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Allocating via Priorities

Jose Alcalde and José Ángel Silva-Reus ()
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José Ángel Silva-Reus: Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica, Postal: Instituto Interuniversitario de Desarrollo Social y Paz. Universidad de Alicante, , Apartado de correos 99, Ctra. San Vicente s/n, 03080 Alicante, Spain

No 13-3, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: We design a mechanism to allocate indivisible objects that combines procedural and distributive fairness. It associates each allocation problem a family of priorities to be used when determining how agents and objects should be matched. The selection of specific priorities, correlated with agents' preferences, guarantees the (ex-ante) equity of the outcome. The analysis of our mechanism, both from the efficiency and the strategic perspectives, enables us to connect the recent literature on random assignment (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) and the traditional analysis of matching mechanisms (Gale and Shapley, 1962).

Keywords: Correlated Priorities; Random Assignment; Serial Rule; Matching Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2013-07-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2013_003

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