Cross-border Merger, Vertical Structure, and Spatial Competition

Hamid Beladi, Avik Chakrabarti () and Sugata Marjit

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border mergers in industries with a vertical structure. Absent free trade, in a vertically related industry, the downstream firms will not choose the social optimum under spatial price discrimination when none of the downstream firms produce all the varieties that consumers demand. We show that free trade will induce the downstream firms to gravitate toward the social optimum but an upstream merger across borders, under free trade, will pull the downstream firms away from the social optimum back to their autarkic positions.

Keywords: Product-differentiation; Price-discrimination; Spatialcompetition; Firm-location; Cross-border Merger (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 F12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mkt, nep-reg and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cross-border merger, vertical structure, and spatial competition (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:24474

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