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China shock

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The China shock (or China trade shock) is the impact of rising Chinese exports on manufacturing employment in the United States and Europe after China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.[1][2] Studies have estimated that the China trade shock reduced U.S. manufacturing employment by 550,000 (explaining about 16% of the total decline in manufacturing employment in the U.S. between 2000 and 2007),[3] 1.8-2.0 million,[4] and 2.0-2.4 million.[5] Losses in manufacturing employment have also been observed in Norway,[6] Spain,[7] Canada,[8] and Germany.[9] Studies have shown that there was "higher unemployment, lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in local labor markets" in U.S. regions that have industries that competed with Chinese industries.[10]

A 2023 review of existing economic research concluded that US-China trade since the early 2000s caused aggregate welfare gains in both countries; had winners and losers in the US; and was not a leading cause of manufacturing employment decline in the US.[11]

Experts have argued that the China trade shock has ended.[1][12][13] In relation to consumer goods, the China shock largely ended by 2006 or 2007[13] while indicating that for capital goods the effects of Chinese imports to the United States continued up until 2012 and are ongoing in specific product categories.[1]

Background

In 1991, China only accounted for 1% of total imports to the United States.[14] Innovations in communications and transportation technology in the 1990s made it easier for firms to offshore production to low-wage countries such as China.[15] China's accession to the WTO meant that it had to liberalize its economy, and reduce state interference, which boosted the efficiency of Chinese exporters.[16] As China already had "most-favored nation" (MFN) status since the 1980s in Europe and the United States, WTO accession did not lead to lower trade barriers.[16] However, China's MFN status had been subject to annual approval by Congress in the United States; research has suggested that this caused uncertainty, and discouraged China-U.S. trade.[16]

Economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon H. Hanson, who have extensively studied U.S. labor markets adjustments to trade competition shocks caused by China,[16] supported the Trans-Pacific Partnership.[17] Autor, Dorn and Hanson argue the adoption of the TPP "would promote trade in knowledge-intensive services in which U.S. companies exert a strong comparative advantage" and pressure China to raise regulatory rules and standards to those of TPP members, while "killing the TPP would do little" to bring manufacturing back to the United States.[17]

Economic impact

Studies have shown that while some markets in the United States suffered adverse welfare and labor impacts, American trade led to net gains in employment and welfare over the period 1991–2011.[4][3][18] These claims have been disputed by Economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson, who state that "at the national level, employment has fallen in the US industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize."[19] A 2017 study found that Germany gained on net from trade.[20] A 2023 study found that increased wealth in China as a result of trade liberalization boosted the American higher education sector, as more Chinese families sent their children to study at American universities and pay tuition.[21]

Political impact

Studies have linked the effects of the China shock to an increase in populism and a backlash against globalization.[22] Studies have shown that British regions that were more exposed to Chinese import competition were more likely to vote for Brexit in the 2016 referendum.[23][24][25] Exposure to the China shock has led to negative views of minorities, in particular among American whites and males.[26]

Papers have found that the China shock has contributed to political polarization.[27] One analysis also found that it contributed to Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 presidential election: "A counterfactual study of closely contested states suggests that Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania would have elected the Democrat instead of the Republican candidate if, ceteris paribus, the growth in Chinese import penetration had been 50 percent lower than the actual growth during the period of analysis. The Democrat candidate would also have obtained a majority in the electoral college in this counterfactual scenario."[28]

In Italy, surges in support for the Lega Nord in the 2010s have been observed in localities where textile mills were undercut by Chinese manufacturers.[29]

Social impact

A 2016 study found that exposure to Chinese import competition led to greater high school graduation rates in the United States. This is possibly because of lower wages and employment opportunities for individuals without high school degrees in regions that competed with China.[30] Economist Samuel Hammond, the director of poverty and welfare policy for the Niskanen Center, has argued that the signing into law of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China on October 10, 2000, and the subsequent accession of China to the WTO has had wide reaching social implications. He states that the "PNTR has been implicated in some of the most significant and distressing trends of American life in this century: millions of well-paying manufacturing jobs lost; declining family formation and rising deaths of despair; soaring real-estate prices and medieval levels of urban inequality; increased political polarization and populist movements, left and right; and faltering faith in the power of liberal democracy to respond to these and related challenges. To pin all this on a single trade agreement would be a step too far, of course. And yet the imprint of what's come to be known as the "China shock" can be seen on all these trends, either through its first-order effects, or its reverberations through the body politic."[31]

