A Robust Efficient Dynamic Mechanism,
Endre Cs\'oka,
from arXiv.org
(2022)
Choice and Market Design,
Samson Alva and Battal Do\u{g}an,
from arXiv.org
(2021)
Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location,
Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam, Barton Lee and Toby Walsh,
from arXiv.org
(2023)
Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets,
Gian Caspari and Manshu Khanna,
from arXiv.org
(2024)
Cross-Game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions,
Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Martin Kocher and Simeon Schudy,
from CESifo
(2021)
Keywords: cognitive ability, cross-game learning, experiment, auction, heuristics, first-price auctions, second-price auctions
A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Analysis in Competing Mechanism Games,
Seungjin Han and Siyang Xiong,
from McMaster University
(2021)
Keywords: competing mechanisms; unified equilibrium analysis; multiple principals
Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities,
Jose H. Blanchet, Martin I. Reiman, Virag Shah, Lawrence M. Wein and Linjia Wu,
from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
(2020)
Large Auctions,
Paulo Barelli, Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson,
from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
(2021)
Score Disclosure,
Levent Celik and Mikhail Drugov,
from New Economic School (NES)
(2021)
Keywords: Monopoly, quality uncertainty, verifiable information disclosure, multi- dimensional types.
A Functional Estimation Approach to the First-Price Auction Models,
Jean-Pierre Florens, Andreea Enache and Erwann Sbai,
from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
(2021)