Deadly Contests An economic note on al Qaeda’s reward system

Raul Caruso () and Andrea Locatelli

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The aim of this brief paper is to interpret al Qaeda’s modus operandi in the light of the economic theory of contests. The main idea expressed here is that al Qaeda can be considered as a contest-designer rewarding an indivisible prize. Affiliated groups compete with each other to win the prize. The argument is discussed and some tentative policy prescriptions are presented.

Keywords: terrorism; contest; al Qaeda; open source; reward; prize setting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5448/1/MPRA_paper_5448.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9466/1/MPRA_paper_9466.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Deadly contests: An economic note on al Qaeda's reward system (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:5448

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