According to two studies, trade-related job losses contribute to greater military enlistment in the United States.[32][33]

See also

Further reading

References

  1. ^ a b c Brad W. Setser. "When Did the China Shock End?". Council on Foreign Relations.
  2. ^ Lipton, Gabe (2018-08-14). "The Elusive 'Better Deal' With China". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2019-06-10.
  3. ^ a b Caliendo, Lorenzo; Dvorkin, Maximiliano; Parro, Fernando (2019). "Trade and Labor Market Dynamics: General Equilibrium Analysis of the China Trade Shock". Econometrica. 87 (3): 741–835. doi:10.3982/ECTA13758. ISSN 1468-0262.
  4. ^ a b Feenstra, Robert C.; Sasahara, Akira (2018). "The 'China shock,' exports and U.S. employment: A global input–output analysis" (PDF). Review of International Economics. 26 (5): 1053–1083. doi:10.1111/roie.12370. ISSN 1467-9396. S2CID 168726505.
  5. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Autor, David; Dorn, David; Hanson, Gordon H.; Price, Brendan (2015-12-21). "Import Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s" (PDF). Journal of Labor Economics. 34 (S1): S141–S198. doi:10.1086/682384. hdl:1721.1/106156. ISSN 0734-306X. S2CID 14134863.
  6. ^ Balsvik, Ragnhild; Jensen, Sissel; Salvanes, Kjell G. (2015-07-01). "Made in China, sold in Norway: Local labor market effects of an import shock". Journal of Public Economics. The Nordic Model. 127: 137–144. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.08.006. hdl:11250/196942. ISSN 0047-2727. S2CID 14918934.
  7. ^ Donoso, Vicente; Martín, Víctor; Minondo, Asier (2015-01-01). "Does Competition from China Raise the Probability of Becoming Unemployed? An Analysis Using Spanish Workers' Micro-Data". Social Indicators Research. 120 (2): 373–394. doi:10.1007/s11205-014-0597-7. ISSN 1573-0921. S2CID 55904167.
  8. ^ Kovak, Brian; Morrow, Peter (2024). "The Long-Run Labor Market Effects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement - The Review of Economic Studies". Review of Economic Studies.
  9. ^ Dauth, Wolfgang; Findeisen, Sebastian; Suedekum, Jens (2014). "The Rise of the East and the Far East: German Labor Markets and Trade Integration". Journal of the European Economic Association. 12 (6): 1643–1675. doi:10.1111/jeea.12092. hdl:10419/88626. ISSN 1542-4774. S2CID 11039378.
  10. ^ Hanson, Gordon H.; Dorn, David; Autor, David H. (2013). "The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States". American Economic Review. 103 (6): 2121–2168. doi:10.1257/aer.103.6.2121. hdl:1721.1/95952. ISSN 0002-8282.
  11. ^ Caliendo, Lorenzo; Parro, Fernando (2023). "Lessons from US–China Trade Relations". Annual Review of Economics. 15 (1): 513–547. doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-082222-082019. ISSN 1941-1383.
  12. ^ Bonifai, Niccolò W.; Rudra, Nita; Ludema, Rodney; Jensen, J. Bradford (2024-09-12). "America Is Fighting the Wrong Trade War". Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120.
  13. ^ a b Brandt, Loren; Lim, Kevin (2024). "Opening up in the 21st century: A quantitative accounting of Chinese export growth". Journal of International Economics. 150: 103895. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103895. ISSN 0022-1996.
  14. ^ Feenstra, Robert; Ma, Hong; Sasahara, Akira; Xu, Yuan (2018-01-18). "Reconsidering the 'China shock' in trade". VoxEU.org. Retrieved 2019-06-10.
  15. ^ Irwin, Neil (2018-03-23). "Globalization's Backlash Is Here, at Just the Wrong Time". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2019-06-10.
  16. ^ a b c d Autor, David H.; Dorn, David; Hanson, Gordon H. (2016-10-31). "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade" (PDF). Annual Review of Economics. 8 (1): 205–240. doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015041. ISSN 1941-1383. S2CID 1415485.
