 10.30 a.m., the Federals had captured both strategic crossings with a loss of fewer than 20 men. During the afternoon, Humphreys’ men strengthened both crossings. They made contact with Warren’s 5th Corps further down Vaughan Road. North of Armstrong’s Mill, Humphreys’ men began digging in, forming a line east and west of Rocky Branch, around 1000 yards south of the main Confederate works protecting Boydton Plank Road.^[30] Humphreys discovered that he didn’t have enough soldiers east of Rocky Branch to stretch from a swamp protecting the right flank to his Union soldiers west of the stream. He called up Brig. Gen. John Ramsey’s brigade (from his remaining 2nd Corps division in the Petersburg trenches) who arrived just before 4.00 p.m.^[31]

The Confederate Response

Grant’s Offensive had caught the Confederates off guard. Perhaps they weren’t expecting an advance in the middle of winter? News of the events only reached Robert E. Lee in the late morning while attending Sunday church in Petersburg.^[32] He rushed back to his lines and met with Corps commanders Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon and Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill. They were concerned about Humphreys’ men entrenching around 1000 yards from their main works protecting Boydton Plank Road. Something had to be done. Lee sent a brief message to Richmond outlining the situation and that he was preparing to meet the advance.^[33]

The Confederates prepared to attack the Union II Corps. East of Rocky Branch, Brig. Gen. John Rogers Cooke’s Brigade of North Carolinians, Brig. Gen. William McComb’s Brigade of mostly Tennesseans and Brig. Gen. William MacRae's Brigade of North Carolinians, all from Maj. Gen. Henry Heth’s Division (Hill’s Third Corps), received orders to attack. This force comprised nearly 4,000 men). Heth’s other brigade, the Mississippians, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis (a further 828 men) remained in the Rebel defenses as reserves. The combative Brig. Gen. MacRae was on leave throughout the battle, a fact overlooked by some historians.^[34][35]

West of the stream, Brig. Gen. Clement A. Evans’s division (Gordon’s Second Corps) also received orders to advance. This force (over 2,600 men) comprised three brigades: Brig. Gen. William R. Terry's Virginia Brigade, Col. William R. Peck’s Louisiana Brigade, and Col. John H. Baker’s Georgia Brigade.^[36][34]

Soon after 4.00 p.m., the Confederates attacked. East of Rocky Branch, they drove the Union pickets back into the still-forming Federal line. Brig. Gen. Robert McAllister’s brigade moved to their left to accommodate the arrival of Ramsey’s brigade. However, there still were insufficient soldiers to reach Rocky Branch. Furthermore, the nascent earthworks were not long enough to accommodate all of McAllister’s men. The far left regiment (8th New Jersey) was wholly exposed.^[37][38]

 

West of the stream, the Confederate attacks failed to penetrate the Union picket line formed by the 182nd New York Infantry Regiment. Smyth redirected his two sections of artillery (8th Massachusetts Artillery) to fire across the stream and into the Confederates, charging towards the gap in the Union line and the exposed 8th New Jersey soldiers. The enfilading cannon fire and McAllister’s musketry forced the Confederates back. The Confederates charged again and met with the same fate. The exposed 8th New Jersey stood resolute. West of the stream, Evans’s men again failed to break the sturdy Union picket line. However, a Confederate sharpshooter hit brigade commander Col. Mathew Murphy in the leg as he dismounted his horse. Although not considered a severe wound, it developed complications, and he died on April 16, 1865. Murphy was the most senior Union officer to die as a result of the battle.^[39][40][38]

Lee and his generals called for a third attack east of the stream. Who participated in this final assault is unclear. Many soldiers in Heth’s three brigades were worn out and refused to advance again. Eyewitnesses reported that elements of Mahone’s Division (which had recently arrived from Petersburg) took part in the third attack. William Mahone was on leave, and Brig. Gen. Joseph Finegan commanded the division.^[35] Another eyewitness suggested that Heth’s reserve brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph Davis also participated in the final attack.^[41] Other accounts claimed that Brig. Gen. Philip Cook’s Brigade was also involved.^[42][43] Whichever Confederate units took part, the result was the same: the Federals beat them back. Late in the fighting, McAllister’s division commander, Maj. Gen. Gershom Mott sent Brig. Gen. George West’s brigade to support him. Accounts are divided as to whether these reinforcements arrived just in time to repel the third Confederate attack or whether the Confederates were already beaten before West arrived.^[44][45] As night descended, the battered Confederates returned to their defences.

