Endowment Effects in Contests

Curtis Price () and Roman Sheremeta ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We experimentally study overbidding in contests and find that overbidding is significantly higher when subjects are given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non-monetary utility of winning can partially explain our findings.

Keywords: rent-seeking; contest; experiments; overbidding; endowment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (114)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52103/1/MPRA_paper_52103.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Endowment effects in contests (2011)
Working Paper: Endowment Effects in Contests (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:52103

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