Tax-Transfer Policies and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Robin Boadway, Pierre Pestieau and David Wildasin

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it extends previous models of non-cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing both for distortionary taxation of private goods and for subsidies based on contributions to the public goods. Second, it clarifies the type of behavioural and informational assumptions needed to result in neutrality of lump-sum and distortionary policies. The analysis is developed in the context of fiscal federalism.

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1987
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods (1989)
Working Paper: Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods (1989)
Working Paper: Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods (1987)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:682

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