  17. ^ a b Autor, David; Dorn, David; Hanson, Gordon H. "Why Obama's key trade deal with Asia would actually be good for American workers". Washington Post. Retrieved 24 May 2016.
  18. ^ Galle, Simon; Rodríguez-Clare, Andrés; Yi, Moises (2022). "Slicing the Pie: Quantifying the Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Trade". The Review of Economic Studies. 90: 331–375. doi:10.1093/restud/rdac020.
  19. ^ Autor, David H.; Dorn, David; Hanson, Gordon H. (2016). "The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade". CESifo Working Paper Series.
  20. ^ Suedekum, Jens; Findeisen, Sebastian; Dauth, Wolfgang (2017). "Trade and Manufacturing Jobs in Germany" (PDF). American Economic Review. 107 (5): 337–42. doi:10.1257/aer.p20171025. hdl:10419/149134. ISSN 0002-8282. S2CID 158035589.
  21. ^ Khanna, Gaurav; Shih, Kevin; Weinberger, Ariel; Xu, Mingzhi; Yu, Miaojie (2020). "Trade Liberalization and Chinese Students in US Higher Education". The Review of Economics and Statistics: 1–46. doi:10.1162/rest_a_01378. ISSN 1556-5068.
  22. ^ Broz, J. Lawrence; Frieden, Jeffry; Weymouth, Stephen (2021). "Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash". International Organization. 75 (2): 464–494. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000314. ISSN 0020-8183.
  23. ^ Stanig, Piero; Colantone, Italo (2018). "Global Competition and Brexit". American Political Science Review. 112 (2): 201–218. doi:10.1017/S0003055417000685. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 220040728.
  24. ^ Ballard-Rosa, Cameron; Malik, Mashail A.; Rickard, Stephanie J.; Scheve, Kenneth (2021). "The Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values: Evidence From Local Trade Shocks in the United Kingdom". Comparative Political Studies. 54 (13): 2321–2353. doi:10.1177/00104140211024296. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 92984576.
  25. ^ Steiner, Nils D.; Harms, Philipp (2021). "Trade shocks and the nationalist backlash in political attitudes: panel data evidence from Great Britain". Journal of European Public Policy. 30 (2): 271–290. doi:10.1080/13501763.2021.2002925. ISSN 1350-1763. S2CID 226689961.
  26. ^ Ferrara, Federico Maria (2022). "Why does import competition favor republicans? Localized trade shocks and cultural backlash in the US". Review of International Political Economy. 30 (2): 678–701. doi:10.1080/09692290.2021.1980898. ISSN 0969-2290. S2CID 248439169.
  27. ^ Majlesi, Kaveh; Hanson, Gordon H.; Dorn, David; Autor, David H. (2016-09-01). "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure". CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11511. Rochester, NY. SSRN 2840708.
  28. ^ Autor, David; Dorn, David; Hanson, Gordon; Majlesi, Kaveh (2020-10-01). "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure". American Economic Review. 110 (10): 3139–3183. doi:10.1257/aer.20170011. hdl:10419/260193. ISSN 0002-8282.
  29. ^ Peter S. Goodman and Emma Bubola (2019-12-05). "The Chinese Roots of Italy's Far-Right Rage". New York Times.
  30. ^ Greenland, Andrew; Lopresti, John (2016-05-01). "Import exposure and human capital adjustment: Evidence from the U.S.". Journal of International Economics. 100: 50–60. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.02.002. ISSN 0022-1996.
  31. ^ "The China Shock Doctrine". www.nationalaffairs.com. Retrieved 2024-03-23.
  32. ^ Dean, Adam (2018-12-01). "NAFTA's Army: Free Trade and US Military Enlistment". International Studies Quarterly. 62 (4): 845–856. doi:10.1093/isq/sqy032. ISSN 0020-8833.
  33. ^ Dean, Adam; Obert, Jonathan (2019-10-18). "Shocked into Service: Free Trade and the American South's Military Burden". International Interactions. 46: 51–81. doi:10.1080/03050629.2019.1674298. ISSN 0305-0629. S2CID 211393086.
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