Meade Consolidates his Forces

The Federals were jubilant at winning such a resounding victory. Praise was especially given to the two sections of artillery west of Rocky Branch and McAllister’s brigade that bore the brunt of the fighting.^[46] However, Meade and Humphreys were troubled. They realized that they had had a lucky escape, and they feared that the enemy would regroup overnight and attack again in the morning. With Grant’s blessing, Meade ordered Warren and Gregg to march their forces as soon as possible to the Hatcher’s Run crossing of Vaughan Road. Meade also called up reinforcements to the position, namely Maj. Gen. Frank Wheaton’s division (6th Corps) and Brig. Gen. John F. Hartranft’s division (9th Corps). Overnight, these Union forces reached Humphreys’s endangered position.^[47]

February 6, 1865

Morning Activities

As dawn broke and the Union forces consolidated around Humphreys’ location, Meade felt less anxious. He ordered Warren and Humphreys to probe their fronts to discover the Confederates' whereabouts. Any Confederates found outside their works were to be driven back into their defences. No assaults on defended positions were to occur.^[48] Humphreys sent a few regiments under De Trobriand, who probed beyond the Thompson house. Upon discovering no enemy in the open, they returned and reported their findings.^[49] Meanwhile, Warren remained inactive; the orders he received were ambiguous, and he passed the morning trying to clarify what he was supposed to do.^[50]

From the Confederate side, Lee had pulled back all his forces into their trenches. He sent Mahone’s Division back to Petersburg, as he constantly had to juggle his troops to cover his 30-mile line of Petersburg trenches.^[51] However, something strange was happening on the far right of the Confederate line.

Pegram Splits his Force

John Pegram’s division (2,400 men) guarded the right of the Confederate trenches around the Crow house. They also blocked any Union advance to Burgess Mill on the Boydton Plank Road and beyond to the Southside Railroad. Around 11.00 a.m. Pegram went with two of his brigades (commanded by Brig. Gen. William G. Lewis and Col. John S. Hoffman) south down Quaker Road before turning left up Vaughan Road, where they joined some dismounted Confederate cavalry (commanded by Brig. Gen. Richard L. T. Beale) who had been skirmishing with Gregg’s Union cavalry all morning.^[52][36]

 

This movement left only Brig. Gen. Robert D. Johnston’s Brigade (less than 800 men) to protect the vulnerable Confederate right flank. Johnston was on leave, and Col. John W. “Gimlet” Lea commanded the brigade, a fact some authors haven’t recognized.^[53] Who, if anyone, ordered Pegram to split his division is unknown. What he aimed to achieve is equally a mystery. An eyewitness recalled that Pegram had met with his corps commander, Maj. Gen. Gordon the night before, where Gordon had told him to expect a Union assault on his line in the morning.^[54]

Warren Finally Acts

Shortly after noon, Warren resolved his communication problems, and following a visit from Meade, he prepared to act. At 1.15 p.m., Warren ordered Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford and Maj. Gen. Ayres to move their divisions out of the Hatcher’s Run earthworks, march down Vaughan Road, turn right up the narrow Dabney’s Mill Road, and head towards Dabney’s Mill. He also ordered Gregg’s cavalry to charge down Vaughan Road and clear it of the dismounted enemy cavalry he'd been skirmishing with all morning.^[55] This was not a “probe” as Humphreys had executed but a “reconnaissance in force.” What Warren and Meade were hoping to achieve with this action is unknown. These Union and Confederate movements meant that combat was inevitable along Vaughan Road and around Dabney’s Mill.

