Vertical Price Restraints and Free Entry Under Asymmetric Information

Leda Maria Bonazzi (), Raffaele Fiocco and Salvatore Piccolo ()
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Leda Maria Bonazzi: University of Essex

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We investigate the impact of vertical price restraints on the free-entry equilibrium and its welfare properties in a vertically related market where manufacturer-retailer hierarchies compete under asymmetric information. We compare the legal regimes of laissez-faire and ban on resale price maintenance (RPM) under different entry decision modes. When the entry decision is taken upstream, laissez-faire generates higher entry and increases consumer surplus, but a ban on RPM enhances total welfare. Socially excessive entry occurs under both legal regimes, and the entry bias declines with the spread of demand uncertainty. Conversely, when the entry decision is taken downstream, a ban on RPM stimulates entry and consumer surplus, but laissez-faire can be total welfare superior. Our results provide antitrust policy implications about vertical price control.

Keywords: asymmetric information; free entry; quantity forcing; resale price maintenance; vertical restraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L13 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Vertical Price Restraints and Free Entry Under Asymmetric Information (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:564

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