Inventory Holding and a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Joint-Stock Firm

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates a mixed duopoly model in which there is a state-owned firm competing with a foreign joint-stock firm. The following situation is considered. In the first period, each firm non-cooperatively decides how many it sells in the current market. In addition, each firm can hold inventory for the second-period market. By holding large inventory, a firm may be able to commit to large sales in the next period. In the second period, each firm non-cooperatively chooses its second-period output. At the end of the second period, each firm sells its first-period inventory and its second-period output and holds no inventory. The paper traces out the firms’ reaction functions in the mixed duopoly model.

Keywords: Inventory holding; state-owned firm; foreign joint-stock firm; reaction curves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 F23 L30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88223/1/MPRA_paper_88223.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/105315/1/MPRA_paper_105315.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:88223

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