Fighting Along Vaughan Road, 1.30 – 5.00 p.m.

As ordered, David Gregg sent two of his cavalry brigades (Brig. Gen. John Irvin Gregg and Brig. Gen. Henry Eugene Davies commanding) down Vaughan Road to push back the Confederate dismounted cavalry. They were surprised when they also encountered Pegram’s two infantry brigades. The Confederates heavily defeated the Union troopers, who fled back up the road. They suffered over 100 casualties, including both brigade commanders J. Gregg and Davies wounded.^[56][57] Four Federal troopers received Medals of Honor as a consequence of this fighting.^[58] The Confederates gleefully charged after the fleeing Federals. A nearby Union infantry brigade (Brig. Gen. Frederick Winthrop commanding) went to support the cavalry, and they managed to halt the Confederate advance. For the next hour, Winthrop’s man tussled with Pegram’s force.^[59] Pegram’s larger force slowly pushed Winthrop’s Federals back, and as they began to run out of ammunition, they called for support. From the Union reserves, the Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Sickels’ brigade arrived around 3.00 p.m. and not only halted Pegram’s force but routed it, sending the Confederates into the woods for cover.^[60][61] Pegram managed to regroup his soldiers, and at around 3.30 p.m., they headed north across difficult terrain to join their comrades around Dabney’s Mill.^[62][63] Elements of David Gregg’s cavalry patrolled down Vaughan Road and by 5.00 p.m. had cleared it of enemy troops, thus fulfilling their orders of nearly three hours earlier.^[64]

Fighting around Dabney’s Mill 1.30 – 5.00 p.m.

Five Union brigades (over 7,000 men) advanced along the narrow Dabney’s Mill Road towards where Gimlet Lea’s small Confederate brigade (775 men) occupied nascent earthworks around the site of Dabney’s Mill. Despite Warren’s overwhelming numerical superiority, due to the narrowness of the road and the surrounding dense woods, he could not get all his force to the front at once.

The steam sawmill had been destroyed; what remained was a massive pile of sawdust in a clearing with the Confederate earthworks; all around was dense woods. Many of the soldiers remembered the sawdust pile in memoirs and it provided a focus of the fighting that afternoon.^[65][66] As Warren’s lead regiments began to tangle with Lea’s soldiers, an early casualty was the death of “Sallie,” the famed 11th Pennsylvania mascot dog, who was subsequently memorialized in marble at Gettysburg.^[67]

Dense woods, swamps, and ravines surrounded the clearing, and the ground was slick with ice and mud, not ideal for conducting military operations. As the Federals pushed back Lea’s Confederates towards the Crow house, Rebel Corps commander Gordon eventually realized that Lea’s men faced being swept away by the advancing massive blue force. Gordon sent for reinforcements from the Rebel trenches to his left. At 2.30 p.m., Evan’s division (2,700) arrived and not only stopped the Federal advance but pushed them back beyond the sawdust pile.^[68][69] Warren got more of his men to the front (from Ayres’ division), and they once more pushed Evans and Lea back beyond the mill. The Rebels regrouped and counterattacked, sending the Federals back past the sawdust pile.^[70][71] At 4 p.m., Warren called for support in the form of Brig. Gen. Alfred L. Pearson’s reserve brigade. They arrived around 4.30 p.m., and went to the Union left and, with Col. Richard N. Bowerman’s brigade, prepared to attack the Rebel right held by Gimlet Lea’s men.^[72][73]

 

At this exact time, Pegram and his two brigades arrived. Pearson and Bowerman attacked, and Pegram perished in a hail of bullets. The same volley seriously wounded Col. Hoffman, one of his brigade commanders.^[63][74] But with the arrival of two extra Confederate brigades, the Union attack failed, and the Federals retreated. Around 5.00 p.m., after three hours of constant fighting, a brief lull overcame the battlefield. The Federal line retired about 200 yards southeast of the sawdust pile and started digging in.^[75][76] The Confederates had much reorganizing to do. They had lost a divisional and brigade commander, and a gap had developed in their line. Pegram was the most senior officer killed during the Offensive. Three weeks earlier, he had married the famed Southern belle Hetty Cary.^[63]

Finegan Routs the Federals

Just after 5 p.m., with the Union troops entrenching and awaiting reinforcements from the South. Confederate Brig. Gen. Finegan arrived with Mahone’s division. These five veteran brigades not only resolved the gap in the Rebel line but spearheaded an all-out assault on the Union position.^[77][78]

 

What happened next, some Federal combatants called the “great skedaddle.” The Union line first buckled and then broke; panic-stricken Federals stampeded to the rear in an embarrassing rout. The jubilant Confederates chased after them for over a mile. The bluecoats managed to reach the sanctuary of the recently created Union earthworks along Hatcher’s Run. Various factors contributed to this Union debacle. Many of their soldiers were inexperienced and low on ammunition. Widespread friendly fire enhanced the panic. With night falling, the fighting fizzled out.^[79]

Overnight, a winter storm occurred with gale-force freezing winds, snow, hail, and sleet. The tired and hungry soldiers had no protective materials, and little food available. Many of the wounded left on the battlefield froze to death. The triumphant Confederates deployed a strong picket force and strengthened their works around the sawdust pile.^[80][81][82]

February 7, 1865

One Final Federal Assault

As dawn broke, there was little enthusiasm to continue fighting - except for Warren. Grant and Meade were concerned about the morale of Warren’s men given the previous evening’s “disaster,” as Meade called it. Warren suggested returning to the battlefield and pushing the strong Confederate picket line (composed of elements from Mahone’s Division) back to their defenses at Dabney’s Mill. Meade agreed.^[83] In mid-morning, Warren ordered Crawford’s division (~3,000 men) out of their earthworks and back onto the battlefield. Amid another winter storm, they started pushing back the Confederate pickets. Progress was slow but steady, and the fighting was intense at times.^[84][85] Confederate Brig. Gen. Moxley Sorrel was seriously wounded in this fighting.^[86]

 

By late afternoon, Crawford had pushed the Confederate pickets back to their Dabney’s Mill breastworks. Warren reported back, and Meade recommended that he return to the Union works along Hatcher’s Run and not attack a defended position.^[87] Whether this order was received in time or Warren just wanted to push things is unknown. He ordered Crawford to attack the Rebel position at Dabney’s Mill, which by now contained artillery. At 6.00 p.m. (in near darkness), Crawford gave the order “charge.” The Confederates soundly repelled the Union soldiers. Another assault produced the same result. The Federals finally withdrew to the woods for cover.^[88][89] Here they endured another bleak night of hunger, wet and cold, before in the early hours of February 8, they retired to the Union lines along Hatcher’s Run, thus ending Grant’s 8th Petersburg Offensive ^{[88] [90] [91]}[66].

Union troops extended their siegeworks to the Vaughn Road crossing of Hatcher's Run. The Confederates kept the Boydton Plank Road open, but were forced to extend their thinning lines.

On April 21, 1896, Union assistant surgeon Jacob F. Raub was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the battle.^[92]

The Civil War Trust (a division of the American Battlefield Trust) and its partners have acquired and preserved 387 acres (1.57 km²) of the battlefield in four different transactions dating back to 1990.^[93]

• National Park Service battle detail page
• Petersburg National Battlefield battle description
• Civil War Preservation Trust
• CWSAC Report Update
• Confederate Order of Battle for Hatcher's Run (Nigel Lambert)

37°07′50″N 77°29′07″W / 37.1305°N 77.4853°W / 37.1305; -77.4853